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REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECY ACT:
CURRENCY REPORTING AND THE CRIME OF
STRUCTURING
Courtney J. Linn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970
(BSA) requires financial institutions to record (Title I) and
report (Title II) information about their customers'
transactions, particularly those involving large amounts of
currency. 1  The requirements rest on the Congressional
finding that BSA records and reports have a high degree of
usefulness for law enforcement, tax, intelligence, and
regulatory authorities. After a prolonged period of inaction
that lasted well into the 1980s, financial institutions complied
with the BSA's requirements by sending ever-increasing
numbers of reports to the government. This widespread
compliance in turn led money launderers, tax evaders, and
others who did not want the government to know about their
financial activities, to "structure" transactions to evade the
BSA.2
*Courtney J. Linn is of counsel in the Sacramento office of Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP. From 2000 to 2009, he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the
Eastern District of California. In 2008, Mr. Linn received the Attorney
General's John Marshall Award for his work in promoting the use of Bank
Secrecy Act information in law enforcement investigations. The author thanks
Shannon Hodges, John Byrne, Harry Harbin, Les Joseph, Meredith Linden,
Breann Moebius, and Michael Vitiello for their comments on drafts of this
article. I am grateful to McGeorge School of Law and its staff for their support
for this project.
1. See generally Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)
(examining the BSA's recordkeeping and reporting requirements).
2. The term "structuring" refers to the breaking up of a single transaction
into two or more separate transactions, each transaction below a set dollar
threshold, for the purpose of evading the BSA's recordkeeping or reporting
requirements. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136 (1994) (explaining
what it means to "structure" a financial transaction). As will be discussed
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The BSA and its anti-structuring provisions were a
central focus of reforms enacted in Title III of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT
Act) Act of 2001.1 However, outside the financial services
community, few commentators noticed. Fewer still paid
attention to how, after the events of September 11, 2001, law
enforcement agencies made use of a particular kind of BSA
report called a suspicious activity report (SAR). Structuring,
the breaking up of a single transaction into two or more
separate transactions to evade a BSA reporting or record-
keeping requirement, is a principal kind of illegal activity
disclosed in SARs.
In March 2008, news spread that former New York
Governor Elliot Spitzer's downfall was triggered by a SAR
that disclosed his unusual transaction activity.4 The title of
one Newsweek story succinctly made the connection most
commentators had missed up to that point: Unintended
Consequences: Spitzer Got Snagged by the Fine Print of the
elsewhere, the anti-structuring law-31 U.S.C. § 5324-forbids two different
kinds of transactions: (1) those in which the transactor causes, or attempts to
cause, a financial institution to fail in its BSA duty to report or record a
transaction; and (2) those in which the transactor structures the transaction so
as to circumvent the law. United States v. Hill, 171 F. App'x 815, 820 (11th Cir.
2006); United States v. Vasquez, 53 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056, 1059-62 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining the
distinction between § 5324(a)(1) violations and § 5324(a)(3) violations). A third
kind of activity-causing or attempting to cause a financial institution to file a
report or make a record containing a material misstatement or omission of
fact-is outlawed by § 5324(a)(2), but is not topical to this article. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324(a)(2) (2006).
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, §§ 311-13, 319(b), 321, 326, 351-54, 358-59, 361-63,
365-66, 371-72, 115 Stat. 272. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the BSA to
require financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering programs that
included the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; the
designation of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee training program; and
an independent audit function to test programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2006).
4. See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Michael Isikoff, Unintended Consequences:
Spitzer Got Snagged by the Fine Print of the Patriot Act, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24,
2008, at 47; Luke Mullins, Why Spitzer's Banking May Have Tripped Him Up,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 12, 2008, httpJ/www.usnews.com/articles/
business/economy/2008/03/12/why-spitzers-banking-may-have-tripped-him-
up.html; Don Van Natta Jr. & Jo Becker, Bank Reports, Then Wiretapping, Led
to Unraveling of Ring and Its Client 9, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/nyregion/13legal.html.
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PATRIOT Act. The story of a politician with a reputation for
fighting crime brought down by something vaguely connected
to the USA PATRIOT Act was too rich for bloggers and media
commentators to resist. More thoughtful observers, however,
pointed to a more interesting story yet to be told about how,
in a post-9/11 world, the government now uses BSA data to
detect criminal activity.5
This article tells that story. It has been approximately
twenty years since the BSA and its anti-structuring provision
have drawn scholarly attention.6 Much has transpired in
the intervening time. At a theoretical level, this article
challenges policymakers to reexamine the rationale for the
BSA. The BSA regulatory scheme rests on Congress's finding
in 1970, which it reaffirmed in 2001 with the passage of the
PATRIOT Act, that currency reporting has a "high degree of
usefulness" in the investigation and prosecution of tax,
regulatory, and terrorist related criminal activity.7 This
finding suffers from a threshold defect: it may no longer be
true. Truth be told, there are simply too many currency
reports-over 16,000,000 currency transaction reports (CTRs)
were filed by financial institutions in the 2007-2008 fiscal
year-for the government to make full and effective use of
them.8 Except for SARs, which most observers agree are
5. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS ENFORCEMENT 430-31 (Supp. 2008) ("The Spitzer case raises again the
question of how SARs are used, and specifically how investigators sift through
the large numbers of SARs that are filed each year.").
6. The most comprehensive articles to examine the BSA generally, and the
anti-structuring law in particular, date to the late 1980s and early 1990s. See
John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really Assist
the Government?, 44 ALA. L. REV. 801, 810-12 (1993); Jonathan J. Rusch, Hue
and Cry in the Counting-House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy Act, 37
CATH. U. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (1988) (discussing structuring crime as part of
broader defense of BSA and its value to law enforcement); John K. Villa, A
Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering
Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 495-96 (1988) (discussing the crime of
structuring in the context of other BSA provisions and enforcement actions);
Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law:
The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1989).
7. Cal. Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 25 (1974). The Court
explained that the currency transaction reporting requirements were enacted in
1970 because "Congress recognized the importance of large and unusual
currency transactions in ferreting out criminal activity." Id. at 38; see also 31
U.S.C. § 5311 (2006) (setting forth the legislative findings that underlie the
BSA).
8. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
409
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highly useful, law enforcement agencies struggle to measure,
much less communicate, the high degree of usefulness of
currency reports in criminal investigations. 9
If we accept the premise that the government
underutilizes most BSA records and reports, are they still
worth the cost? The answer is "yes," but only if we are
prepared to renew discussions about the rationale for the
BSA. Putting aside Congress's stated rationale, another
rationale now better explains how government agencies
use BSA data. The BSA's reporting and recordkeeping
requirements make it difficult for crime proceeds or sources of
terrorist financing to enter the financial system without
creating a paper trail. 10  Fearful of the paper trail left
through BSA reports and records, criminals and terrorists
engage in evasive and high-risk transactions such as
structuring, making it easier for law enforcement agencies to
detect their transactions amidst the huge volumes of
legitimate transactions that occur each day." In order for
this rationale to gain acceptance, the relationship between
the BSA's reporting and recordkeeping laws on one hand, and
anti-structuring laws on the other, needs to be inverted.
Where the anti-structuring statute once existed to buttress
the BSA's recordkeeping and reporting requirements, the
FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008).
9. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANK SECRECY ACT: INCREASED
USE OF EXEMPTION PROVISIONS COULD REDUCE CURRENCY TRANSACTION
REPORTING WHILE MAINTAINING USEFULNESS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
5 (2008) ("Linking law enforcement's use of CTRs to specific impacts is difficult,
however, because agencies do not track their use of CTRs, which are typically
one of many sources of information used to support investigations."); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
STRATEGY 2 (2007) (calling for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to
"promote consistent reporting of how BSA data is used and the value of BSA
data to the relevant agencies").
10. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank
Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual,
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa aml infobase/pages..manual/OLM_002.htm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009).
11. This rationale helped inform the U.S. Government Accountability
Office's report on the Bank Secrecy Act. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 9, at 5 ("Law enforcement officials noted that CTR requirements also
aid their efforts by making it more difficult for criminals to get their illicit
proceeds into the financial system and forcing them to act in ways that increase
chances of detection-such as smuggling cash or 'structuring' their cash
transactions to avoid CTRs, which often prompts depository institutions to file a
Suspicious Activity Report.").
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latter requirements now exist in large measure to steer
money launderers and others engaged in crime towards
evasive activities such as structuring, thereby increasing
their risk of detection.
What this shift in rationale means for the future of the
BSA and its enforcement provisions is the unifying question
that runs throughout this article. As law enforcement
agencies come to place greater emphasis on less morally
blameworthy financial crime statutes such as structuring,
there is a need to ensure that these statutes are not misused.
The crime of structuring is a creature of our increasingly
bureaucratized system of government;12 nothing makes it bad
to structure currency transactions, except Congress's finding
that the activity frustrates the collection and analysis of
information that has a high value to law enforcement-a
finding that warrants reexamination. As far as regulatory
offenses go, especially one that rests on such a shaky premise,
the elements of the structuring offense include very few
safeguards against ensnaring innocent conduct. There are
few defenses to a structuring charge, and a conviction for
structuring carries the potential for tough penalties that do
not always bear a correlation to the gravity of the underlying
conduct. We should tolerate a relaxed statutory definition of
a regulatory offense and tough-verging on disproportional-
sanctions only for so long as we are continuously prepared to
reaffirm that the anti-structuring law supports a vital
regulatory regime worthy of such sanctions.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF ANTI-STRUCTURING
STATUTE
This section provides an overview of the BSA's reporting
and recordkeeping requirements. 13 It then discusses how the
government's approach to enforcing BSA requirements has
evolved in recent years to place increasing emphasis on
regulatory offenses, such as structuring, as a means of
detecting and prosecuting financial crimes.14 Understanding
12. See JOHN LUKACS, A NEW REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2004) (arguing that American democracy has
been transformed into a bureaucratic system created by and for the dominance
of special interest groups).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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how the government's approach towards BSA enforcement
has evolved leads into a reexamination of the BSA's
purposes.'5
A. An Overview of the Reporting and Recordkeeping
Requirements
Grossly simplified, Title II of the BSA requires financial
institutions, certain trades and businesses, as well as
international travelers, mailers and shippers, to report
transactions and movements involving currency, and, in some
instances, other kinds of monetary instruments, that exceed
$10,000.16 In turn, Title I requires financial institutions to
verify and record information for certain transactions at or
above $3000."1 Wherever we find transactions or money
movements that implicate these thresholds,' 8  we find
opportunities for transactors to engage in structuring.
The BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirements are
implemented through regulations promulgated by a bureau of
the Department of Treasury known as the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN). These requirements are
discussed in greater detail below.
1. The Title II Reporting Requirements
The Currency Transaction Reporting Requirement: First,
and most importantly, the BSA requires domestic financial
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
17. Various Anti-Money Laundering/Bank Secrecy Act Examination
Manuals contain detailed explanations of the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements that apply to different financial services industries. See, e.g.,
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 60-104 (2007),
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa aml-infobase/documents/BSAAMLMan_2007.pdf;
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, BANK
SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL FOR MONEY
SERVICES BUSINESSES 62-91 (2008), http://www.fincen.gov/newsroom/rp/files/
MSBExamManual.pdf.
18. This might occur, for instance, at a bank where a customer seeks to
make a large cash deposit, at a car dealership where a customer seeks to
purchase a vehicle with currency, at an airport where a traveler boards an
international flight with a hoard of monetary instruments, or at a money
transmitting business when a person wishes to initiate a wire transfer in a
large amount.
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institutions and casinos to report to the Department of
Treasury any cash transactions that exceed a certain
monetary threshold, which is currently set at $10,000.19 This
is the so-called Currency Transaction Reporting requirement
(FinCEN Form 104 for financial institutions and FinCEN
Form 103 for casinos).2 ° In the case of financial institutions,
the requirement applies to deposits, withdrawals, and
exchanges of currency, or other payments or transfers by,
through, or to a financial institution in a banking day
involving a transaction (or multiple transactions by or on
behalf of the same person) in currency exceeding $10,000.21 If
the aggregate amount of cash exceeds $10,000, then the
financial institution must file a CTR. In the case of casinos, it
applies to any "cash in" or "cash out" transaction involving
more than $10,000.22 By volume, the approximately
16,000,000 CTRs that are filed each year dwarf all other BSA
19. See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 221, 84 Stat. 1122 (1970)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006)); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1), (2)
(2008). The term "financial institution" is broadly defined to include, among
others, banks, savings and loans, thrift institutions, and entities such as
casinos, telegraph companies, brokers or dealers in securities, check cashers,
and transmitters of funds. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2006); 31 C.F.R. §
103.11(n) (2008).
20. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (implementing the CTR filing requirement for
financial institutions). A risk-based version of the CTR requirement was
promulgated decades earlier. See Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 37,
n.11-12 (1974). However, this precursor to the CTR had limited usefulness
because of uncertainty as to when the reports were required. Id.
The CTR threshold has been set at $10,000 since it was first given effect by
regulations implemented by the BSA. See AM. BANKERS ASS'N, A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR PARTNERSHIP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BANK SECRECY
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REFORM app. D at D1 (2008). Recent efforts to
raise the threshold have been met by strong resistance from the law
enforcement community. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at
18 ("In this regard, many law enforcement officials, including those from ICE,
IRS, and the U.S. Attorney's office, noted that raising the CTR filing threshold
of $10,000 would affect adversely their ability to deter money laundering,
because the CTR threshold corresponds to those set in other anti-money
laundering provisions.").
In 1988, Congress granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to target
certain geographic regions or specific financial institutions and require
additional reporting below the current $10,000 threshold. See 31 U.S.C. § 5326
(2006). However, the authority has not been utilized. In this instance, financial
institutions complained that the burdens of such targeting orders outweighed
their usefulness, and law enforcement agencies substantially agreed. See
Byrne, supra note 6, at 810-12.
21. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1).
22. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(i), (ii).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
reports combined. 23
The completion of a CTR requires a financial institution
or casino to verify and report a great deal of information that
money launderers, tax evaders and others would just as soon
not divulge. In the case of financial institutions, Part I of the
CTR requires identifying information about the person or
persons involved in the currency transaction(s), including the
person(s) conducting the transaction(s) and the person(s) on
whose behalf of the transaction(s) is conducted.24 Part II of
the CTR report requires details about the transactions itself,
such as the date and amount of the transaction.25 Part III
requires information about the financial institution where the
transaction takes place.26  Importantly, for purposes of
identifying structuring offenses, Form 104 requires financial
institutions to identify on the CTR form whether it is being
filed based upon multiple transactions that aggregate to more
than $10,000.27
So-called "domestic financial institutions" are required
to file CTRs28  The term "financial institution" obviously
includes "banks," such as commercial banks, credit unions,
and savings and loans. 29  Less obviously, the term also
encompasses non-bank financial institutions, such as money
services businesses, casinos, commodities brokers and
merchants, brokers or dealers in securities, and telegraph
companies.30
The Form 8300 Requirement: Second, the BSA requires
certain nonfinancial trades and businesses to report the
receipt of more than $10,000 in currency in the sale of goods
23. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 8, at 6.
24. See FinCEN Form 104: Currency Transaction Report,
http://www.fincen.gov/forms/files/finl04_ctr.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2009); see
also Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Treatment of Deposits by Armored
Cars for Currency Transaction Report Purposes, FIN-2009-R002 (2009),
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/guidance/pdf/fin-2009-r002.pdf (discussing
how the CTR requirement applies in the case where unrelated companies
contract with an armored car service to make deposits that collectively exceed
$10,000 in currency).
25. FinCEN Form 104, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312(a)(2), 5313(a) (2006).
29. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(c) (2008).
30. Id. § 103.11(n) (defining the term "financial institution").
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or services. 3 1 This is the so-called "Form 8300"
requirement-a reference to the name of the form commonly
used by filers such as automobile dealers, real estate closing
agents, and attorneys to report large currency transactions.2
Persons who, in the course of a trade or business, receive
more than $10,000 in currency in one transaction (or two or
more related transactions) must file a Form 8300 report with
the government. 3 In total, the government received slightly
fewer than 185,000 Form 8300 reports in fiscal year 2007-
2008. 34
The Form 8300 report has four parts. Part I requires the
filer to identify the person from whom the cash was
received. Part II requires information about the person or
persons on whose behalf the transaction was conducted.36
Part III requires a description of the transaction itself-i.e.,
the date, time, nature of the currency, and amount of
the transaction. 7 Part IV requires information about the
business participating in the transaction.3" The Form 8300 is
unique among BSA reports in that it doubles as a kind of SAR
form as well. A trade or business that believes a customer is
attempting to evade a Form 8300, or is providing false
information, must file a Form 8300 and designate that it is
31. See 31 U.S.C. § 5331(a) (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (2008); see also
I.R.C. § 60501 (2006).
32. The application of the Form 8300 requirement to attorneys has
provoked objections on the grounds that the filing requirement intrudes on the
attorney-client relationship. Some attorneys complete the Form 8300 report,
but omit identifying the source of the funds. The IRS has responded by issuing
a summons to the attorney for information about the source of the funds. In
addressing challenges to these summonses, courts have reached different
results. See, e.g., United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995)
(enforcing summons); United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963 (1st Cir. 1995)
(denying enforcement of summons); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th
Cir. 1994) (enforcing summons); United States v. Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936, 940
(11th Cir. 1992) (enforcing summons). These decisions date to a time when the
Form 8300 requirements fell only within Title 26. It is unclear whether the
force of these challenges may have been blunted when Congress reenacted the
Form 8300 requirement and codified it outside of the tax code. See infra note
41.
33. 31 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(i).
34. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 8, at 6.
35. FinCEN Form 8300: Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000 Received in
a Trade or Business, httpJ/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8300.pdf (last visited Oct.
11, 2009).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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being filed because of the suspicious nature of the
transaction.39
Whereas most currency reporting requirements derive
from the BSA, the Form 8300 requirement has a different
origin. When enacted in 1984, the Form 8300 requirement
was intended primarily as a means of assisting the IRS in
identifying tax evaders, and thus was codified in the Tax
Code.4° In 1998, Congress authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to disclose Form 8300s to officers and employees of
any federal agency for the administration of federal criminal
statutes not related to tax administration. 4' However, the
requirement remained within the Tax Code, meaning that
Form 8300 disclosure for non-tax investigations turned on
disclosure rules that apply to tax returns and return
information.42 In 2001, Congress effectively detached Form
8300s from their tax law origins by reenacting the Form 8300
requirement as part of the BSA. This made it easier for law
enforcement agencies engaged in non-tax investigations to
access Form 8300 information. 43 As of January 1, 2002, Form
8300 disclosures are authorized under the more permissive
disclosure provisions of the BSA and accompanying
regulations.44
The CMIR Requirement: Third, the BSA requires
persons transporting, mailing or shipping more than $10,000
in currency, in or out of the United States to file a FinCEN
Form 105 (formerly Customs Form 4790) with Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), an agency of the Department of
39. Id.
40. See I.R.C. § 60501 (2006); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MONEY LAUNDERING: THE USE OF CASH TRANSACTION REPORTS BY FEDERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2-3 (1991) (discussing the origins of the Form
8300 requirement).
41. See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 66 (2004); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
42. See I.R.C. § 6103(i)(8) (2006); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §§
9.5.5.4.8.4, 9.5.5.4.8.5 (2007) (setting forth the elaborate procedures an IRS
agent must follow to disseminate a Form 8300 under Title 26 authority).
43. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 365(a), 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5331 (2006)).
44. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.5.4.8 (2007) ("The rules under
Title 26 strictly limit (Form 8300] disclosures, whereas the rules under Title 31
are less restrictive.").
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Homeland Security.45 FinCEN Form 105 implements the so
called Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR)
requirement. Unlike virtually all other BSA requirements,
the CMIR requirement imposes obligations directly on the
public at large and applies to the physical cross-border
transportation, shipment or mailing of monetary instruments
in an amount greater than $10,000.46 The government
received approximately 177,000 CMIR reports in fiscal year
2007-2008. 47
The CMIR has four parts.4" Part I requires information
about the person departing or entering the United States, or
shipping, mailing or receiving more than $10,000 in monetary
instruments.49 Part II requires information about the person
on whose behalf the importation or exportation of the money
instruments was conducted.50 Part III requires the filer to
identify the total amount of currency and monetary
instruments subject to reporting;5 1 and Part IV requires the
filer to attest to the truth of the information contained in the
completed CMIR under penalty of perjury. 2
Other Reporting Requirements: There are three other
45. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (2008).
46. See 31 U.S.C. §5316; see also 31 C.F.R. §103.23 (imposing the reporting
obligation on the shipper or transporter of currency).
47. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 8, at 6 n.4.
48. The statute authorizing the filing of CMIRs, 31 U.S.C. § 5316, provides
in part:
(a) Except as provided subsection (c) of this section [a provision
generally exempting common carriers from the CMIR requirement], a
person or an agent or bailee of the person shall file a report under
subsection (b) of this section when the person, agent, or bailee
knowingly-
(1) transports, is about to transport, or has transported, monetary
instruments of more than $10,000 at one time-
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States; or
(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place
outside the United States; or
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one
time transported into the United States from or through a place
outside the United States.
31 U.S.C. § 5316.
49. FinCEN Form 105: Report of International Transportation of Currency
or Monetary Instruments, http'J/www.fincen.gov/forms/files/finl05_cmir.pdf
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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categories of Title II reporting: the Foreign Bank Account
Report (FBAR),5 3 the Foreign Currency Report,54 and, most
importantly, the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).55 These
requirements do not lend themselves to structuring-type
behavior. As discussed in Section B below, however, the SAR
filing requirement relates closely to the crime of structuring.
SARs often report suspected structuring offenses, and thus
lead to initiation of investigations into possible structuring
activity.
2. The Title I Recordkeeping Requirements
Title I of the BSA imposes recordkeeping requirements
upon bank and non-bank financial institutions, such as
53. The FBAR requirement applies to each person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States having a financial interest in, or signature authority over,
foreign bank accounts containing more than $10,000 in funds. 31 U.S.C. § 5314
(2006); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.24, 103.32 (2008). The FBAR is not a currency
reporting requirement and, thus, not susceptible to structuring-type conduct.
The willful failure to file an FBAR is nonetheless subject to criminal
enforcement under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)-(b) and subject to civil enforcement by
the Internal Revenue Service under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) and 31 C.F.R. §
103.56(g).
54. The foreign currency reporting is omitted from this discussion because it
is not the subject of structuring-type conduct and, in any event, Congress has
not imposed criminal sanctions for violations of the foreign currency reporting
requirement. See 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (2006); see also id. § 5322(a), (b) (excepting
violations of § 5315 from the criminal enforcement provisions of § 5322).
55. The SAR filing requirement was first implemented for banks in 1996,
and over the ensuing years has been extended to other financial institutions as
follows:
Table 1. Expansion of SAR filing requirement.
Type of Financial Date of Implementation Regulatory Provision
Institution of SAR Requirement
Depository Institutions April 1, 1996 31 C.F.R. § 103.18
Money Services January 1, 2002 31 C.F.R. § 103.20
Businesses
Broker-Dealers December 30, 2002 31 C.F.R. § 103.19
Casinos March 23, 2003 31 C.F.R. § 103.21
Futures Commission May 18, 2004 31 C.F.R. § 103.17
Merchants
Insurance Companies May 3, 2006 31 C.F.R. § 103.16
Mutual Funds November 1, 2006 31 C.F.R. § 103.15
From 1986 to 1996, banks reported suspicious transactions by checking a
.suspicious transaction" box on a CTR form. See IRS.gov, Currency Reporting-
Money Laundering, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcementlarticle/O,,id=
113003,00.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
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money services businesses. Most importantly for purposes of
this discussion, the BSA and implementing regulations
impose the following two recordkeeping requirements:
Cash Purchases of Bank Checks and Similar
Instruments: Financial institutions must identify and record
information about transactions involving the purchase of
monetary instruments using cash in amounts of $3000 or
more. 5 6  To comply, financial institutions record the
purchaser's name and address, including certain identifying
information such as a driver's license number or date of birth,
the date of purchase, the type of instruments, their serial
numbers, and in the dollar amount each instrument. 7
Strictly speaking, 31 U.S.C. § 5325 is a reporting
requirement, not a recordkeeping requirement. Section
5325(b) provides that "[a]ny information required to be
recorded by any financial institution ... shall be reported by
such institution to the Secretary of the Treasury at the
request of such Secretary."" Consistent with this language,
the anti-structuring statute59  describes § 5325 as a
"reporting" requirement.6 0 For purposes of this discussion, at
least, § 5325 nonetheless resembles a recordkeeping
requirement because, as implemented through regulations,
the requirement acts more as a record creation and
maintenance requirement than it does as a reporting
requirement. 61
Wire transfers: In addition, Title I requires financial
institutions to create and retain records relating to domestic
and international fund transfers in amounts of $3000 or
56. 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to
require financial institutions to verify and record the identity of persons
purchasing cashier's checks and similar instruments with currency); 31 C.F.R. §
103.29 (2008).
The impetus for the recordkeeping requirement for cash purchases of
monetary instruments emerged out of concern that money launderers were
using such instruments to launder their illegal proceeds. See Byrne, supra note
6, at 809-10 & n.36.
57. 31 C.F.R. § 103.29(a)(2).
58. 31 U.S.C. § 5325(b) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 5324.
60. Id. § 5324(a).
61. 31 C.F.R. § 103.29(c) ("Records required to be kept shall be retained by
the financial institution for a period of five years and shall be made available to
the Secretary upon request at any time.").
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more. 62  The requirements are detailed and vary depending
on whether the wire is conducted through a bank or through
a nonbank financial institution.6"
Since its inception in the early 1990s, the recordkeeping
requirement for domestic and international wire transfers
has been the subject of intense debate. Prior to 9/11, the
banking industry complained about the lack of consideration
Treasury officials had given to the costs of implementing the
recordkeeping requirement for wires.64 These objections were
put on hold after 9/11 and the legislative momentum shifted
against the banks. With the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress authorized the
Secretary to prescribe new regulations requiring financial
institutions to report all cross-border wires after submitting a
feasibility report to Congress.65 Moreover, the United States
has been under increased pressure from the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) to either lower the cross-border
recordkeeping threshold or eliminate it all together.66 So far,
the Treasury has done neither.
The BSA's recordkeeping provisions require financial
institutions to verify and record certain identifying
information about the person conducting a financial
transaction at or above a $3000 monetary threshold. As is
true of the reporting requirements, the typical money
launderer, tax evader, or terrorist would just as soon not
share this information. Thus, both of these recordkeeping
requirements are susceptible to structuring-type behavior,
62. See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, §
1515, 106 Stat. 3672, 4058 (1992) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b
(2006)) (authorizing the Secretary and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve to impose recordkeeping requirements on domestic and international
funds transfers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1953(c) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary
of Treasury to impose § 1829b wire transfer recordkeeping requirements on "an
uninsured bank or financial institution" defined in § 5312(a)(2)); 31 C.F.R. §
103.33(e), (f) (2008).
63. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e)(1), (f) (requirements for banks and non-bank
financial institutions).
64. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 818.
65. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 6302, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
66. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, SUMMARY OF THIRD MUTUAL EvALUATION
REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCING,
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (2006) (noting that the United States is
out of compliance with the FATF wire recordkeeping threshold--currently set at
$1000).
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though perhaps not to the same extent as are the BSA Title II
reporting requirements.
B. The Resurgence of BSA Enforcement Efforts
Those familiar with the background of BSA enforcement
may have been surprised by the media attention drawn to the
BSA when the Elliot Spitzer story broke in March 2008. BSA
enforcement had spiked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a
time when the government first pursued banks for non-
compliance with the BSA's currency transaction reporting
requirement and, later pursued their customers for
structuring transactions to evade CTRs.67 Thereafter, in the
years between 1994 and 2002, prosecutions of banks for
noncompliance with the BSA were virtually nonexistent and
structuring prosecutions were almost as rare.6 The
perception existed among commentators that government's
real anti-money laundering efforts seemed to lie elsewhere.
Although there are still some prosecutions for currency
reporting violations and for structuring, the major
prosecutorial focus is now on the money laundering statutes,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957.69 Indeed, prior to the events that
led to former Governor Spitzer's downfall, some
commentators had grown so doubtful that structuring crimes
mattered to anyone that they began to ask whether it was
worth the bother for banks to continue to report structuring-
like behavior in SAR filings."
But just as commentators were beginning to pronounce
67. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.5.3.6 ("The historical emphasis of
the IRS in Title 31 money laundering investigations has related to the failure to
file or the false filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs)...").
68. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENDERS, 1994-2001 (2003),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/mloOl.txt; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 94 (providing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 prosecution
statistics for FY 2004).
69. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 436 (4th ed. 2006). Money laundering and BSA criminal
statutes define overlapping, but different, crimes. Generally speaking, the
money laundering statutes criminalize financial transactions involving the
proceeds of crime. The BSA enforcement statutes criminalize certain conduct
intended to evade the BSA without regard to the source of the funds involved in
the transaction.
70. Robert B. Serino, Viewpoint: SARs Are Useful Only when an Activity Is
Illegal, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 2006, at 9 (asking, "[should there really be
prosecutions for structuring legal funds?").
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the anti-structuring statute to be a "has been" among anti-
money laundering laws, events were unfolding that would
lead the government away from traditional money laundering
enforcement and back towards BSA enforcement. First, aside
from cases involving drugs, guns, and violent crime, or those
that involve professional money launderers, prosecutions for
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 are not what they
used to be. Prior to November 2001, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines) meted out far more
serious punishment for a § 1956 or § 1957 offense than for the
underlying offense that generated the laundered funds.71 In
November 2001, the Sentencing Commission significantly
narrowed this sentencing disparity, especially in white collar
cases where a defendant launders funds incident to
committing the underlying criminal violations. For these
kinds of cases, a prosecutor has less to gain by pursuing a
money laundering charge above and beyond any underlying
charge.72 Second, in 2008 a sharply divided Supreme Court
ruled in United States v. Santos that the term "proceeds,"
71. While there are countless cases that illustrated these former disparities,
none was more significant than United States v. Santos. United States v.
Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008). Santos was convicted of two counts relating to
conducting an illegal gambling business under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and three
counts relating to money laundering offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Id. at
2020. His pre-November 2001 advisory guideline sentence for the gambling
offenses was sixty months; yet his guideline sentence for the later offenses was
210 months. Id. at 2023. The huge disparity-made possible by pre-November
2001 guidelines-weighed upon Justice Stevens. In concurring in the judgment,
he wrote:
Allowing the Government to treat the mere payment of the expense of
operating an illegal gambling business as a separate offense is in
practical effect tantamount to double jeopardy, which is particularly
unfair in this case because the penalties for money laundering are
substantially more severe than those for the underlying offense of
operating a gambling business.
Id. at 2033 & n.6 (discussing the sentencing disparity between a money
laundering conviction and a conviction for the underlying offense, and
explaining how prior to November 2001, the disparity was even greater).
72. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1(b)(2) (2004)
(providing for a one level increase for Section 1957 offenses; and providing for a
two level increase for Section 1956 offenses). The Sentencing Commission
reacted to findings that "from 1992 to 1996, the election to pursue a money
laundering charge in addition to an underlying fraud-related offense would
raise the guideline penalty in [eighty-five] to [ninety-five] percent of the cases."
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: SENTENCING POLICY FOR
MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES, INCLUDING COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE REPORT 8 (1997).
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under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, refers to "profits" as opposed to "gross
receipts," at least on the facts of that case.73  Santos had a
short shelf life; Congress rejected the Santos holding in the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, enacted in May 2009.14
However, Congress tempered its rejection of Santos with the
statement that the Department of Justice should not charge
money laundering on facts similar to those presented in
Santos. Thus, both Santos and Congress's reaction to it have
forced the government to rethink its assumptions about the
reach of §§ 1956 and 1957. 71 The government thought these
statutes reached financial transactions involving the gross
receipt of crime, but, in fact, they may only reach the profits
of crime. For certain white collar offenses such as mail, wire,
or bank fraud, it may prove difficult for the government to
differentiate between the profits of the scheme and the mere
receipts of the scheme.76 The practical consequence of these
two developments-Sentencing Guideline reforms and
Santos-is that §§ 1956 and 1957 are no longer the favored
73. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2020. Because the opinion was so sharply divided,
with no one opinion commanding the assent of a majority of the Justices, it
remains unclear what the effect of the ruling will be going forward. See, e.g.,
United States v. Shelburne, 563 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (W.D. Va. 2008) (rejecting
government's argument that Santos is so fractured that it has no precedential
effect outside the context of the facts presented in the decision itself); see also
United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
74. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)-
(g), 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Grasso, 381 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that "proceeds," in the context of § 1956, means gross proceeds, not net
profits); United States v. lacaboni, 363 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that
"proceeds" means gross proceeds, not net profits). But see United States v.
Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2002).
Five Justices (Justice Stevens, in his plurality decision, joined by the four
dissenting Justices) agreed in dicta that the term "proceeds" means "gross
receipts" in cases involving the sale of contraband. See Santos, 128 S. Ct. at
2032 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that "Congress
intended the term 'proceeds' to include gross revenues from the sale of
contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such
sales").
76. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803 (money laundering statute did not
apply to courts involving the disbursement of funds back to investors in a fraud
scheme); Shelburne, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (stating that expenses of Medicaid
fraud scheme are not "proceeds" within the meaning of Santos); United States v.
Thompson, No. 3:06-CR-123, 2008 WL 2514090, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 19,
2008) (discussing theft of monies violation under 18 U.S.C. § 641); United States
v. Poulsen, 568 F. Supp. 2d 885, 913 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (finding that even under
"profits" interpretation, conviction for laundering Medicare fraud proceeds
survived Santos challenge).
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prosecutorial tools that they once were."
Setbacks for the government in the area of traditional
money laundering prosecutions under §§ 1956 and 1957
merely added momentum to policy shifts that were already
underway. As mentioned, Title III of the PATRIOT Act
included a number of significant reforms to the BSA.78 With
the passage and implementation of these reforms, financial
institutions bore both the added compliance costs and added
scrutiny. 79 Beginning in September 2002, the government
returned to enforcing the BSA requirements aggressively,
particularly the requirement that banks file suspicious
activity reports disclosing crimes such as structuring. 0
Forced by the PATRIOT Act to bear added BSA compliance
burdens, and troubled by the government's increased use of
threatened criminal sanctions to coerce BSA compliance,
financial institutions began to raise questions in Congress
and elsewhere about the value of BSA data to law
enforcement. Was the government even looking at the many
reports that the BSA required financial institutions to
prepare and file?
This pressure prompted the government to disclose a
significant law enforcement initiative that involved the use of
BSA data. The 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy
disclosed that federal law enforcement agencies were
"maintain[ing] robust Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)
review programs and BSA data analysis in order to initiate
and support investigations of attempts to exploit the banking
system for money laundering."8 ' To achieve that objective,
77. On February 5, 2009, Senators Leahy and Grassley introduced a bill
that would amend § 1956 to clarify that the term "proceeds" includes gross
receipts. Press Release, Leahy, Grassley Introduce Anti-Fraud Legislation: Bill
Would Give Federal Government More Resources to Combat Mortgage Fraud
(Feb. 5, 2009), http'J/www.leahy.senate.gov/press/200902/020509b.html.
78. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272.
79. One estimate suggests that industry costs for BSA enforcement
increased sixty-six percent between 2001 and 2004 and another seventy-one
percent between 2004 and 2007. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 20, at 1.
80. See generally Lester Joseph & John Roth, The Criminal Prosecution of
Banks Under the US Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 1 J. SEC. COMPLIANCE 298
(2008) (discussing recent criminal investigations of bank and other financial
institutions for willful failures to adhere to the BSA).
81. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 2; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., NATIONAL ASSET FORFEITURE STRATEGIC PLAN 2008-2012, at
[Vol:50424
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the government promoted the development of SAR review
teams-there are now approximately ninety-five such
teams-to review SARs filed by banks, money services
businesses, casinos, and other financial institutions.12  In
2009, the U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division
joined when it announced it had formed a National
Suspicious Activity Review Team to focus on SARs that
showed a significant international nexus.8 3  BSA/Money
Laundering/Structuring offenses, termed "Code A violations"
in the parlance of the BSA, are, by far, the most prevalent
criminal activity reported in SARs. 4  Thus, structuring
offenses are chief among the kinds of offenses that
SAR review teams investigate. In fact, investigations into
suspected structuring activity form something of a lowest
common denominator. Some SAR review teams may focus on
crimes as diverse as identity theft and mortgage fraud, but
almost all share an interest in pursuing structuring-type
violations.85 Eliot Spitzer's banking activities were detected
49-50 (2008) (calling for efforts to encourage and develop "SAR Review Teams
to analyze and target criminal proceeds within the financial system").
82. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANK SECRECY ACT: SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY REPORT USE IS INCREASING, BUT FINCEN NEEDS TO FURTHER
DEVELOP AND DOCUMENT ITS FORM REVISION PROCESS 26 (2009), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09226.pdf. An early discussion of the
SAR Review Team approach appeared in a Department of Justice publication
in the late 1990s. See Marion Percell, Using Suspicious Activity Reports: A
Task Force Approach, USA BULL., July 1999, at 25,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usab4703.pdf. Those efforts
gathered momentum after the events of 9/11.
83. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 2001-2009 34, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/doj-
accomplishments.pdf.
84. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW-BY THE NUMBERS (2008),
http'J/www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/files/sarbynumb-10.pdf
("BSA/Structuring/Money Laundering continues to be the most prevalent type
of suspicious activity reported by depository institutions, increasing [fifteen
percent] from 2006. Furthermore, this characterization accounts for 47.56 of
activity reported overall since 1996.").
85. One key to understanding why BSA-type offenses are central to most
SAR Review Teams is to understand the mandate of the Internal Revenue
Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). IRS-CI is the lead law enforcement
agency on most government SAR Review Teams. However, IRS-Cl investigative
powers are narrow. The agency may investigate only tax offenses, money
laundering offenses under Title 18, and BSA violations under Title 31.
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.1.2.2(3) (2008) ("The IRS also has explicit
enforcement responsibilities with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. §
1957, dealing with money laundering, and 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., dealing with
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by one of these law enforcement teams.
Not coincidentally, the government's renewed interest in
BSA-type offenses complements its post-9/11 emphasis on
disrupting suspected terrorist financing activity.6 After 9/11,
the government turned to financial crime statutes that it had
used infrequently in preceding years.7 The principal money
laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, remained
useful tools, even after sentencing guideline reforms and
Santos. But in all but one instance, those statutes require
proof that the funds involved in the transaction were derived
from a "specified unlawful activity."88  In international
terrorist financing investigations, evidence of "specified
unlawful activity" may be located overseas or otherwise
difficult to unearth. 9 Even when found, the evidence may
have been obtained using techniques reserved for national
security matters and thus not readily admissible in criminal
proceedings. 90 In fact, if the government could marshal the
evidence needed to convict someone of laundering money to
promote terrorism, it is safe to bet that the government would
mind criminal charges more serious than simply money
laundering in mind. 91
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).").
86. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 12 (2006),
http://www.cbsnews.comhtdocs/pdf/NSCT0906.pdf (stating priority of
disrupting of funding sources for terrorism); see also FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting remarks of FBI Deputy
Director John S. Pistole on the value of BSA data in terrorism investigations).
87. In August 2004, the Department of Justice published an influential
monograph entitled "Terrorist Financing." The monograph includes extended
discussions of alternative remittance systems (sometimes prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. § 1960), the currency reporting statutes, and the crime of structuring.
See David M. Nissman, Terrorist Financing, OLE LITIG. SERIES, chs. 10, 16
(2004); see also Courtney J. Linn, How Terrorist Exploit Gaps in US Anti-Money
Laundering Laws to Secrete Plunder, 8 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 200
(2006) (discussing areas where BSA laws need to be reformed to address the
terrorist financing threat).
88. Except in the case of the international transportation of funds to
promote specified unlawful activity (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A)), all money
laundering offenses require proof that the funds in fact derive from specified
unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)-(3), 1957 (2006).
89. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1998)
(explaining that Congress shaped the penalties for cash smuggling and
reporting offenses because of "problems of individual proof" of another crime).
90. See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L.
No. 95-511, § 106(b), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1806 (2006)).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (providing for a maximum fifteen-year
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In contrast, regulatory offenses, such as structuring or
unlicensed money transmitting, do not necessarily require
proof that the funds involved in the illegal activity derived
from crime or were intended to promote crime. 92  These
statutes define serious regulatory offenses; violations carry
stiff criminal and civil penalties, including asset forfeiture. 93
In prosecuting a domestic regulatory offense like structuring,
the government does not need to get drawn into evidence-
gathering issues that have the potential to derail almost any
international terrorist-financing prosecution. 94 Conveniently
for the government, the best evidence of a structuring
violation can often be found in domestic bank records and
databases housing BSA information. 95 In a post-9/11 era,
what may begin as a terrorism or terrorist-financing
investigation often evolves into an investigation of a possible
BSA-type violations.96
statutory penalty for providing material support to terrorists); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(G) (2006) (providing for the forfeiture of all assets of a person, entity,
or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating a crime of terrorism).
92. See Courtney J. Linn, One-Hour Money Laundering: Prosecuting
Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, 8 U.C.
DAVIS. Bus. L.J. 138, 140 (2007) (discussing the government's increased use of §
1960); see also United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C.
2008) (examining a situation where the government prosecuted a digital
currency payment system operated through the Internet with, among other
things, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100,
133-35 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming in part § 1960 and structuring convictions and
forfeitures for individuals operating a hawala that sent money to Yemen).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (2006) (listing criminal penalties); 31 U.S.C. §
5317(c) (2006) (discussing asset forfeiture); 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(4)(A) (listing
civil penalties).
94. One of the government's earliest post-9/11 "material support"
prosecutions floundered after it encountered just such a problem. See Philip
Shenon, Ex-Prosecutor Acquitted of Misconduct in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ll/0 1us
01detroit.html (detailing how a terrorism conviction was thrown out, and a
federal prosecutor charged and acquitted of intentionally and illegally
withholding photographs of a military hospital in Jordan).
95. See Dennis Lormel, Terrorist Financing: Balancing the Benefits and
Burdens of Reporting Requirements, IPSA INT'L., Feb. 16, 2009,
http://www.ipsaintl.com/news-and-events/articles/pdf/lormel-balancing-the-
benefits.pdf.
96. Consider this example: One of the government's few post-9/11 terrorism
prosecutions involved the prosecution of Umer and Hamid Hayat in the Eastern
District of California. After a mistrial was declared in the prosecution against
Umer Hayat, he entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty not to
making a false statement in connection with a terrorism investigation-as he
had been charged-but with making a false statement in connection with his
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C. The Rationale for Reporting and Recordkeeping
Requirements
A detection rationale underlies each of the reporting and
recordkeeping requirements identified in Part II.A. In
enacting the BSA, the Congress responded to the increased
use of financial institutions by those engaged in criminal
activity.97 It expressly found that reports and records of
certain financial transactions, particularly large and unusual
currency transactions, are highly useful to law enforcement
agencies and taxing authorities in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings.9" In the PATRIOT Act,
Congress reaffirmed the finding that currency transaction
reporting has a high degree of usefulness and that "the
usefulness of such reports has only increased in the years
since the requirements were established."99 Congress also
expanded the finding by determining that BSA records and
reports would have a high degree of usefulness in the conduct
of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including
analysis, to protect against international terrorism. 10 In
sum, to assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts to
failure to file a Form 8300. See Don Thompson, Calif Man Pleads Guilty in
Terrorism Case, WASH. POST, June 1, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/01AR2006060100315.html. What Hayat admitted
to having lied about was not terrorism, but rather the fact that he had
structured large amounts among different travelers of currency by dividing it
into sub-$10,000 amounts to evade a currency and monetary instrument
(CMIR) report when departing abroad. Id.
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-975, at 10 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-1139, at 2, 24
(1970); see also Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1974).
98. See 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 91-875, at 11-12 ("Criminals
deal in money-case or its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawals of large
amounts of currency or its equivalent . . . under unusual circumstances may
betray criminal activity. The money in many of these transactions may
represent anything from the proceeds of a lottery racket to money for the
bribery of public officials."); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,
351 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Congress enacted the [CMIR] reporting
requirement because secret exports of money were being used in organized
crime, drug trafficking, money laundering and other crimes. Likewise, tax
evaders were using cash exports to dodge hundreds of millions of dollars in
taxes owed to the Government.") (citations omitted); Cal. Bankers Ass'n, 416
U.S. at 37 (explaining legislative history of CTR provisions); see also H.R. REP.
No. 99-746, at 17-18 (1986).
99. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 366(a)(1), 115 Stat. 335.
100. See id. § 358(a), (b).
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combat money laundering, the financing of terrorist activities,
and other crimes, Congress has mandated the filing of CTRs,
Form 8300s, and CMIRs. Congress has also required the
maintenance of certain records. These requirements
effectively mandate the creation of a paper trail for large
currency transactions, giving law enforcement authorities a
way to "follow the money" and detect criminal activity. 101
The detection rationale for the BSA requirements,
particularly the CTR requirement, has been the subject of
mounting critical attention. 10 2 Bankers have long suspected
that law enforcement valued CTRs not so much because they
helped to detect crime, but because they helped to deter it. In
the early years of CTR filings, the banking community
criticized law enforcement agencies for not using the data
more actively, a task made difficult by the sheer volume of
CTR filings. 10 3 By 1994, Congress responded to the growing
volume of CTRs by directing the Secretary of the Treasury to
try to reduce the increasing volume of CTR filings by thirty
percent, largely through though the liberalization of
provisions allowing financial institutions to exempt certain
customers from the filing requirement.0 4 Indeed, a key
impetus behind the Money Laundering Suppression Act of
101. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 52 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987)
("The CTR filing leaves the government a 'paper trail' in order to follow the
unusual movement of large amounts of money."); United States v. LBS Bank-
N.Y., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 496, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding, likewise, that the CTR
filing leaves the government a paper trail for the purpose of tracking large
amounts of money).
102. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 803. Some foreign jurisdictions, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Japan for example, have made a studied decision not
to impose a currency transaction reporting requirement. In the case of the
United Kingdom, this policy decision stems from concerns about the costs
implications both to financial institutions, which would bear the cost of
generating the data, and law enforcement, which would bear the cost of
managing it. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT: THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
146 (2007).
103. Henry R. Ray, Dir. Admin. Justice Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs: Money Laundering: The Use of Bank Secrecy Act Reports by Law
Enforcement Could be Increased 1, 8 (1993); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 9, at 13; see also FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: USE OF CURRENCY
TRANSACTION REPORTS 2 (2002).
104. Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 402,
108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2006)).
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1994 was a desire to simplify and streamline the CTR filing
process and "reduce the number and size of [CTRI reports
consistent with effective law enforcement."105
Law enforcement agencies blunted that criticism in
recent years by using technology to make better use of the
bulk CTR data and by providing more user-friendly web-
based access to the database that houses CTR and other BSA
data. 106 In these larger bulk data projects, analysts have
identified a strong link between, terrorist subjects and CTR
and other BSA filings. 1 7 But even if the government is doing
a better job of managing and sharing CTR data, that does not
address the fact that the number of CTR filings remains
around 16,000,000 each fiscal year. The high volume of CTR
filings has led to calls in the BSA-regulated community and
in Congress for ideas to decrease the administrative burdens
associated with CTR requirements. '
Various proposals have been circulated to reduce
the volume of CTR filings. Congress, for example, has
entertained the idea of raising the CTR threshold
from $10,000 to $30,000.1°9 Alternatively, the GAO has
recommended that regulators liberalize the provisions
authorizing financial institutions to exempt certain
customers. 110 The banking community leans toward a more
risk-based approach that affords it greater deference in
105. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 20, at C20 (citing Money Laundering
Suppression Act of 1994, H.R. REP. NO. 103-438, at 10 (1994)).
106. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 13-15 (discussing
newly implemented CTR data management and sharing methods).
107. Robert W. Werner, Dir. of Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network,
Prepared Remarks Before the American Bankers Association Money
Laundering Enforcement Conference 6-7 (Oct. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/speech/pdf/20061009.pdf.
108. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 366(b), 115 Stat. 335 (urging the Secretary to study
the problem of the underutilization of the CTR exemption process); Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, §1001, 120 Stat.
1966 (2006) (requiring the Comptroller General to study several aspects of CTR
filings, including their usefulness to law enforcement and the burdens imposed
on financial institutions). See generally FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
supra note 102 (responding to a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act requiring
the Treasury to study the system for exempting certain customers from the CTR
filing requirements).
109. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 10.
110. Id. at 7-8.
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deciding how to implement a CTR program."' FinCEN
embraced the GAO report's recommendations and responded
by implementing regulations intended to liberalize the CTR
exemption process. 1
12
At the same time, bankers continue to press government
agencies for more information about the value of BSA
reporting and have challenged the government to measure
the utility of BSA reports, particularly CTRs.113 The 2007
National Money Laundering Strategy confronts the bankers'
concerns by setting a goal for the Treasury Department to
evaluate and report law enforcement's use of BSA reporting
in their investigations. 114 But even with this goal in mind,
the law enforcement and regulatory communities have been
unable to do much in the way of linking the use of CTR data
to specific case results. 115 It may never succeed.
The CTR requirement dates to a time before ATMs,
stored value products, virtual currency, and the globalization
of banking; it dates to a more quaint time when financial
transactions were handled across teller windows. In those
days, money flowed through financial institutions that had
recurring and personal relationships with their customers.
Since 1970, there has been a huge increase not just in the
volume of financial transactions, but also in their complexity,
making it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to lift
meaningful information out of such things as CTRs, Form
8300s, and CMIRs.116 CTRs, for example, are not themselves
highly useful any longer, except perhaps in certain broad
analytic applications in which government tries to identify
111. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 20, at 24.
112. See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN
Announces Final Rule on Currency Transaction Exemptions (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/nr/pdf/20081204.pdf.
113. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 20, at 21-22 (setting forth banking
community's recommendations for providing greater feedback on how BSA data
is used).
114. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 13.
115. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 24 ("Linking law
enforcement's use of CTRs to specific case outcomes measures is difficult
because agencies do not track their use of CTRs, which are typically only one of
many sources of information used to support investigations.").
116. See generally MOISES NAIM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS,
AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 134-36 (2005) (arguing
that the increase in the volume and complexity of financial transactions over
the past fifteen years has made it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track
the movement of illicit funds).
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financial crime trends. One value of CTRs is that they
provide personal information such as a current address or
telephone number. In the absence of a national identification
system in the United States, CTRs may provide personal data
about a subject that would otherwise be unavailable to an
investigator. If today, these reporting requirements were
subject to a cost-benefit analysis that measured their
usefulness in detecting crime against the regulatory burden
they impose, the reporting requirements might endure, but
only in a diminished form.117
A new rationale for reporting and recordkeeping
requirements is emerging in the fine print of recent
government reports. Increased public awareness of the BSA
has effectively deterred large currency transactions in, and
cross-border movements of, criminally-derived funds.
Curtailing the flow of illicit funds is itself a worthy policy
objective, and is one that underlies the money laundering
statutes, particularly 18 U.S.C. § 1957.118 Yet only recently
has the government begun to emphasize a deterrence
rationale for the BSA reporting and recordkeeping
requirements. When answering recent GAO questions about
the continued usefulness of CTRs, law enforcement agencies
117. One bell weather of judicial reaction to reporting requirements-or at
least the CMIR requirement-was the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Bajakajian. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). There,
the Court was dismissive of the governmental interest at stake when a traveler
fails to file a CMIR:
The harm that respondent caused was also minimal. Failure to report
his currency affected only one party, the Government, and in a
relatively minor way. There was no fraud on the United States, and
respondent caused no loss to the public fisc. Had his crime gone
undetected, the Government would have been deprived only of the
information that $357,144 had left the country.
Id. at 339. On the other hand, enforcement of the CMIR reporting requirement
has led to the discovery of significant cross-border movements of currency. If it
was not for routine CMIR enforcement at the points of entry, movements of
currency such as these would be difficult to detect.
118. See United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Iacaboni, 363 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004). Indeed, a key anti-money
laundering criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, rests primarily on the objective of
deterring crime proceeds from entering the U.S. financial system and thereby
rendering the funds worthless. See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270,
1291 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is designed to freeze criminal
proceeds out of the banking system). There is a logical connection between the
rationale for § 1957, which applies to monetary transactions greater than
$10,000 and the CTR, Form 8300, and CMIR reporting requirements, each of
which utilize the same dollar threshold.
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defended the CTR requirement on the traditional ground that
CTRs help detect criminal activity. But the GAO only paused
on that justification and was quick to shift the discussion to a
new rationale:
Law enforcement officials noted that CTR requirements
also aid their efforts by making it more difficult for
criminals to get their illicit proceeds into the financial
system and forcing them to act in ways that increase
chances of detection-such as smuggling cash or
"structuring" their cash transactions to avoid CTRs, which
often prompts depository institutions to file a Suspicious
Activity Report. " 9
This deterrence rationale has also begun to find its way
into the reports of financial regulators. Today, for example,
when FinCEN describes the rationale for the CTR
requirement, it is just as likely to speak in terms of crime
deterrence as it is to speak in the traditional terms of crime
detection. 120 Although the CTR, CMIR, and Form 8300
reporting requirements address different kinds of activities,
they work in tandem; each requires reporting of currency
and/or monetary instrument transfers greater than $10,000.
From the perspective of a money launderer, tax evader, or
terrorist financier, the requirements form an interlocking
barrier to large currency transactions and cross-border
movements in tainted funds.' 2
What has been described thus far is an emerging
rationale for the BSA reporting and recordkeeping
requirements. No legislative finding supports it, and it has
not been publicly debated.'22 Under this fledgling rationale,
119. U.S. GOVTACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 5.
120. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 8, at 4 ("Currency
transaction reporting requirements are a key impediment to criminal attempts
to legitimize the proceeds of crime."); see also James H. Freis, Dir., Fin.
Crimes Enforcement Network, Prepared Remarks at the ABA/ABA Money
Laundering Enforcement Conference 12 (Oct. 22, 2007),
http'J/www.fincen.gov/news-room/speech/pdf/20071022.pdf ("The existence of
BSA regulations has a deterrent effect on those would abuse the financial
system. The certainty of a CTR filing and the mere possibility of a SAR filing
force criminals to behave in risky ways that expose them to scrutiny and
capture.").
121. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 69, at 436 ("The currency reporting laws
have been largely successful in preventing drug traffickers and other money
launderers from placing sums of illegally generated cash directly into the U.S.
banking system.").
122. Some, for example, might reasonably question whether as a matter of
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the objective of detection carries forward, but with a twist.
For instance, CTR requirements deter the cash proceeds of
crime from entering the U.S. financial system, driving
criminals to act in ways that increase the chance of
detection.123 A criminal who structures currency transactions
with a bank to evade a CTR risks detection at multiple levels.
The person runs the risk that the structured transactions
might be captured in an aggregation report and generate a
"multiple transaction" CTR-a red flag to investigators of
possible structuring activity. 124  Worse, from the perspective
of the would-be-structurer, is the risk that the financial
institution or casino will detect the structuring behavior and
file a SAR. 2 5 The proactive review of SARs by SAR review
teams and financial crime task forces is one of the chief
means used by law enforcement to detect this kind of high
risk behavior.
A main value of the BSA's reporting and recordkeeping
requirements lies in the fact that they drive money
launderers, terrorists, and other criminals to evade them and,
in doing so, to engage in evasive behavior that increases their
risk of detection and prosecution, even if only for a regulatory
crime such as structuring. 126  If the BSA's reporting and
record keeping requirements now rest more on the rationale
that they force money launderers to act in ways that increase
their risk of detection, and less on the finding that the reports
and records are in themselves of high value to law
enforcement, then we can expect investigation and
prosecution emphasis to fall on the ways that criminals evade
policy it makes sense to drive money laundering and terrorists fuirther
underground by erecting obstacles to their use of traditional financial services.
123. James H. Freis, Jr. Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, The
Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime 2 (Aug. 31, 2009),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/speech/pdf/20090831.pdf ("The
near certainty of a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) filing for cash
transactions over $10,000, . . . deters criminals and forces them to behave in
risky ways that expose them to scrutiny and capture.").
124. An astonishingly high percentage-sixty-five percent-of CTRs filed in
2006 involved multiple currency transaction in a single day that aggregate to
more than $10,000. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 32.
125. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2006); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2008)
(imposing SAR filing requirements on banks); 31 C.F.R. § 103.20 (imposing SAR
filing requirements on most money services businesses); 31 C.F.R. § 103.21
(2008) (imposing SAR filing requirements on casinos).
126. See supra note 120.
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those requirements. 127 Chief among those ways is the activity
of structuring. 12
8
If we discard the old rationale for the BSA, and accept
the new one, a couple of things become clear. First, the
government is less concerned with detecting large money
flows through the review of such things as CTRs, and more
concerned with detecting evasions of the CTR requirement.
This new reality explains the law enforcement community's
stubborn resistance to efforts to raise BSA reporting and
record keeping thresholds. From the government's
perspective, reporting thresholds should remain relatively
low, at around $10,000, so that they create a firm and
interlocking barrier to the entry of crime proceeds into the
financial system. Second, this shift in rationale puts more
pressure on the government to utilize anti-structuring, bulk
cash smuggling, and related criminal laws, to punish those
seeking to evade these barriers. Unless it does so, the
justification for the new rationale collapses. Finally, the new
rationale for the BSA's reporting and recordkeeping
requirements shifts the debate over currency reporting onto a
different, firmer ground. The government may not be able to
quantify the role a particular CTR played in a law
enforcement investigation, but it can quantify those instances
where a criminal investigation arose from a SAR and resulted
in a structuring conviction, the forfeiture of assets, and/or a
civil enforcement penalty.129 It remains to be seen whether
the government will respond by making more robust use of
SARs to pursue crimes such as structuring.
127. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 23 (explaining
that there are three primary ways criminals evade the CTR filing requirement:
structuring, bulk cash smuggling, and trade-based money laundering).
128. Ironically, in undertaking to evade a CTR, persons often engage in
evasive conduct that triggers a different and more serious report, a suspicious
activity report. See id. at 5.
129. FinCEN periodically publishes The SAR Activity Review-Trends, Tips
and Issues. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS TIPS & ISSUES (2008),
http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/files/sar-tti_13.pdf. It provides some
feedback to financial institutions about how SARs are being used in criminal
investigations.
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III. THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-
STRUCTURING LAW
A. Events Leading to the Enactment of§ 5324
For many years after the passage of the BSA, there was
no urgent need for an anti-structuring law because financial
institutions largely ignored the BSA. From April 1972 until
the mid-1980s, financial regulators did not emphasize the
need for financial institutions to comply with, and, as a
consequence, banks did not widely adhere to the CTR
requirement. 130  In the absence of regulatory enforcement,
particularly enforcement of the CTR filing requirement,
individuals conducting currency transactions with financial
institutions had little reason to engage in structuring-type
behavior. 131
This all changed in 1985. That February, the Bank of
Boston pleaded guilty to and was fined $500,000 for violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act. 132  In the course of that criminal
proceeding, the public learned that that Bank of Boston had
exempted a known criminal organization from the CTR filing
requirements. 133 That event led to Congressional hearings in
April 1985 that awakened the banking community and their
regulators to the need to enforce BSA requirements.3 3 The
130. "Cash reports continued to be filed in the early 1980s, but the quantities
were not significant. It was not until several major institutions were fined for
failing to report cash transactions that a dramatic upsurge occurred in filings."
Byrne, supra note 6, at 804; see also United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1530
(lth Cir. 1984) (discussing expert testimony received at trial to the effect that
the banking industry had uniformly ignored the reporting requirements in the
mid-1970s); Villa, supra note 6, at 490 (emphasizing that blame for non-
compliance with the BSA rested with regulators who did not prioritize it).
131. By contrast, the government aggressively enforced the CMIR
requirement during this time period. Until May 31, 1985, the CMIR reporting
threshold was $5000.
132. Byrne, supra note 6, at 804 n.18.
133. Id.
134. The First National Bank of Boston: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 99-118 (1985).
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result was a sharp uptick in CTR filings. 35 The increased
attention to the CTR requirement invited structuring-type
activity by some bank customers.
Initially, nothing in the BSA specifically forbade
structuring.136  In some early structuring prosecutions, the
government argued that the bank customer was a "financial
institution" with a duty to file a CTR.137 Alternatively, the
government charged structuring as a scheme to defraud the
United States of reports to which it was entitled. 38 But the
most prevalent prosecution theory during this era rested on
the premise that a person who engaged in structuring aided
and abetted a financial institution's failure to make a report
required by 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321 and 5322.13
This last prosecution theory strained the limits of aider
and abettor liability, the merits of which split circuit courts of
appeal. 40 For example, in United States v. Tobon-Builes, the
135. The following table shows the increase in CTR filings in the period of
time around the enforcement actions of the Mid-1980s:
Year CTR Filings
1983 513,000
1984 716,000
1985 1,859,000
1986 3,572,000
1987 4,952,000
Byrne, supra note 6, at 804-05, n.18.
136. See COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: BANK SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAvE NOT YET
MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING NEED FOR AMENDMENT 23-25 (1981) (noting
that the regulations implementing the CTR requirement did not "specifically
prohibit dividing a large transactions into several smaller transactions to
circumvent the reporting requirement").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 947 F.2d 362, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 777 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1986).
138. See United States v. Winfield, 997 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (4th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1987).
139. United States v. Lafaurie, 833 F.2d 1468, 1471 (11th Cir. 1987)
(affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001); United States v. Heyman, 794
F.2d 788, 790-93 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming conviction); United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1985) (reversing convictions under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096-1101
(11th Cir. 1983) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001).
Due process requires "that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
140. The individual as "financial institution" theory was rejected by the
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the use of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001 as a viable basis for prosecuting a
defendant who causes or attempts to cause financial
institutions to fail to file CTRs on cash purchases of cashier's
checks. 141 On the other hand, other courts-most notably the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Anzalone-
held that the existing statutes, when stretched to meet the
exigencies of a structuring prosecution, failed to give fair
notice of what the law forbids. 142 The Anzalone line of cases
had two branches; one branch rejected the imposition of
criminal liability for any type of structuring behavior; and the
other limited the government to charging only those instances
when the transactor's conduct, in fact, triggered a bank's
obligation to file a CTR, so-called "imperfect" structuring. 1
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Thus, one key issue that divided the Tobon-Builes and
Anzalone lines of cases was the distinction between
"imperfect" and "perfect" structuring. Imperfect structuring
occurs when a transactor structures currency transactions in
an attempt to evade a currency transaction report, but the
transactions, when aggregated, nonetheless trigger a
financial institution's duty to file a CTR obligation. 144 Perfect
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Bucey. United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d
1297, 1303-07 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that an individual cannot be an "agency,
branch or office" of a financial institution, and is therefore not held to the same
requirements as a financial institution). The aiding and abetting the
concealment of a material fact theory was sharply limited by the First Circuit in
United States v. Anzalone. 766 F.2d at 682-83 (explaining that theory works
only where an individual triggers financial institution's duty to file a CTR by
conducting more than $10,000 in currency transactions at the same financial
institution on the same day).
141. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1100-01; see also United States v. Massa, 740
F.2d 629, 645 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp.
990, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1984); United States v. Konefal, 566 F. Supp. 698, 701
(N.D.N.Y. 1983).
142. See Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 680-83; United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d
1559, 1562-64 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 760-63
(9th Cir. 1986).
143. See Denemark, 779 F.2d at 1562-64; United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d
625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("Liability ... depends on whether the
bank was required to file a CTR, for.., a bank customer is not liable merely for
structuring his cash transactions so as to create transactions in which the filing
of a CTR is not required."). A discussion of this split of authority appears in
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
157-60 (1994).
144. In 1987, the Secretary of the Treasury amended the CTR requirement to
impose an obligation on financial institutions the duty to aggregate related
currency transactions. Amendments to Implementing Regulations Under the
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structuring, in contrast, occurs when the transactor
structures his/her currency transactions in such a way as to
never trigger the bank's CTR filing obligation. The transactor
might, for example, split transactions between different
financial institutions such that no one financial institution
handles transactions involving more than $10,000 in a single
business day. Anzalone was noteworthy because it rejected
the government's attempt to prosecute so-called "perfect"
structuring using an aider and abettor theory of liability.145
Under the reasoning of Anzalone, the defendant could not be
convicted of aiding and abetting the concealment of a
material fact if, in fact, the financial institution had no duty
to file a CTR on the charged facts. 14 6
These developments set the stage for legislative action.
In the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Congress
addressed the problem of structuring, and, in particular,
addressed the emerging distinction between perfect and
imperfect structuring. It did so by enacting an anti-
structuring statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5324.14' The House and
Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,436 (Apr. 8, 1987) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103
(2008)). Under the "aggregation rule," a bank must file a CTR if currency
transactions totaling more than $10,000 are made by a single person, or his/her
partners or associates, in a single banking day either in different branches of
the same bank or at the same branch of a bank. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(c) (2008); see
also United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 850 & n.5 (1st
Cir. 1987) (discussing regulation articulating aggregation rule); United States v.
Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 789 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Giancola, 783
F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986); Amendments to Implementing Regulations
Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,436 (Apr. 8, 1987) (codified at 31
C.F.R. § 103) (explaining the aggregation rule). Casinos have a similar
aggregation requirement. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(c)(3) (2008).
145. Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 679-83; see also Denemark, 779 F.2d at 1561-64
(stating that there was no liability under § 1001 because defendant had no cash
transaction over $10,000 with any one bank).
146. Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 683 ("As no such duty existed on behalf of
appellant to report to the Secretary either directly or through the financial
institution, there can be no concealment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.").
147. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §
1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
5324 (2006)).
While there are few reported cases under this clause of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, it
is far from dormant. In 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District
of Florida initiated a significant prosecution in which several defendants,
including a check cashing business called "La Bamba," allegedly conspired to
cause the filing of materially false CTRs. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's
Office of S. Dist. of Fla., Guilty Verdict Announced Against La Bamba Check
Cashing in Connection with $132,000,000 in Financial Transactions (Jan. 18,
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Senate Reports accompanying the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 suggest that Congress enacted § 5324 because it
sought to embrace the Tobon-Builes line of cases and reject
the Anzalone line of cases."4  To address the problem of
"imperfect" structuring, Congress forbade in § 5324(a)(1) the
act of causing or attempting to cause the non-filing of a
required report-effectively adopting an aider and abetter
theory of liability against those transactors who cause or
attempt to cause a bank to fail to file a CTR. 149 To address
the problem of transactors who cause financial institutions to
file reports containing false statements, Congress proscribed
in § 5324(a)(2) the causing or attempting to cause the filing of
a report that contains material omissions or misstatements of
fact. 5 °  To address the problem of perfect structuring,
Congress proscribed in § 5324(a)(3) structuring activity
"without regard to whether an individual transaction is,
itself, reportable under the Bank Secrecy Act."''
B. Key Legislative Amendments to § 5324
Since its enactment in 1986, § 5324 has been amended
several times. Many of these amendments are technical and
non-substantive; but other more substantive amendments
merit discussion because they form a basis for understanding
current litigation issues in structuring prosecutions. For ease
of reference, the text of the current statute is set forth in the
appendix to this article.
1. Structuring Statute Expanded to Cover Other
Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements
In its original form, § 5324 reached only evasions of the
CTR requirements imposed upon financial institutions. 2' In
2008), http'//www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/080118-01. In February
2009, a jury returned a guilty verdict against La Bamba and its owner. Id.
148. S. REP. No. 99-433, at 22 (1986) ("Subsection (h) would codify Tobon-
Builes and like cases and would negate the effect of Anzalone, Varbel and
Denemark."); H.R. REP. No. 99-746, at 18-19 (1986) (citing Tobon-Builes
favorably and explaining that the new provision "would resolve the legal issues
raised by the various circuit courts" and "create the offense of structuring a
transaction to evade the reporting requirements").
149. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1) (2006).
150. Id. § 5324(a)(2).
151. See S. REP. No. 99-433, at 22 (1986); 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).
152. The text of the original anti-structuring law provided as follows:
Section 5324. 31 USC 5324 Structuring transactions to evade reporting
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1992, Congress recodified these offenses as subsections
5324(a)(1)-(3), and added subsection 5324(b) (now recodified
as subsection 5324(c)), which makes it a crime to evade CMIR
requirements. 153  Congress made a similar amendment in
2001 when it criminalized structuring to evade Form 8300
reporting requirements.1 54  To accommodate the new
provision, Congress recodified the CMIR and pushed the
penalty provisions back to subsections 5324(c) and 5324(d),
respectively. 55
Congress also amended § 5324 to prohibit structuring as
a means of evading certain recordkeeping and reporting
requirements. In 1992, Congress amended § 5324(a) to make
it a crime to structure financial transactions to evade the
reporting and recordkeeping requirement relating to the cash
purchase of cashier's checks and similar instruments in
requirement prohibited
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements
of section 5313(a) 31 USC 5313 with respect to such transaction-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to
file a report required under section 5313( a);
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a
report required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission
or misstatement of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist
in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial
institutions.
See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354(a), 100
Stat. 3207-22 (2986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See also United States v. One 1985 Mercedes-Benz, 300D SD, 14 F.3d
465, 467 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing legislative changes); see also Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, tit. III, § 365(b)(1)(A), 115 Stat. 272, 273 (designating subsections of Section
5324).
154. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(b).
155. Id. § 5324(c), (d). The provisions of § 5324(b) are similar to the anti-
structuring provisions that remain in Title 26. See I.R.C. § 60501 (2006).
As a practical matter, the anti-structuring provisions of I.R.C. § 6050I(f) are
now superfluous. To convict a person of a violation of section 60501(f), the
government arguably must prove that the defendant acted willfully. See I.R.C.
§ 60501(f)(2) (incorporating I.R.C. § 7206 penalty provisions for willfully making
a false tax return); see also United States v. Rogers, 18 F.3d 265, 267 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1994) (finding that conviction under section 7203 requires Ratzlaf showing).
But see United States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1405 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the term "willful" in section 7206 must be given same interpretation as
Supreme Court gave it in United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-13 (1976)).
As discussed above, the willfulness requirement has been eliminated from
structuring prosecutions brought under § 5324, thus prosecutors should prefer
the Title 31 means of prosecuting a Form 8300 violation to the Title 26 form.
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amounts of $3000 or greater. 156 In 2001, Congress expanded
the reach of § 5324(a) again by prohibiting structuring to
evade the recordkeeping requirement relating to wire
transfers in amounts of $3000 and greater.' 7
Subsections (b)(1)-(3) and (c)(1)-(3) largely mirror the
structuring prohibitions in subsection 5324(a). That is to say,
subsection 5324(b) prohibits "imperfect" structuring, material
misstatements and omissions, 15 8 and "perfect" structuring in
connection with the Form 8300 requirements imposed upon
trades and businesses. 15 9  The prohibitions of subsection
5324(c) differ slightly. Subsection 5324(c)(1) does not
proscribe "imperfect" structuring; it proscribes the failure to
file a report for purposes of evading the CMIR.' 60 Otherwise,
the provisions of subsection 5324(c) mirror those of
subsections 5324(a) and (b), and subsection 5324(c)(2)
proscribes the filing of a materially false CMIR.
Subsection 5324(c)(3) proscribes structuring to evade a
CMIR. 16' The prohibitions apply to persons transporting
large sums of currency into and out of the United States,
including those individuals structuring cash amounts
156. See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 1517(a), 1535(a)(1), 106 Stat. 3672 (1992); Money Laundering Suppression
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 413(a)(2), 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
157. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (2006).
158. The provisions of § 5324 dealing with materially false statements and
omissions (subsections 5324(a), (b)(2), and (c)(2)) are beyond the scope of this
article. They are not structuring provisions. In fact, these offenses are
predicated on the filing of the requisite reporting or the maintenance of a
requisite record, albeit one containing material false statements or omissions.
See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.5.3.2.6.
159. The aggregation rule for Form 8300 filers is very broad. It requires
Form 8300 filers to aggregate subsequent currency payments within a twelve-
month period with respect to a single transaction (or two or more related
transactions) when the payments individually or in aggregate exceed $10,000.
See 31 C.F.R. § 103.30(b)(2) (2008). The breadth of this aggregation rule for
Form 8300 filers means that most attempts to structure to evade a Form 8300
reporting requirement will be prosecuted as "imperfect" structuring cases under
subsection 5324(b)(1).
160. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(1). Subsection 5324 (c)(1) differs from its
counterparts in subsections 5324(a) and 5324(b) in that it proscribes the simply
failure to report for purpose of evasion; it does not proscribe imperfect
structuring.
161. Congress did not need to create a structuring offense (§ 5324(c)(3)) for
CMIR violations. Since August 1989, the Treasury Department had defined the
phrase "at one time" to impose the reporting requirement even in cases where
travelers break down currency among difficult travelers or parcels. See 31
C.F.R. § 103.11(b) (2008).
[Vol:50
2010] REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECY ACT 443
between different travelers to evade a CMIR filing. 62 While
increasing numbers of structuring and civil asset forfeiture
prosecutions arise under both § 5324(b) and (c), by far, the
most prevalent kinds of structuring prosecutions are those
brought under subsections 5324(a)(1) and (3) for evasions of
the CTR requirement. 163
News that Congress expanded § 5324 to include other
reporting and recordkeeping requirements beyond simply
CTRs has been slow to reach commentators, prosecutors, and
the courts. Long after the relevant legislative changes,
commentators still ask whether the Supreme Court's decision
in Ratzlaf v. United States requires proof of a "willful"
violation of the Form 8300 reporting requirement without
recognizing that, as a practical matter, future Title 26
prosecutions for Form 8300 violations will be rare. 164 Though
prosecutors could use either Title 26 or Title 31 to prosecute a
Form 8300 violation, most will prefer the Title 31 alternative
because it eliminates any issue about the meaning of the term
"willful." Moreover, the government continues mistakenly to
prosecute CMIR offenses under § 5322. This habit formed in
the 1980s and early 1990s when the government prosecuted
numerous CMIR offenses under § 5322-the only criminal
enforcement statute available for a CMIR violation at the
time. 65  However, in 1994, when Congress reacted to the
162. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 139 n.5 (1994) (explaining
the 1992 amendments to § 5324).
163. United States v. Twenty-Three Thousand Ninety Dollars in U.S.
Currency, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005), is an example of a forfeiture
prosecution premised on a violation of subsection 5324(c)(1) (causing or
attempting to case the failure to complete a CMIR). The case highlights the
subtle distinction between structuring to evade a CMIR, and the separate
offense of bulk cash smuggling (31 U.S.C. § 5332). Structuring to evade a CMIR
entails breaking down monetary instruments into sub-$10,000 amounts and
dividing them between different travelers. Id. at 1230-31. Bulk cash
smuggling entails concealing the monetary instruments in luggage,
merchandise, containers, or on a person. See generally United States v.
Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the elements of
bulk cash smuggling).
164. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ELLEN S. PODGOR, PAUL D. BORMAN & PETER J.
HENNING, WHITE COLLAR CRIME LAW AND PRACTICE 98 (2d ed. 2003) (asking
whether Ratzlaf imposes a heightened mens rea element for violations of the
Form 8300 requirement codified in I.R.C. § 6050).
165. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), was a case in which
the government correctly charged a CMIR violation under 31 U.S.C. § 5322.
The offensive conduct in Bajakajian occurred at a time (June 1994) when § 5322
still provided the criminal enforcement mechanism for CMIR violations.
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Ratzlaf decision in 1994, it amended § 5322 to exclude from
the statute's reach offenses chargeable under § 5324.166
Because all CMIR offenses, i.e., violations of § 5316, are now
chargeable under § 5324, it follows that they should no longer
be charged under § 5322.167 Nonetheless, appellate decisions
affirming CMIR convictions obtained under § 5322 persist,
including at least one decision that engaged in an extended,
and probably superfluous, analysis of whether the alleged
CMIR violator acted "willfully" within the meaning of § 5322
Ratzlaf.168
2. Ratzlaf and Its Aftermath
In the period between the statute's original enactment in
1986, and legislative amendments in September 1994, § 5324
did not include a criminal penalty provision. During this
period, the criminal penalties for violations of § 5324 were
found first in 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058 and 1059, and later in §
5322.169 Subsection 5322(a) makes it a crime for a person to
"willfully" violate certain provisions of the BSA. 17 ° Prior to
September 1994, § 5322 provided the criminal sanction for
violations of § 5324.
166. See United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In
response to Ratzlaf, Congress excepted violations of § 5324 from the penalty
provisions of § 5322, which require willfulness, and added a penalty provision to
§ 5324 that did not require knowledge that structuring was illegal.").
167. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2006) ("A person willfully violating this
subchapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this subchapter
(except section 5315 or 5324 of this title or a regulation prescribed under section
5315 or 5324) .... ").
168. See, e.g., Tatoyan, 474 F.3d at 1177-78 (affirming CMIR conviction
predicated on a violation of §8 5316 and 5322 and addressing whether the
government had established a "willful" violation under § 5322); United States v.
Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 401 (6th Cir. 2006) (reciting how the defendant was convicted
of three counts including one count of concealing currency in violation of §
5316); cf United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2007) (reciting how
the government mistakenly submitted a proposed forfeiture order for a bulk
cashing smuggling offense premised on a violation of § 5322 rather than § 5332).
169. The criminal penalty provisions for Bank Secrecy Act violations were
originally codified at 31 U.S.C. §8 1058 and 1059. See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L
No. 91-508, § 209, 84 Stat. 1121 (1970). In 1982, Congress recodified the
provisions at 31 U.S.C. § 5322 without substantive change. See United States v.
So, 755 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Section 5322(b) is a recodification of 31
U.S.C. § 1059 ... and was not intended to and did not change the substance of
the original section 1059."); see also H.R. REP. No. 97-651 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895, 1897.
170. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
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In some contexts, courts have construed the term
"willfully" to require heightened proof of knowledge; a
defendant must know not just the facts that bring his/her
conduct within the reach of the statute, but must also know
that such conduct is a crime. 7' Prior to 1994, defendants
engaged in so-called "perfect" or Anzalone-type structuring
schemes (loosely described as consecutive day structuring as
opposed to same day/same bank structuring) began to argue
that without a heightened knowledge requirement, a
defendant could innocently violate § 5324. The argument had
been largely unsuccessful, but nonetheless created a circuit
split. 172
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed this circuit split
when it held in Ratzlaf that the term "willfully," as used in
subsection 5322(a), required proof that the "defendant acted
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful." 17 3 Ratzlaf
can be understood as part of a longer line of recent Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court assumes "Congress
believes that criminal liability follows moral culpability."
174
Under this line of cases, if the Court, after construing the
statute, is left with the impression that a morally blameless
person could violate the statute's elements, then the Court
formulates an additional mental state element "to shield
blameless conduct from criminal condemnation."' 75
171. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973).
172. Compare United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489-92 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that government was not required to prove that defendant actually
knew that structuring of currency transaction was unlawful in order to convict
him of willful violation of Section 5324), with United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d
493, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1993), vacated by Donovan v. United States, 510 U.S. 1069
(1994) (requiring only a "reckless disregard" of a statute to prove a willful
violation).
173. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994). Ratzlaf construed a
criminal statute that required proof of a willful violation. Id. at 137-38. As
such, the decision had no bearing on the government's ability to use civil
forfeiture to enforce Section 5324 because the civil forfeiture statute applicable
to structuring violations omits the term "willfully." Id. at 146 n. 16. For civil
forfeiture actions, the government need only show that the transactor knew of
the reporting requirement and intended to evade it. United States v. Ahmad,
213 F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. One 1991 Chevrolet Corvette
Convertible, 969 F. Supp. 476, 480 (W.D. Tenn. 1997).
174. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1023
(1999).
175. Id.
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The majority expressed just such reservations in Ratzlaf.
What preoccupied the Ratzlaf majority was the concern that a
person's motive for structuring might be legitimate; a
business owner, for example, might structure to reduce the
likelihood of a tax audit. 176 Or a person might structure for
reasons having nothing to do with a desire to keep his or her
financial activities from the government. For example, a
person may make small deposits "fearful that the bank's
reports would increase the likelihood of burglary, or in an
endeavor to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth." 177
Ratzlaf upset settled case law in every circuit court of
appeals that had previously addressed the mental intent
element of the structuring statute, except for the First
Circuit. 178 The upshot was that it had a dramatic impact not
just on the many pending criminal structuring prosecutions
that were not yet final for purposes of appeal, but also on
finalized convictions. 179 The government's reaction was one of
dismay. 180
176. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144.
177. Id. at 145.
178. See United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 767 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gibbons,
968 F.2d 639, 643-45 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382,
1389-92 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 343-45 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 92, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1567-69 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537-40 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Scanio, 900
F.2d 485, 489-92 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125,
1128-30 (9th Cir. 1990). Contra United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir.
1993) (en banc).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Winn, 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United
States v. Marshall, 56 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d
1359 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garza, 42 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 1994).
180. See U.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 2033, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading-room/
usam/title9/crm02033.htm ("Ratzlaf truly upset the government's criminal
prosecutions for structuring currency transactions in order to avoid the CTR
reporting requirement. In pending prosecutions involving closed investigations,
the agents generally had not obtained evidence, if such evidence existed, that
the defendant(s) knew that structuring transactions to avoid the filing of CTRs
was illegal. Hence, many pending prosecutions had to be dismissed. Moreover,
Ratzlaf very clearly applied to all cases not yet final for purposes of appeal
(indeed, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings
several CTR cases pending on petitions for certiorari at the time that Ratzlaf
was decided). But to aggravate matters further, Ratzlaf was held to apply
retroactively and convicted defendants began to flood the courts with habeas
corpus and coram nobis petitions.").
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Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsberg, in so many
words, invited Congress to intervene if it did not like the
Court's construction of the statute. "Had Congress wished to
dispense with [the willfulness] requirement, it could have
furnished the appropriate instruction." 1 ' Congress so
wished; within ten months of the ruling, Congress superseded
Ratzlaf. This legislative reaction-sometimes called the
"Ratzlaf fix"-had two features. First, Congress amended 31
U.S.C. § 5322 to add a clause exempting violations of § 5324
from that statute's reach. Second, Congress wrote a criminal
penalty provision directly into § 5324 that omitted
the willfulness requirement. 8 2  Taken together, these
amendments eliminated the basis on which the Supreme
Court in Ratzlaf had read the statute to require proof that a
defendant knew structuring was a crime.' 3
Even though Ratzlaf was superseded by statute, the
majority and dissenting opinions in that case continue to
inform serious discussion about the merits of structuring
prosecutions, particularly in cases where the government
seeks to use the statute to punish the accused based on
circumstantial evidence of knowledge and intent. The
legislative response to Ratzlaf signals a rejection of the
Supreme Court's attempt to ensure that structuring
prosecutions target only morally blameworthy conduct-
moreover, a rejection of the Court's attempt to resist
bureaucratization of a criminal statute. Nonetheless, in cases
181. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146.
182. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324 (2006). See United States v. Morales-Rodriguez,
467 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing Ratzlaf); United States v. Pang, 362
F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing legislative response to Ratzlaf);
United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining the
"Ratzlaf fix"); United States v. Griffith, 84 F.3d 912, 923 n.7 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing Ratzla); see also Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, § 411(a), (c)(1), 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), (b), (d)); H.R. REP. No. 103-438, at 22 (1994) (stating that
after the amendments, the prosecution needs to prove "that there was an intent
to evade the reporting requirement," but does not need to also prove "that the
defendant knew that structuring was illegal").
183. Some commentators (and even the occasional indictment) treat
structuring offenses as though the government must continue to prove that the
defendant acted "willfully." JOEL M. ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 10:12,
10:15 (2006); see also Pang, 362 F.3d at 1193-94 (stating that use of the term
"willfully" in an indictment was surplusage in light of Ratzlaf fix); United States
v. Manfredi, 628 F. Supp. 2d 608, 628 (W.D. Pa. 2009). For offenses committed
after September 1994, this is no longer the case.
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where the government seeks to infer knowledge and intent
based upon circumstantial evidence, such as a pattern of high
dollar deposits below the CTR threshold, the Ratzlaf Court's
concern about punishing morally blameless conduct will
hover over the prosecution, if not as a question of statutory
interpretation then at least in the mind of a trier of fact.
3. Enhanced Penalties
As discussed above, the criminal penalty provisions for
violations of the BSA were originally codified in 31 U.S.C. §§
1058 and 1059. Section 1058 proscribed misdemeanor
penalties for any person who willfully violates any provision
of the BSA.1 s4  Section 1059, in turn, proscribed felony
penalties for certain aggravated violations, including serial
misdemeanor violations."i 5 In 1982, §§ 1058 and 1059 were
recodified as § 5322(a) and (b) respectively without change. 1 86
In the mid-1980s, Congress abandoned the
misdemeanor/felony dichotomy of former law in favor of the
felony/aggravated felony dichotomy that exists today. What
was formerly punished as a misdemeanor under former §
1958 was, after legislative amendments in 1984, made
punishable by a five-year term of imprisonment and a fine of
$250,000.117 Similarly, what was once punishable by a term
of imprisonment of five years and a fine of $500,000 under §
1059 was, after legislative amendments in 1986, made
punishable by a term of imprisonment of ten years and a
184. Section 209 of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1058, read as follows:
"Whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter or any regulation
under this chapter shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both."
185. Section 210 of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1059, read as follows:
Whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter where the
violation is-
(1) committed in furtherance of the commission of any other violation of
Federal law, or
(2) committed as part of a pattern of illegal activity involving
transactions exceeding $100,000 in any twelve-month period,
shall be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
186. 31 U.S.C. § 5322.
187. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(b), 98 Stat. 2135 (1984)
(striking out misdemeanor penalty provisions and imposing five year term of
imprisonment and $250,000 fine); see also United States v. Bank of New
England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 853 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987).
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$500,000 fine. 18 When, in response to Ratzlaf, Congress
amended § 5324 to include a separate penalty provision for
structuring offenses, it imported into § 5324(d) the same
felony/aggravated felony dichotomy that appears in
subsections 5322(a) and (b).189
As will be discussed in Part VI, the Sentencing
Guidelines incorporate the BSA's aggravated penalty
provisions into the section that governs structuring offenses,
United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) section 2S1.3.190
But section 2S1.3 invites extraordinarily punitive sentences
for aggravated structuring violations, particularly when
compared with the recently-revised advisory guidelines for
money laundering offenses. 191  As discussed below, the
advisory guideline for structuring offenses is so punitive that
an individual guilty of nothing more than structuring
transactions involving a legitimately acquired sum of money
may receive a sentence greater than that suggested for more
morally culpable crimes such as mail or wire fraud involving
a comparable sum of money.
IV. ELEMENTS AND ISSUES OF PROOF
The crime of structuring to evade a CTR under
subsection 5324(a)(3), termed "perfect" structuring, occurs
when an individual structures cash transactions in such a
way that the transactions, taken together or apart, never
implicate the financial institution's duty to file a report or
keep a record. Perfect structuring typically involves one of
two fact patterns:
Fact Pattern No. 1:
The transactor splits currency transactions between two
different financial institutions on a single business day
such that the aggregate of the two currency transactions
exceeds a reporting threshold, but no single transaction
188. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §
1357(g), 100 Stat. 3207-26 (1986) (increasing the penalty in § 5322(b) from five
years to ten years); see also Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d at 853 n.6.
189. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994).
190. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.3(b)(2) (November 2008)
(providing for a two-level enhancement for Title 31 violations involving a
pattern of unlawful activity involving more than $100,000 in a twelve-month
period).
191. Id. § 2B1.1.
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does so. For example, this would occur when a conductor
deposits $9900 in currency into a branch of the Bank of
America, N.A. and, on the same business day, deposits
$9900 into a branch of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. This is an
example of "perfect" structuring because while the total of
the deposits exceeds $10,000, the total amount deposited
into each financial institution on a single banking day is
under $10,000. Thus neither Bank of America, N.A. nor
Wells Fargo, N.A. has a duty to file a CTR. 192
Fact Pattern No. 2:
The transactor has a cash hoard of $19,000.00, which the
conductor wishes to deposit into her business bank
account. On Monday, the conductor deposits $9500.00 in
currency into the business bank account. The depositor
returns to the same financial institution on Tuesday and
deposits an additional $9500.00 into the same business
account. Again, the bank did not have a duty to file a CTR
because an amount greater than $10,000 in currency was
never deposited on the same day.
Perfect structuring requires proof of four elements: (1)
the defendant knowingly structured a currency transaction;
(2) the transactions involved one or more domestic financial
institutions; (3) the defendant knew of the domestic financial
institution's legal obligation to report or keep a record of
transactions above $10,000, or $3000 for recordkeeping
offenses; and (4) the purpose of the structured transaction
was to evade that reporting or recordkeeping requirement. 193
192. See United States v. Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 1996)
(explaining the distinction between perfect and imperfect structuring).
193. See U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIR., CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2.96 (2005); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIR.,
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES § 98 (2003); DIST. JUDGES ASS'N
OF THE FIFTH CIR., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES § 2.99
(2001); see also United States v. Chaudhry, No. C 03-40210 SBA, 2008 WL
2128197, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2008) (setting forth elements); see also United
States v. Trading Post of Pasco, Inc., No. 08-46939, 2009 WL 3287881 (9th Cir.
October 13, 2009) (unpublished) (describing three elements of structuring
offense); United States v. Manfredi, 628 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616 n.2 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (same).
Where the government seeks the enhanced penalties provided in subsection
5324(d)(2), it must prove a fifth element: that the defendant violated this law
while violating another law of the United States, as part of a pattern of illegal
activity involving more than $100,000 in a twelve-month period. 31 U.S.C. §
5324(d)(2) (2006). If the government seeks such enhanced penalties, the
defendant must have a jury trial. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
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"Imperfect" structuring, as defined under subsection
5324(a)(1), is similar. "Imperfect" structuring occurs when a
transactor attempts to defeat a financial institution's
reporting or recordkeeping requirement in a transaction or
series of transactions that nonetheless implicate that duty.
194
This would occur where a customer makes multiple cash
deposits into the same or different bank accounts at the same
bank on the same banking day such that the total of the
deposits aggregates to more than $10,000. This conduct
should be charged as a violation of subsection 5324(a)(1)-
causing or attempting to cause a financial institution to fail to
file a CTR. 195 Rather than require proof that the purpose of
the structured transaction was to evade the reporting or
recordkeeping requirement, a § 5324(a)(1) offense requires
proof that the defendant purposefully caused or attempted to
cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report [or
keep a record] required by law. Likewise, the elements of the
subsection 5324(b)(1)(3) and 5324(c)(3) offenses track those
set forth above.
A. The First Element-Structuring
1. Definition of Structuring
The term "structuring" is not defined in § 5324. Treasury
regulations define the term broadly. Under the regulations
that implement the BSA, structuring occurs when a person
"conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in
currency, in any amount, at one or more financial
institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the
purpose of evading the reporting requirements." 196  Most
commonly, structuring entails "breaking down . ..a single
(2000).
194. It has been said that the provision proscribing imperfect structuring-
now codified as subsection 5324(a)(1)--"is obsolete today" and a historical
.anomaly" because it refers to a set of conditions that no longer exist after the
implementation of regulations require banks to aggregate related cash
transactions conducted in a single banking day. See Welling, supra note 6, at
305. This is inaccurate. Despite regulations imposing the aggregation
requirement, a transactor may still "cause or attempt to cause" a financial
institution to fail to file a CTR (in other words cause or attempt to cause the
bank to fail in its duty to aggregate). See Phipps, 81 F.3d at 1059-62
(explaining how a subsection 5324(a)(1) violation occurs).
195. See generally Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056.
196. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg) (2008).
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sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums"
amounting to $10,000 or less for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements under subsection 5313(a). 197 Though
the regulation defining structuring is not essential to the
enforcement of § 5324, it has nonetheless been relied upon by
courts in defining the reach of § 5324.198
This regulatory definition broadly covers two different
kinds of transactions that the anti-structuring laws aim to
prevent (1) those in which a conductor causes or attempts to
cause a bank to fail to file a report in transactions that
nonetheless implicate a financial institution's duty to file a
currency transaction report, termed "imperfect structuring"
and (2) those in which a conductor conducts currency
transactions in such a manner as to evade a financial
institution's duty to file a currency transaction report, termed
"perfect structuring".199  The former violates subsection
5324(a)(1), while the latter violates subsection 5324(a)(3).
The key to understanding the difference between
imperfect and perfect structuring is the aggregation rule. For
purposes of CTR filings, bank and nonbank financial
institutions have a duty to aggregate multiple cash
transactions made in a single business day on behalf of the
same person, even if made at different branches, and even if
made into or out of different accounts of the same person.2 °°
To fulfill their duty to aggregate, larger banks run
sophisticated computer programs at the end of each banking
day in an attempt to catch currency transactions subject to
the aggregation rule and file a CTR where appropriate.
These computer-generated CTRs can sometimes be identified
from a review of the CTR filing itself. Near the top of the
CTR form there appears a box for the financial institution to
indicate "multiple transactions."20 ' When the aggregate
amount of such currency transactions exceeds $10,000.00 in a
single banking day, banks must file a CTR.
197. Id.
198. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (construing
regulatory definition of structuring). Section 5324, unlike § 5313, is self-
executing and requires no regulatory implementation. See United States v.
Paul, 23 F.3d 365, 367 (11th Cir. 1994).
199. United States v. Vasquez, 53 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir.1995).
200. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(c) (2008).
201. FinCEN Form 104, supra note 24.
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2. A Currency Transaction
The overwhelming majority of structuring prosecutions
involve structuring to evade the CTR reporting requirements.
At the risk of stating the obvious, to be reportable under the
CTR requirement, the transaction must involve currency-
that is to say, either "cash in" or "cash out."2 °2  Financial
institutions and casinos have no obligation to file CTRs on
transactions involving negotiable instruments, such as
personal checks, cashier's checks, or bank drafts, unless those
instruments are tendered or received in exchange for cash in
the transaction.0 3 Consequently, it is legally impossible to
commit a structuring violation under either subsection
5324(a)(1) or subsection 5324(a)(3) if the transaction involves
only a personal or cashier's check, even if the instruments are
made payable in amounts at or below the $10,000 threshold.
Most, but not all, transactions subject to CTR
requirements involve cash deposit transactions. However,
202. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (discussing the CTR requirement); id. § 103.30
(discussing the Form 8300 requirement). The term "currency" refers to:
[Cloin and paper money of the United States or of any other country
that is designated as legal tender and that circulates and is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country
of issuance. Currency includes U.S. silver certificates, U.S. notes and
Federal Reserve notes. Currency also includes official foreign bank
notes that are customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange
in a foreign country.
Id. § 103.11(h).
203. A recent decision in United States v. $1,399,313.74 in U.S. Currency
(Currency 1), 591 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), appears to confuse the
distinction between currency and monetary instruments. There, the
government sought to forfeit funds under Section 5317(c) of Title 31, United
States Code, based on violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5324(a) (structuring
to evade a CTR). Id. at 373-74. However, the instruments structured in the
transactions were checks, not currency. Id. at 375 ("It appeared that each
check was for a sum less than ten thousand dollars."). The district court
engaged in an extended analysis of whether the checks were monetary
instruments, apparently conflating two different violations: structuring
currency to evade a CTR in violation of subsection 5324(a) and structuring
.monetary instruments" to evade a CMIR in violation of subsection 5324(c). See
id. at 373-76. In a second opinion in the same case, the court seemed to remain
confused by the distinction. United States v. $1,399,313.74 in U.S. Currency
(Currency II), 592 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("The government has not
pleaded the existence of unreported cash deposits totaling over $10,000 in
violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. Because every alleged deposit was made by
money order, wire transfer or check, each indicating the payer and the payee,
the deposits were not 'monetary instruments' subject to the reporting laws.")
(emphasis omitted).
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the scope of the reporting requirement broadly requires
domestic financial institutions to report any transactions
involving more than $10,000 in cash.20 4  Thus, cash
withdrawals are subject to currency reporting, as are
transactions involving a customer who exchanges a check for
cash. 205
The rules pertaining to the Form 8300 requirement
define the term "currency" more broadly. The term
"currency" refers to cash, cashier's checks, bank drafts,
traveler's checks, and money orders having a face value
greater than $10,000.206 Similarly, the CMIR requirement
applies to "monetary instruments," a term defined to include
currency, traveler's checks, and certain negotiable
instruments. 207  Thus, a person who structures travelers
checks-say, by dividing them between different travelers
with no one traveler holding more than $10,000 in such
instruments-violates subsection 5324(c)(3), even though the
same conduct would not be a violation of any provision of
subsection 5324(a) if conducted through a financial
institution, because it does not involve currency.
B. The Second Element-Involving a Domestic Financial
Institution
In a structuring prosecution under subsection 5324(a)(1)
or (a)(3), the government must prove that the transaction
involved a domestic financial institution. This element of the
204. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 ("Each financial
institution other than a casino shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal,
exchange of currency, or other payment or transfer, by, through or to such
financial institution which involves a transaction in currency of more than
$10,000 .. "); United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1995).
205. United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2006).
206. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.30(c)(1) (2008).
207. See id. § 103.23 (setting forth CMIR requirement); id. § 103.11(u)
(defining the term "monetary instruments"); see also United States v.
$173,081.04 in U.S. Currency and One Personal Check Drawn by Jaime
Buendia in the Amount of $21,128.00, 835 F.2d 1141, 1142 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988)
(reciting the fact that a customs agent returned non-negotiable instruments to a
traveler because they were not subject to CMIR reporting); United States v. Ali,
561 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the definition of
monetary instrument for purposes of CMIR requirement); Courtney J. Linn,
Regulating the Cross-Border Movement of Prepaid Cards, 11 J. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL 146 (2008) (discussing the CMIR regulatory definition of
monetary instruments and advocating that the definition be expanded to
include certain prepaid cards).
454 [Vol:50
2010] REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECY ACT
offense serves two purposes. First, it serves as a
jurisdictional element. In much the same way that certain
bank fraud statutes require proof that the affected entity was
a "financial institution," this element requires comparable
proof to establish federal jurisdiction over the offense. °8
Second, the element exists to ensure that the financial
institution is one that has a BSA duty to report or record the
transaction information that its customer sought to evade by
structuring. Under the CTR regulations, only "financial
institutions" have an obligation to file a CTR, and only
casinos have a duty to file a CTRC, the functional equivalent
of a CTR. 2°9 The term "financial institution" refers to each
agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States of
any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis
or as an organized business concern, in one or more of the
following capacities: (1) a bank, (2) a broker or dealer in
securities, (3) a money services business, (4) a telegraph
company, (5) a person subject to supervision under any state
or federal regulatory bank supervisory authority, (6) a futures
commodities merchant, or (7) an introducing broker in
commodities. 2" The term "casino," in turn, generally refers
to a casino or card club that is duly licensed or authorized to
do business as such in the United States and has gross
gaming revenue in excess of one million dollars.211
C. The Third and Fourth Elements-Knowledge and Intent
The Ratzlaf fix eliminated the "super" knowledge
requirement that the Supreme Court had read into the term
"willfully," as that term is used in § 5322. In other words, it
eliminated the requirement that the government prove the
defendant knew his or her conduct was unlawful.212
208. See United States v. Thomas, 176 F. App'x 626 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating
that it is sufficient that expert witness testified that bank met definition of
"financial institution" subject to CTR requirement; the government does not
have to also prove that bank was FDIC insured).
209. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1)-(2) (2008) (dealing with financial institutions
and casinos).
210. Id. § 103.11(n)(1)-(4), (7)-(9).
211. Id. § 103.11(n)(5); see also id. § 103.11(n)(5)(iii) (explaining that the term
.casino" as used in the regulations includes a reference to "card club" unless
otherwise specified).
212. See United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004);
Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 875 n.10 (6th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 371 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999).
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However, even after the Ratzlaf fix, the government must
prove mental state elements; it must prove that the
defendant knew of the reporting or recordkeeping
requirement.213 And it must prove the defendant acted for
the purpose of evading that reporting or recordkeeping
requirement.214 There are two methods of establishing these
mental state elements. First, the government may establish
them through direct evidence, such as the defendant's own
admissions that he knew of the reporting requirements and
broke down cash transactions to evade them. Second, the
government may put forward circumstantial evidence from
which a jury may find the "requisite knowledge on the
defendant's part by drawing reasonable inferences from the
evidence of defendant's conduct."21 5 These methods of proof
are discussed in the subsections that follow.
1. Direct Evidence
a. Admissions
In a surprising number of instances, subjects in
structuring investigations readily admit to law enforcement
agents or other witnesses that they conducted financial
transactions with the intent to evade the CTR requirement.216
Often these admissions are accompanied by explanations for
the structuring behavior. Two explanations are typical: "I
structured for the sake of convenience" (e.g., "I sought to
avoid the delay caused by completing the CTR form") or "I
213. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1117-19 (8th Cir.
2000) (reversing conviction under structuring prong of subsection
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) because the stipulated facts did not address defendant's
knowledge with respect to any federal transaction reporting requirement). But
cf United States v. Manfredi, 628 F. Supp. 2d 608, 626 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (stating
that a structuring indictment is sufficient notwithstanding the fact that it omits
knowledge element).
214. See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 2008) ("In
order to sustain a conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5324, we have held that the
government must prove 'only that a defendant knowledge of the reporting
requirements and acted to avoid them.'") (citations omitted); Regalado Cuellar
v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 1999 (2008); United States v. Morales-
Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. MacPherson, 424
F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (summarizing the post Ratzlaf mental elements).
215. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Hovind, 305 F. App'x 615, 621 (11th Cir. 2008)
(discussing a situation where employees and associates of defendants testified
that defendants knew of and complained about reporting requirements).
456 [Vol:50
2010] REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECY ACT
structured because the bank teller told me to do it."
Neither explanation rises to the level of a legal
justification or defense. The first explanation provides an
exculpatory motive for the structurer's conduct, but proof of a
bad motive is not an element of a structuring prosecution.217
The second explanation, if true, only serves to reinforce the
bank customer's intent to evade. The fact that he or she was
counseled to evade the reporting requirement is not a legal
justification.218
b. Cash "Pull Backs" and Teller Conversations.
In many structuring prosecutions, the government relies
on evidence that the transactor conversed with the teller
about the CTR requirements. The government may even
introduce evidence that the transactor altered the transaction
amount when advised by a teller or branch manager of the
currency transaction reporting requirement. A depositor
may, for example, present $15,000 for deposit, and when
advised that the transaction amount requires the filing of a
CTR, the depositor may "pull back" a portion of the cash to
bring the transaction to an amount below the CTR threshold.
Such "pull back" evidence is powerful proof of both knowledge
and intent to evade.
The difficulty with the aforementioned scenario is that
dating back to the time of the fall of 1994 and the Ratzlaf fix
financial institutions have generally been reluctant to engage
a transactor in a dialogue about the crime of structuring for
fear that the conversation may cross a line between merely
explaining the law, which is permissible, and advising a
customer as to how to evade the law, which is not
permissible.21 Thus, until recently, many customers heard
217. See MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193 (stating that § 5324 makes no
reference to the reason why a person structures); United States v. Gibbons, 968
F.2d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 1992).
218. Cf United States v. Wilcox, 919 F.2d 109, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that the fact that the defendant may have been encouraged by bank employees
to make a false statement on a loan application was not a defense).
219. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Domestic
Currency Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 3023, 3026 (Jan. 23, 1989) (explaining that
financial institutions may explain the reporting requirements to a customer, but
may not advise a customer as to how to evade those requirements). Before the
Ratzlaf fix, some financial institutions viewed it as a good customer service
policy to alert clients to the reporting requirements so that they could avoid
government reporting.
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only part of the story: the customer heard about the
requirement to file a CTR, but did not hear about the severe
legal consequences that occur when the transactor "pulls
back" currency to evade a CTR.22°
The practice of telling the customer only half of the story
is changing. The FinCEN recently issued guidance in the
form of a pamphlet that financial institutions are authorized
to distribute to their customers. 22' Among other things, the
pamphlet alerts the customer to the CTR requirement and
then takes the added step of cautioning the customer about
the consequences of structuring transactions to evade that
requirement:
Can I break up my currency transactions into
multiple, smaller amounts to avoid being reported
to the government?
No. This is called "structuring" and may also lead to a
required, separate report from the financial institution to
the federal government. Federal law makes it a crime to
break up transactions into smaller amounts for the
purpose of evading the CTR reporting requirement.
Structuring transactions at a financial institution to
prevent a CTR from being reported can result in
imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine of
up to $250,000. If structuring involves more than
$100,000 in a twelve-month period or is performed while
violating another law of the United States, the penalty is
doubled.222
220. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 n.6 (noting that the Secretary of Treasury
considered, but did not promulgate, a regulation requiring banks to inform
currency transaction customers of § 5324's proscription); see also United States
v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Much of the public's ignorance
regarding the illegality of structuring must be laid at the feet of the
government."); United States v. Simon, 85 F.3d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1996) (Winter,
J., dissenting) ("The government's failure to post such requirements is no
defense. Nevertheless, the lack of such notices undermines any assumption
that the details of the law are widely known.").
221. This kind of government-sanctioned notice to bank customers about
structuring has some precedent. For years, the Internal Revenue Manual
authorized agents to distribute during contacts or presentations with financial
institutions and trades or business "money laundering posters," but these
posters were designed to be voluntarily displayed in the "employee area" of the
business. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.5.8 (2004).
222. Notice to Customers: A CTR Reference Guide,
http'//www.fincen.gov/whatsnew/pdf/CTRPamphletBW.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2009).
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The pamphlet's language reflects a compromise between
the banking and law enforcement communities, and perhaps
a belated recognition that the government should do more to
educate the public about the serious consequences of
structuring financial transactions. For years, the IRS-
Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) has used so-called
"appointment letters" and "notification letters" to alert
individuals engaged in structuring that their conduct is a
crime.223 In addition to helping to curb structuring activity,
the letters and follow-up appointments served to establish
knowledge of the BSA's requirements.224  Financial
institutions complained to regulators and law enforcement
that these letters often had the unintended effect of alerting
their customers to the fact that the financial institution had
reported their structuring activity, placing the banks in an
awkward position vis a vis their customer. FinCEN's Notice
to Customers addresses this problem by allowing banks to
give notice directly. It also gives financial institutions the
latitude to alert their customers to the consequences of
structuring activity.
2. Circumstantial Evidence
a. Prior Experience with CTRs /Form 8300s
In a structuring case, the existence of other CTRs, Form
8300s, or CMIRs filed on transactions in which the defendant
was the conductor can be a double-edged sword. In the hands
of the prosecutor, prior reports may provide direct evidence
that the defendant knew of the reporting requirement and
may provide circumstantial evidence he or she acted with the
purpose of evading them.225 However, CTRs and Form 8300s
223. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.4.1.4.5.2.1 (2005) (authorizing
special agents to consult the participants and institutions identified in a
currency report to identify the source, disposition, and nature of the currency
transaction).
224. See United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1058 (10th Cir. 1997)
(finding it probative that IRS had notified defendant about CTR reporting
requirement prior to the time the defendant engaged in structuring activity).
225. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189-95 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868, 878 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing a
situation where the defendant's partner in the restaurant business testified
that the CTR requirements are "common restaurant knowledge"), vacated on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005); United States v. Nesersian, 824 F.2d 1294,
1314-15 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570,
459
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
can also be a sword in the hands of the defense. If, during the
period of the alleged structuring activity, the defendant
conducted CTR-generating transactions in which the CTR
was filed "with conductor," meaning in the presence of the
person conducting the transaction, such reports tend to
negate the inference that the defendant intended to structure.
In effect, the presence of CTR reports amidst a pattern of
seemingly structured transactions raises a question: why
would the defendant contemporaneously conduct transactions
that triggered reports in some circumstances but not others?
The leading case discussing the government's use of
previously filed CTRs to prove knowledge and intent is
United States v. MacPherson.226 MacPherson was a New
York City police officer who, in the course of a four-month
period between September 2000 and January 2001, deposited
$258,100 in cash into three bank accounts over the course of
thirty-two transactions in which no single transaction
1580-81 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that knowledge predicated on prior discussion
of CTR requirements); United States v. Ozbay, No. 1:04-CR-0524, 2007 WL
656049, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007) ("Where there is evidence of a pattern of
structuring as well as evidence of other transactions which generated CTR
filings, it is permissible to infer that a person knows of and intends to evade
currency reporting requirements."); cf United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174,
1177 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying, in part, on notice of CMIR requirements contained
in passport to conclude evidence was sufficient to show knowledge); United
States v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (inferring knowledge of
CMIR requirement from fact that defendant was an experienced international
traveler who had completed and signed the Customs Declaration form (Form
6059B), which details the requirements for filing a CMIR).
In evaluating whether these reports are relevant to prove or negate
knowledge or intent, a couple of things need to be kept in mind. First, banks
frequently file CTRs "without conductor." 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2008) (setting
forth the requirements of the aggregation rule). These CTRs are filed on
aggregated transactions, typically outside the presence of the conductor, and
thus the conductor does not necessarily have knowledge that the CTR was even
filed. Because they may be filed without the knowledge of the transactor, these
CTRs are generally not probative of knowledge or intent.
Second, Form 8300s differ from CTRs in that the Form 8300 filer must
notify its customer that a Form 8300 has been filed. See 26 C.F.R. § 1,60501(f)
(2008). Thus, if it can be proved that the customer was notified about the Form
8300 by the trade or business, then that fact could be probative of knowledge or
intent.
Finally, CMIRs differ from both CTRs and Form 8300s because they are
filed by the transporter of the currency, not a bank or business. Thus, a
previously filed CMIR will be strong evidence that the transporter was aware of
at least the CMIR requirements.
226. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183.
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exceeded $10,000.227 In reversing a judgment of acquittal, the
court of appeals discussed evidence showing MacPherson had
acquired knowledge of the CTR filing requirements in 1989
and 1999 when he conducted four cash withdrawals, each of
which prompted his bank to file CTRs. 2 8  While no bank
employee could specifically recall the transactions, the
government elicited testimony from the bank manager who
completed the CTRs that her practice was to complete the
CTR "sitting across the desk from the customer while she
obtained the necessary identifying information from him."229
The court held that such testimony, when combined with
the pattern of deposits, strongly reinforced the conclusion
that the defendant acted with the intent to evade the CTR
requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected
the defense argument that the testimony supported only the
inference that the defendant knew some sort of form needed
to be filled out, not the inference that it was a reporting form
required by the government.230
In MacPherson, the evidence establishing defendant's
knowledge of the currency transaction reporting requirement
was strong: viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, the evidence established that the CTR Form was
completed in the defendant's presence. In United States v.
Baydoun, the evidence of prior knowledge was not as
strong. 231 There, the defendant presented $16,700 in cash for
deposit. 232 When told by a teller that the transaction required
a "form" to be completed, the defendant reduced his
transaction to an amount under the CTR threshold.233 He
then returned over the next couple of days to deposit the rest
of the currency.234 On these facts, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled the evidence was insufficient to establish that
the defendant had the intent to deprive the government of
anything or to structure currency transactions to evade the
reporting requirements.235  In its reasoning, the court
227. Id. at 184.
228. Id. at 186.
229. Id. at 194.
230. Id.
231. United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 177.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 180-82.
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emphasized that the defendant had been told a "form" was to
be completed, but he was not told that the form was a CTR
required by federal law.236
In any structuring prosecution, the government should
query the Currency and Banking Retrieval System (CBRS)
and identify prior CTRs, Form 8300s, and even CMIRs filed
in connection with reportable transactions involving the
defendant and produce them in discovery. Currency reports
that predate the structuring activity may help the
government establish a defendant's knowledge and intent to
evade. Currency reports that fall within the midst of the
structuring activity could rise to the level of Brady material 237
because they could be favorable to the accused and material
to the issue of whether the defendant acted with the intent to
evade. If such reports are not produced, good defense practice
in most cases would be to request their production.
38
b. Inferring Knowledge and Intent Based on Proof of
a Cash Hoard
In many structuring prosecutions, the government can
marshal evidence that the defendant had a cash hoard in an
amount greater than $10,000 prior to engaging in a series of
sub-reporting threshold transactions. Ratzlaf is a perfect
236. Id. at 181.
237. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (discussing
materiality). The term Brady material refers to evidence that is both favorable
to the accused and material either to guilty or to punishment.
238. See United States v. Aversa, 769 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.N.H. 1990) (ruling
on defense discovery requests in a structuring prosecution). One interesting
issue is whether a defendant is entitled to a suspicious activity report (SAR)
filed by a financial institution reporting suspected structuring activity. See
generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (setting forth the government's discovery
obligations in a criminal case). In the context of civil litigation, courts have
generally held that SARs are not discoverable. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v.
Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Cotton v. PrivateBank and
Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 809, 814 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Weil v. Long Island Sav.
Bank, 195 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that SAR may not be
disclosed in civil discovery). However, the issue is more complicated in a
criminal case. A law enforcement agent may be asked questions on cross-
examination that call for him or her to disclose the existence of the SAR.
Alternatively, the narrative portion of the SAR may include a statement of the
defendant made to a bank teller, for example, or may contain exculpatory
information. Given that so many structuring investigations emerge from a
SAR, the possibility that the SAR might be disclosed in the course of a
structuring trial seems very high.
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illustration. Ratzlaf lost $160,000 gambling on credit at a
Nevada casino and was given a week within which to pay off
the debt.239 He returned a week later with a $100,000 in
cash, telling the casino's shift manager that he wanted to pay
off his markers, but did not want any paperwork filled out.
240
When the casino refused the paperless currency transaction,
it arranged to have a casino employee accompany Ratzlaf as
he went from bank to bank in and around the Stateline,
Nevada area purchasing cashier's checks in amounts just
below the CTR threshold.24 1  Those cashier's checks were
later used to pay off the debt.242
The facts of Ratzlaf represent a sort of "gold standard" in
terms of the government's proof that a defendant knew of the
CTR requirement and broke up a cash transaction into
smaller transactions for the purpose of evading it. Many
other appellate decisions present similar facts in which the
government proved that the defendant possessed a cash
hoard in an amount greater than $10,000 and then engaged
in a series of sub-$10,000 cash deposits, withdrawals, or
exchanges of currency. 243
c. Inferring Knowledge and Intent Based on Pattern
and Purpose of High-Dollar Cash
Transactions
Some early appellate decisions addressed situations in
which the government could prove the existence of a cash
hoard in an amount greater than the CTR threshold and
further show the "breaking down" of that cash hoard into two
or more financial transactions, which in aggregate exceeded
the threshold. Ratzlaf was such a case. Mr. Ratzlaf
unmistakably had $100,000 in hand when he began driving
around from bank to bank purchasing cashier's checks in sub-
$10,000 cash transactions.24  In these early appellate
decisions, courts would sometimes refer to structuring as the
239. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 533 (10th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the government proved the defendant won approximately $92,000,
paid out in cash, while gambling); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169,
1173 (7th Cir. 1991).
244. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137.
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breaking down of a cash hoard into enough separate deposits
to avoid the CTR requirement.245
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from these
cases that the government must prove the existence of a cash
hoard greater than $10,000 in order to sustain a structuring
conviction. Proof that the defendant possessed a cash hoard
greater than $10,000 and then broke it down into two or more
transactions below the reporting or recordkeeping threshold
is just one of many ways the government may prove
structuring.246 More recent cases from numerous circuits
have sustained structuring convictions in cases based on
inferences drawn from a pattern of large cash transactions
below the CTR threshold.247 In many of these cases, the
245. See Davenport, 929 F.2d at 1173; see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg) (2008)
(defining structuring to include the breaking down of a single sum of currency
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or below $10,000).
246. See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that proof of the breaking down of a cash hoard is just one method of
proving structuring; government may also prove it through evidence of a
pattern of sub-$10,000 cash transactions); see also United States v. Hovind, 305
F. App'x 615, 619-20 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument that the
indictment was deficient for failing to allege that the defendant structured more
than $10,000 in currency).
247. See United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.
2006) ("The consistent avoidance of the $10,000 threshold over a period of
almost three years would, in our view, permit a jury to conclude that Morales
divided all transactions above the threshold 'for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements'"); United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189-95
(2d Cir. 2005) (reversing judgment of acquittal in structuring case; defendant's
knowledge of reporting requirement and intent to evade it could reasonably
have been inferred by the pattern of large cash transactions and earlier cash
withdrawals that generated CTRs); United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310,
314-15 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction based on evidence of pattern of
bank deposits, wife's knowledge of the reporting requirements, and defendant's
knowledge that depositing over $10,000 would require additional paperwork);
United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other
grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005); United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1069
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that "evidence that a defendant has structured currency
transactions in a manner indicating a design to conceal the structuring activity
itself, alone or in conjunction with other evidence of the defendant's state of
mind, may support a conclusion that the defendant knew structuring was
illegal"); United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 574 (1st Cir. 1995); United
States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that defendant's
purpose of multiple cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000 to conduct
transactions in larger amounts "created an inference that he was motivated to
avoid the reporting requirement"); United States v. Walker, 25 F.3d 540, 543,
548 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Funds in Amount of $101,999.78, No.
08 cv 237, 2008 WL 4222248 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2008) (following Van Allen, 524
F.3d 814).
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government marshaled other evidence to support the
inference of intent. But others, the government's entire case
rested on inferences drawn from the pattern of the
transaction activity.
Cases in which the government relies on a pattern of
deposits to show knowledge and intent present two principal
challenges. First, the pattern must be very strong, and even
then may not be sufficient. In several pre-Ratzlaf fix cases,
courts declined to infer knowledge that structuring was a
crime based solely on the structuring behavior itself.24 The
Ratzlaf fix, which eliminates the heightened element of
specific intent, increases the risk that a morally blameless
person could be convicted of violating the statute if the
government's evidence rests exclusively on a pattern of
transaction activity.249  Thus, isolated instances of
structuring, even when supported by other acts evidence, may
not be sufficient to support the requisite inferences of
knowledge and intent.250
Second, the trier of fact must be especially wary in cases
where the government relies on a strong pattern of sub-
$10,000 cash transactions. Often in precisely those cases
where the evidence of structuring pattern may appear
strongest-cases involving businesses with large daily cash
deposits or withdrawals-the danger exists that the
transactor may have conducted transactions below the
reporting or recordkeeping threshold for reasons having
nothing to do with the currency transaction reporting
requirement.251 A small business operator may avoid
248. See United States v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997) (collecting
cases).
249. See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1999)
(explaining that the Ratzlaf decision is an example of the Court imposing an
additional mental state to shield blameless conduct from criminal
condemnation).
250. See Wynn, 61 F.3d at 928 (representing a pre-Ratzlaf-fix decision;
evidence insufficient to show knowledge of illegality where defendant structured
transactions on only two occasions; fact that on one occasion defendant knew he
was dealing with drug proceeds does not alter analysis).
251. Both the majority and dissent in Ratzlaf expressed particular concern
about the application of § 5324 to individuals who may have legitimate business
reasons for engaging in extensive cash deposit activity. Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsberg expressed concern that "under the Government's
construction an individual would commit a felony against the United States by
making cash deposits in small doses, fearful that the bank's reports would
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accumulating too much currency at his or her store location
for fear of robbery, and thus routinely make large sub-
$10,000 cash deposits. 252 The store owner's purpose in such a
circumstance is not to evade the currency transaction
reporting requirement, but to reduce the risk of robbery.258
In these cases, if the government relies on a pattern of
large cash deposits, it should show some combination of facts
that, taken together, eliminate the possibility that some other
purpose explains the transactions. 5 4  For example, the
government may show some combination of the following
factors: extensive transaction activity over a period of months
or years; transactions that occur close in time to one another,
increase the likelihood of burglary." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 145
(1994). Justice Blackmun, in dissent, answered this argument, but in terms
suggesting that the government would have problems if it charged a person who
may have legitimate business reasons for conducting frequent cash
transactions. Id. at 155 n.6 (Blackman, J., dissenting) ("If a person has
legitimate business reasons for conducting frequent cash transactions, or if the
transactions can genuinely be characterized as separate, rather than artificially
structured, then the person is not engaged in 'structuring' for the purpose of
'evasion.'"); see also FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL app. G (2006),
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/bsa-amlexamination_manual2006.pdf ("However, two
transactions slightly under the $10,000 threshold conducted days or weeks
apart may not necessarily be structuring. For example, if a customer deposits
$9900 in currency on Monday and deposits $9900 in currency on Wednesday, it
should not be assumed that structuring has occurred. Instead, further review
and research may be necessary to determine the nature of the transactions,
prior account history, and other relevant customer information to assess
whether the activity is suspicious."); FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK &
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 17, at 62-91.
252. There may similarly be instances where a business owner's insurance
policy limits the amount of currency that may be maintained at a business
location at any one time. The effect of such policies may be to cause business
owners to make frequent cash deposits below the reporting threshold rather
than accumulate cash and make larger deposits above the reporting threshold.
253. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 155 n.6 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting
that if there was some business reason for conducting a large cash transaction
below the CTR threshold, the court would be more sympathetic to evidence of
such a defense); United States v. Tipton, 56 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Noonan, J., dissenting); United States v. Trading Post of Pasco, Inc., No. 08-
35939, 2009 WL 3287881 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2009) (unpublished) (appellants
raised a genuine issue of material fact defeating summary judgment in civil
forfeiture prosecution premised on structuring where appellants offered
evidence that transactions were conducted for "legitimate business reasons");
JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES § 6.44 at 6-125-26 (2006).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 641 (9th Cir.
1992) (inferring knowledge of CTR because otherwise the defendant's actions
make no sense).
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e.g., on the same day or on consecutive days; the use of
different banks and bank branches; the cashing of multiple
checks where one would have been more efficient; and
transactions in which the amount of the transaction itself is
some indication of intent to structure, e.g., even dollar deposit
amounts just below the relevant threshold.25 The key for the
government is to show that the defendant sacrificed efficiency
and convenience for no justifiable reason.25 6 In the absence of
such evidence, fact finders-or appellate courts-may be
sympathetic to what might be termed "business necessity"
defenses, particularly those offered by individuals operating
smaller, cash-intensive businesses.257  Indeed, with few
exceptions, most appellate cases that affirm structuring
convictions based on a pattern of high-dollar deposits have
also relied upon other evidence tending to show intent or
criminal motive.258
d. Other Acts Evidence
In many structuring prosecutions, the government may
seek to bolster its proof that the defendant acted with the
purpose or intent to evade a reporting or recordkeeping
255. For example, in United States v. Van Allen, the defendant argued that
the nature of his business-the auto parts business-required him to engage in
the pattern of withdrawals and deposits in sub-$10,000 amounts. 524 F.3d at
820. The court of appeals explained that the jury likely rejected the defense
because the defendant's transactions were irrational and inefficient. Id.
256. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 89 (2d
Cir. 2002) ("As to the structuring violation, the probable cause . . . is of course
only enhanced by the additional facts of the dates and locations of purchase,
which not only indicated the extraordinary effort which went into purchasing
the money orders in such small denominations but also eliminated any
possibility that the money orders had been received in those denominations in
the ordinary course of business."); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 645
(8th Cir.1992) (stating that because "receipt and cashing of six checks would
have been less efficient and convenient than receiving and cashing one, it is
difficult to explain this change except that [the defendant] sought to evade the
reporting requirements"); cf. United States v. Funds in Amount of $101,999.78,
No. 08 cv 237, 2008 WL 4222248 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2008) (stating that facts set
forth in civil forfeiture complaint are sufficient to infer knowledge and intent
where complaint alleges numerous $8000 cash deposits, the use of several
accounts, and total cash deposited).
257. Van Allen, 524 F.3d at 821 ("We would be more sympathetic to this
argument had Van Allen cashed only a small handful of sub-$10,000 checks, or
pointed to the unique nature of the auto parts business that, for whatever
reason, necessitated transactions under $10,000.").
258. See JOHN K. VILLA, supra note 253, § 6.43, at 6-114 (collecting cases).
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requirement with evidence of other acts that tend to show
motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or common
scheme or plan. The defendant may, for example, structure
to evade unwanted attention from his or her creditors.
259
Alternatively, the defendant may structure to conceal a tax
evasion scheme or the disposition of criminal proceeds.260 As
Judge Posner once wrote: "The shadier the source [of the
currency], the greater the [defendant's] motive to conceal the
money from authorities by taking measures to thwart the
reporting requirements." 26' However, evidence that the
currency derives from an unlawful source is subject to
exclusion under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and
404(b), particularly where the evidence has only marginal
relevance and raises the specter of a mini-trial on uncharged
but serious criminal conduct such as drug trafficking.262
Attempts by defense counsel to put on "innocent source"
or "innocent motive" evidence have largely proved
unsuccessful. The most common "innocent motive" defense is
sometimes called "convenience structuring," meaning that the
259. United States v. Garza, 42 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that
evidence of lien put on car sold by defendant to a third party's wife, although
she owed no money, was admissible in structuring prosecution to show
defendant's involvement in scheme); cf. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 191 ("Rather,
the evidence suggested that the cash was a long-held asset that MacPherson
had shielded for some years from a possible tort judgment.").
260. See MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193 ("Certainly, the criminal origin of
funds, to the extent it provides a motive for concealment from government
authorities, may constitute an additional circumstance from which a jury can
infer a defendant's knowledge of and intent to avoid CTR filings."); United
States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
district court properly admitted expert testimony on money laundering under
Rule 404(b) in structuring prosecution); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d
1169, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing tax evasion motive); United States v.
Conners, 825 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in CMIR, the
prosecution district court properly admitted evidence of defendant's
involvement in drug trafficking "to prove [the defendant's] state of mind, that is,
that he had a motive to conceal the currency . . . and to fail to report its
transportation into the United States"); United States v. Chaudhry, No. C 03-
40210, 2008 WL 2128197 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2008) (denying motion in limine to
exclude evidence of tax evasion; such evidence may be probative of motive to
engage in structuring).
261. Davenport, 929 F.2d at 1174.
262. See United States v. Oreira, 29 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating
that evidence that narcotics-detecting dog alerted to currency should have been
excluded in prosecution for structuring currency, evidence did little to prove the
defendants knew that money was connected to drugs, criminal nexus is not an
element of structuring offense, and there was a substantial risk of prejudice).
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defendant's motive for evading a currency or reporting
requirement was a desire not to be delayed by the process of
completing the CTR. Appellate courts have regarded such
evidence as irrelevant unless it tends to negate the element of
specific intent.263
e. Occupation / BSA Background Evidence
Some individuals, such as bank employees, are employed
in lines-of-work that give them exposure to BSA reporting
and recordkeeping obligations. Evidence of such employment
or specialized BSA training may be admissible to prove
knowledge and intent.2"
V. RECURRING ISSUES IN STRUCTURING PROSECUTIONS
A. Lawful Source of Structured Funds
It is sometimes said that for purposes of anti-structuring
263. See MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193-94; United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d
639, 645 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is immaterial that [the defendant's] apparent
purpose for [structuring] was to prevent his ex-wife rather than the government
from tracing the funds. The focus of the statute is on the structuring person's
conduct, not on the reason why he did not want the transaction report filed.");
cf. United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The
government, therefore, was only required to prove that the [defendants] knew
they were required to file a [CMIRI and that, for whatever reason, they
deliberately evaded this requirement. Because motive is neither an element of
the crimes nor a defense under either § 5322 or § 5332, the district court was
within its discretion to exclude evidence [that funds came from a legitimate
source or had a benevolent purpose].").
264. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 194 (discussing a licensed real estate sales
person); United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated
on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005) (discussing a restaurant owner); United
States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing to defendant's legal
training and career on bench as evidence that supported inference of
knowledge); United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1997)
(discussing knowledge inferred from, among other evidence, defendant's
employment as tax return preparer and CPA); United States v. Simon, 85 F.3d
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that because defendant was a stockbroker
required to file Form 8300s in connection with his own business, "[tihe jury
reasonably could have inferred that [he] possessed the knowledge and
sophistication to understand that his own conduct was unlawful"); United
States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing an attorney);
United States v. Warner, No. 02 CR 506-1, 02 CR 506-4, 2006 WL 2583722
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2006) (discussing an officer/director of bank). But see United
States v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997) (featuring a pre-Ratzlaf-fix
case; defendant's prior experience as bank president was insufficient absent
evidence to establish that defendant knew of his duty not to structure).
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laws it does not matter whether funds derive from a
legitimate source. "[Ilt would make no difference to the
Treasury if someone illegally structured a transaction to
avoid reporting an exceptionally generous gift that fell above
the $10,000 threshold, or if she wanted to avoid reporting the
receipt of illegal proceeds."265 This statement is true, at least
in so far as it describes the underlying purposes of § 5324.
Section 5324 makes no reference to the source of the money or
the defendant's motive; its "singular focus is on the method
employed" to evade the reporting requirement. 266
However, the source of the funds makes a difference in a
structuring prosecution in two ways.267 First, in a structuring
prosecution, evidence that funds derived from a criminal
source may be admitted to show the defendant had a motive
to structure.26 Indeed, a main objective of the reporting laws
and, consequently, the anti-structuring laws, is to help law
enforcement detect illegally-derived currency when it moves
through the financial system.
Second, anti-money laundering laws differentiate
between structuring legitimate and illegitimate funds, and
the distinction is important to keep in mind in understanding
the government's prosecutorial options. The structuring of
illegitimate funds, i.e., funds that derive from a specified
unlawful activity, is a violation not just of § 5324, but is also
an 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) violation.269 Essentially, it is
a traditional form of money laundering. In cases where the
government can readily prove that the structured funds
derived from the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, the
265. United States v. Gabel, 85 F.3d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1996).
266. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193; see also United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d
774, 777 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thakkar, 721 F. Supp. 1030, 1032
n.5 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
267. As explained in Part VII below, the source of the funds also matters in a
third way: it impacts upon sentencing and forfeiture issues.
268. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193.
269. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); see also United States v. Dinero
Express, Inc., 57 F. App'x 456, 461 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that a money
laundering conviction premised on structuring behavior is not multiplicitous of
structuring offense because the offenses involve different elements); United
States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1069-70 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that structuring
is not a lesser included offense of money laundering charge because the offenses
have different scienter requirements); United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213,
1221-22 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 927-28 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Walcott, 61 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1995).
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government may elect to charge the offense under §
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) rather than under § 5324. A conviction
under § 1956 should, in theory, provide for more serious
penalties than a comparable conviction under § 5324.270
Moreover, because the essence of a § 1956 transaction is a
financial transaction involving criminal proceeds, the
prosecutor may have broader latitude at trial to admit
evidence not just of the underlying criminal activity that
generated the funds, but also "other acts" evidence.27
1
Finally, the unit of prosecution under § 1956, each individual
financial transaction,272 is usually easy to identify. The unit
of prosecution under § 5324(a)(3) is the "structuring" activity
itself, which, as discussed in Part V.B, is sometimes difficult
to identify.
B. Identifying the Unit of Prosecution
As a general rule, the unit of prosecution is the aspect of
criminal activity that the statute aims to punish. When the
same statutory violation is charged multiple times, an issue
can arise as to whether the indictment or information is
multiplicitous.273 By contrast, when the conduct is charged as
one offense, but the statute treats the conduct as involving
multiple offenses, an issue can arise as to whether the
indictment or information is duplicitous.274 The unit of
prosecution in structuring cases can be difficult to identify,
particularly in cases in which no single source can be
identified for the funds that are structured.
270. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (2003) (stating
the guideline for § 1956 offenses), with id. § 2S1.3 (stating the guideline for §
5324 offenses).
271. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also id. at 609 (governing admissibility of
prior convictions for purposes of impeaching a witness); United States v. Oreira,
29 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 1994) (excluding narcotics evidence from structuring
prosecution in part because proof that the funds derived from a criminal source
is not an element of a § 5324 offense).
272. See United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 412 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995).
273. See e.g., United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2009) ("An
indictment is multiplicitous if its charges a single offense in more than one
count.").
274. See, e.g., United States v. Renteria, 557 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir.
2009) ("An indictment is considered duplicitous if a single count combines two
or more different offenses.").
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1. The Unit of Prosecution in Perfect Structuring Cases
Early cases addressing the unit of prosecution for perfect
structuring follow a pattern. The government could establish
that, prior to the structuring conduct, an individual possessed
a single cash hoard and subsequently engaged in multiple
sub-$10,000.00 transactions with those funds. In defining the
unit of prosecution, appellate decisions in cases such as
United States v. Davenport, United States v. Dashney, and
United States v. Nall looked to the source of the funds
structured. If the funds come from a single cash hoard, the
government must charge a single substantive violation of §
5324(a)(3). The alternative, charging one count for each
structured transaction, would be multiplicitous.275 Under the
"single source rationale," a defendant who possesses $100,000
in currency and deposits that currency into a bank account in
a series of transactions just beneath the pertinent reporting
or recordkeeping threshold commits one § 5324(a) offense.276
The Davenport-Dashney-Nall line of cases, though
instructive in circumstances where the government can prove
a single source for the structured funds, provides little
guidance outside that context. For example, a transactor may
engage in structured cash withdrawal activity. In the case of
structured cash withdrawals, can it be said that there is a
single source of funds? What if the bank account steadily
replenishes during the time frame in which cash is
withdrawn in structured transactions? In the case of deposit
transactions, what is the unit of prosecution in cases where
the government cannot identify a single source of funds-as is
often true in the case of individuals who operate cash
275. See United States v. Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 308 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing
a $26,000 cash hoard); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 533 (10th Cir.
1991) (discussing an almost $100,000 cash hoard exchanged for multiple sub-
$10,000 cashier's checks); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1171-72
(7th Cir. 1991) (discussing an $81,000 cash hoard deposited in ten structured
transactions); see also United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868, 881-82 (7th Cir.
2004) (breaking two separate cash hoards into multiple parts may be charged as
two offenses), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005).
276. One alternative to the "single source rationale" is to focus on the
disposition of the structured funds. If the government can identify two or more
structured transactions, each tied to the same intended disposition, then those
transactions group into a single count of structuring. See United States v.
Coney, No. CR.A. 02-321, 2003 WL 2004437, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2003)
(rejecting motion to dismiss an indictment that broke the structuring counts
down according to the intended disposition of the funds).
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intensive business such as a convenience store or money
transmitting business?
When the government cannot prove a single source or
disposition for the structured funds, it has struggled to
identify the unit of prosecution. In United States v.
Handakas, for example, the government attempted to define
the unit of prosecution by time interval, i.e., one count of
structuring for each twelve-month period of structuring
activity. 277 While this theory of prosecution finds some
support in the enhanced penalty provision of § 5324(d), which
similarly refers to structuring that occurs across a twelve-
month time period, the Handakas Court rejected it. "[N]o
provision of the statute indicates that a single course of
structuring can be segmented based on [twelve]-month
intervals (or for any other intervals of time) or by the amount
of funds in any interval."2 7' The Handakas court also rejected
the government's attempt on appeal to bring the facts within
the Davenport-Dashney-Nall line of cases. 79 However, the
Handakas court did not offer any guidance as to how the
government should have defined the unit of prosecution.
Similarly, in United States v. Catherman, the
government attempted to define the unit of prosecution by
looking for logical breaks in the structuring activity, i.e., gaps
in time when the structuring activity ceased before resuming
again. 28 0 The Catherman court rejected this approach. Citing
the Davenport-Dashney-Nall line of cases, the court held that
without proof of multiple sources for the structured funds, the
government could not charge multiple counts.
Faced with the Davenport-Dashney-Nall-Handakas line
of authority, the district court in United States v. Kushner
offered guidance as to how the government should proceed if
it cannot identify a single source of funds for the structured
transactions.28' In Kushner, the defendants operated a check
cashing business. Over a period of several years, they
deposited $15,000,000 in funds into several accounts from
which they withdrew large amounts of currency in sub-
277. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2002).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 98-99.
280. United States v. Catherman, No. 4:07-cr-00106-JEG, 2007 WL 2790384,
at *2 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 24, 2007).
281. See United States v. Kushner, 256 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Mass. 2003).
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$10,000 transactions. 8 2  The government charged the
defendants with independent structuring counts for each day
in which defendants conducted cash withdrawals in
structured amounts. The district court concluded that such a
charge was multiplicitous because it repeated the error in
Handakas by arbitrarily attempting to define a time-based
unit of prosecution. In dicta, the Kushner Court suggested
that if the government can identify various sources of money
deposited into the defendants' accounts, then the government
can attempt to tie individual structuring counts to each
source. 283 If the government cannot identify a particular
source or sources, then it should charge "one count of
structuring that span[s] the relevant time period."214  In
Kushner, the government could not identify any sources of
deposit. "All of the money within the Defendants' accounts
was the product of the Defendants' unlicensed business, and
it was the sum in its entirety that the Defendants' sought to
conceal."285
One by-product of the unit of prosecution problem in
structure cases is that it can shape the scope of the trial. If,
for example, the government charges too narrow a
structuring pattern it may face a Rule 403 or 404(b)-type
objection when it seeks to admit evidence of other large sub-
$10,000 transactions. Some courts have allowed the
government to charge a group of structured transactions and
then use other transactions as circumstantial evidence
supporting an overall theory of structuring.286 However,
others, most notably the Kushner court, appear less
sympathetic to this practical problem.
2. The Unit of Prosecution in Imperfect Structuring Cases
The unit of prosecution in an imperfect structuring
prosecution is comparatively easy to identify. In contrast to
the unit of prosecution in a perfect structuring case, which is
282. Id. at 111.
283. Id. at 114.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 113.
286. See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008);
United States v. 21090 Boulder Cir., No. 92-1589, 1993 WL 432376, at *5 (6th
Cir. Oct. 5, 1993) (admitting evidence of prior cash purchases of cashier's checks
in structured amounts to refute claims of mistake, inadvertency or lack of
knowledge as to the structured nature of the transactions at issue).
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defined by the source of the structured funds, the unit of
prosecution in an imperfect structuring case is defined by the
obligation that the accused sought to evade, i.e., the bank's
obligation to file a CTR.2 7 That obligation in turn is defined
by regulation; in any banking day on which a customer
conducts a transaction involving more than $10,000 in
currency, the bank has a duty to file a CTR.
Consider this hypothetical. An individual transactor
conducts three deposits into a single bank account, each in an
amount just below the $10,000 CTR threshold. Assume
further that the transactions were conducted with the
purpose of causing or attempting to cause the bank to fail to
file a CTR. In that circumstance, for each banking day when
the bank had a duty to file a CTR, a transactor who caused or
attempted to cause the bank not to file a CTR would violate §
5324(a)(1). In other words, each day of imperfect structuring
equals one unit of prosecution.
3. Charging Alternatives in Cases Where the Unit of
Prosecution Is Difficult to Identify
Where the government cannot identify the proper unit of
prosecution, it has several fall-back positions. It can prove a
conspiracy to structure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 by
showing the existence of an agreement between two or more
persons to engage in structuring and an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.288 In this instance, the unit of
prosecution is the agreement itself, not the individual
transactions that constitute overt acts in furtherance of the
agreement. Alternatively, the government can charge the
offense under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), which makes it a crime to
conduct a financial transaction with the proceeds of a
specified unlawful activity with the intent to evade a
reporting requirement. Here, the unit of prosecution is each
individual financial transaction.2 9 In other words, each
287. Cf United States v. Kushner, 256 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 n.6 (D. Mass.
2003) (explaining that in the case of a willful failure to file a CTR the unit of
prosecution is each day in which a required CTR was not filed); see also Welling,
supra note 6, at 324 (stating that in the case of imperfect structuring, the unit
of prosecution refers to each instance the bank fails to file a report or the
transactor attempts to cause the bank to fail to file the report).
288. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 412 (5th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.14 (11th Cir. 1999) (dictum);
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individual transaction below the pertinent reporting or
recordkeeping threshold conducted with the purpose of
evading the BSA is a stand-alone § 1956 violation.
VI. DEFENSES TO STRUCTURING CHARGES
A. Mistaken Identity-Deposit Transactions
A latent issue in CTR structuring prosecutions is the
problem of identifying the transactor. In a debit transaction,
e.g., a currency withdrawal, a jury can reasonably infer that
the person(s) who maintain signature authority over the
account participated in the structured cash withdrawal.
Testimony from a bank employee will readily establish that
the bank does not authorize a customer to withdraw cash
from an account unless the customer either uses a unique
personal identification number (PIN) presumably known only
to the customer or, in the case of a withdrawal conducted at a
teller window, verifies his or her identity with some
acceptable form of photo identification.
A deposit transaction is different. At some financial
institutions, a person can deposit currency into a bank
account in structured amounts, and precisely because the
transaction does not exceed the CTR threshold, there may be
no record of who conducted the transaction.2 90 Banks have no
obligation to verify or record the identity of the transactor in
the case of deposit transactions under the CTR threshold.
Thus, in the case of deposit transactions, evidence identifying
the transactor may be more difficult to find. It may take the
form of testimony from a bank teller or branch manager who
handled the transaction(s) and who can identify the
transactor. Alternatively, proof may take the form of
surveillance video footage from the branch where the
transaction was conducted that corresponds in date and time
to that recorded on the deposit slip, assuming the bank has
not otherwise destroyed or recorded over the relevant footage.
United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995).
290. See Courtney J. Linn, How Terrorists Exploit Gaps in U.S. Anti-Money
Laundering Law to Secrete Plunder, 8 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 200
(2005) (discussing this issue and urging regulators to require banks to verify the
identity of persons making large sub-$10,000 currency deposits).
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B. Negating Knowledge and Specific Intent
1. Bank Policy Defense
The Bank Policy Defense, which is something akin to a
"good faith" defense, has received surprisingly little
attention.291 Under this defense, the defendant may concede
that he conducted transactions in structured amounts, but
nonetheless argue that he held a good faith belief that he was
evading a bank requirement, rather than a reporting or
recordkeeping requirement imposed by federal law.
The leading case exploring this defense is United States
v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456.292
There, the district court granted summary judgment in a civil
forfeiture action predicated on an allegation that forfeited
funds had been involved in structuring violations.293 The
claimant to the seized funds had offered evidence suggesting
he was unaware that the CTR was required by federal law.294
He asserted that he had consulted with an attorney who
advised him he would need to fill out a report if the
transaction exceeded $10,000, but that it was lawful to avoid
filling out the reports by depositing less than $10,000 at a
time.295 Over the course of approximately two weeks, the
claimant proceeded to make twenty-six deposits totaling
$199,800 at seven different banks with most deposits ranging
from $8000 to $9500.296 He maintained that he had asked
two bank branch managers whether it was lawful to avoid
reporting transactions by depositing amounts under $10,000.
The branch managers said it was lawful, but did not inform
him that reporting was required by law.297
291. United States v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456,
980 F.2d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d
175, 181 (6th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that the defendant must know that the
CTR requirement is imposed by federal law and acted to evade that
requirement); United States v. 316 Units of Mun. Sec. in the Name of Efrain
Gonzalez, 725 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that although
claimants "had conducted previous transactions in which the bank filed CTRs,
there is doubt as to whether [they] knew that it was a federal law that required
the reporting").
292. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456, 980 F.2d 233.
293. Id. at 236.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 235.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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On appeal, the defendant argued that this evidence
tended to negate the specific intent requirement needed to
establish a structuring violation. The Third Circuit agreed,
rejecting the government's contention that § 5324 defined a
general intent crime for which the claimant's professed belief
would be irrelevant. In pertinent part, it ruled that § 5324
requires a specific and precisely defined mens rea: a person
must structure for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements of § 5313(a). A person who believes that
reporting is required by bank policy, instead of the law,
cannot structure for the purpose of evading the requirements
of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). 298 "Proof that the accused structured
transactions in amounts under $10,000 is not enough. It
must also be proven that he structured for the specific
purpose of evading the federal reporting requirements."299
The "bank policy" defense proves especially problematic
for the government in two situations. The first occurs where
evidence shows the bank maintained policies that
discouraged cash transactions in amounts greater than
$10,000. For example, a particular branch may maintain a
policy of disallowing a customer to withdrawal more than
$10,000 without the customer having first placed an order for
the currency, or it may charge fees for counting currency
when a deposit or withdrawal transaction exceeds certain
thresholds. Both sets of facts raise the concern that the
transactor may have acted to comply with the bank's policies
rather than to evade a reporting requirement required by
federal law.3 °0
The second situation where this defense proves
problematic involves recordkeeping requirements. In the case
of wire transfers, several large money-transmitting
businesses impose recordkeeping requirements, as a matter
of corporate policy, that are significantly below the $3000
threshold currently imposed by federal law. 3 1 They do so
298. United States v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456,
980 F.2d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1992).
299. Id. at 237.
300. But see United States v. Vosburgh, No. 98-30074, 1998 WL 879495, at *1
(9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998) (rejecting "legal impossibility" defense to structuring
prosecution premised on postal service regulations forbidding sale of more than
$10,000; defendant's obligation not to structure is independent from Postal
Service's obligation to file CTRs).
301. See Letter from Richard Weber, Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money
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because while the United States retains a $3000
recordkeeping requirement for international wires, the
international standard has dropped to $1000.302 The
imposition of corporate record-keeping policies below the
federal threshold raises the specter that an individual who
structures wire transfers in amounts below the corporate
thresholds does not act with the intent to evade a federal
reporting threshold; he or she acts with the intent to evade a
threshold imposed as a matter of corporate policy. The
Department of Justice has raised this concern with the
Director of FinCEN, but thus far, FinCEN has taken no
regulatory action to require wire remitters to adhere to a
uniform federal threshold. 3
2. Advice of Counsel Defense
After the Ratlzaf fix, it is no longer relevant whether the
defendant knew structuring was illegal. Thus, defendants
are foreclosed from introducing evidence that they relied on
the advice of counsel that structuring was lawful.
This is not to say that all advice-of-counsel defenses are
now foreclosed. Even after the Ratzlaf fix, § 5324 requires
specific intent to evade, even if this is something less than the
specific intent to engage in crime. Thus, the government
must prove the defendant acted with the purpose of evading
the reporting requirements. A defendant who is advised by
counsel that his conduct does not amount to a purposeful
evasion of a federal reporting requirement, and in good faith
relies upon that advice, would have a defense to a structuring
prosecution.0 4 This defense is likely to be most viable in
circumstances where counsel offers advice in the still-existing
grey area between structuring business activities to avoid
Laundering Section, to Director of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Re:
Threshold Requirement to Collect Retain and Transmit Information on
Funds Transfers and Transmittal of Funds (June 21, 2006),
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/frn/commentletters/71fr35564_35567_rinl
506_aa86/commentletter rin 1506-AA86.pdf.
302. See id. (citing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special
Recommendation VII-recommending a de minimis threshold no higher than
$1000).
303. See id. ("At least in some jurisdictions, such an argument may afford an
absolute defense to a structuring charge, notwithstanding the defendant's
obvious intent to structure.").
304. See United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543-44 (11th Cir.
1984), cited with approval in Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994).
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accumulating large amounts of currency and structuring
transactions to evade a reporting or record-keeping
requirement.
C. Constitutional Challenges
1. Notice / Vagueness
Following the enactment of § 5324, there were a handful
of constitutional challenges to the structuring provision of
what was then § 5324(3), particularly on vagueness
grounds. °5 The term "structuring," as these challenges
pointed out, lacked any statutory definition. The challenges
did not succeed; given that the Treasury Department
promulgated a regulatory definition of the term "structure" in
February 1989, any future challenges are not likely to
succeed. 306
2. Fifth Amendment/Privacy
In early structuring prosecutions, defendants argued that
the CTR requirement violated the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and/or the privacy rights of the
bank customer. Courts rejected the former argument because
statements are made by financial institutions, not
customers. 3 7 The Supreme Court rejected several variations
of the latter argument.0 8  Congress has addressed the
305. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 765-66 (7th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1395 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing a void-
for-vagueness challenge), vacated on other grounds by Mohwish v. United
States, 507 U.S. 956 (1993); United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 640
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing a void-for-vagueness challenge); United States v.
Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (arguing statute
unconstitutionally vague prior to regulations defining structuring); United
States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting self-
incrimination and void-for-vagueness challenges); United States v. Langenberg,
No. 8:09CR183, 2009 WL 3157397 (D. Neb. Sept. 28, 2009) (rejecting arguments
currency reporting and structuring statutes constitute unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to define crimes and that statutes and
regulations are void for vagueness).
306. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg) (2008).
307. United States v. Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1331 (2d Cir. 1991); Hoyland,
914 F.2d at 1130.
308. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (stating that a bank
depositor has no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in contents of
original checks and deposit slips); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54
(1974) (stating that mere maintenance of records pursuant to requirements of
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privacy concerns surrounding bank records in two federal
laws. 30 9 The protections of those laws, however, do not extend
to the BSA's reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 1 °
VII. SENTENCING IN STRUCTURING CASES
Section 5324(d) provides criminal punishment for two
categories of structuring offenses: ordinary structuring
offenses and aggravated structuring offenses. Under the
statute, ordinary structuring offenses, the statute authorizes
a fine of up to $250,000 and a term of imprisonment not to
exceed five years.3 11 For aggravated cases, the statute
provides enhanced penalties:
Whoever violates this section while violating another law
of the United States or as part of a pattern of any illegal
activity involving more than $100,000 in a [twelve]-month
period shall be fined twice the amount provided in
subsection (b)(3) or (c)(3) (as the case may be) of § 3571 of
title 18, United States Code, imprisonment for not more
than [ten] years, or both.312
The penalty provisions mirror those found in §§ 5322(a)
and (b). The Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Manual
addresses structuring-type offenses in terms similar to the
penalty provisions of § 5324(d). 13  As explained below,
however, the Sentencing Guidelines are too punitive,
particularly when compared to guideline offenses for
comparable (but yet more serious) offenses such as fraud or
money laundering.
A. The Base Offense Level
Courts determining an advisory guideline sentence begin
by ascertaining the pertinent guideline applicable to the
BSA does not invade the Fourth Amendment rights of the depositor); see also
SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) (stating that an
individual has no Fourth Amendment privacy interest once he gives his
financial information to someone else, "even on the understanding that the
communication was confidential").
309. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422
(2006); The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6809 (2006).
310. See 12 U.S.C. § 3413(d) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(5) (2006).
311. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d)(1) (2006).
312. Id. § 5324(d)(2).
313. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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offense of conviction. 314  In the case of BSA-type violations,
including structuring, the applicable provision is section
2S1.3. 315  From there, the sentencing court determines the
base offense level, and then applies any appropriate special
offense characteristics and special instructions contained in
the guideline.3 1 6 Under section 2S1.3(a)(2), the base offense
level for a structuring offense is a level six "plus the number
of offense levels from the table in section 2B1.1 (Theft,
Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value
of the funds." 317
In cases involving a small dollar volume of structuring
activity, subsection 2S1.3(a)(2) provides for a comparatively
low base offense level. Such treatment is consistent with the
Sentencing Commission's general treatment of regulatory
offenses. In the case of simple criminal regulatory offenses,
i.e., those in which "the offender may have failed to fill out a
form intentionally, but without knowledge or intent that
substantive harm would likely follow," the guidelines provide
a low base offense level of six.31 8 However, the greater the
dollar volume of structuring activity, the more the guidelines
deviate from the premise that structuring offenses, like other
regulatory offenses, should begin with a low base offense
level. Subsection 2S1.1(a)(2) defines the "value of the funds"
as the amount of the funds involved in the structuring or
reporting conduct 9.31  This definition refers to the total value
of the funds structured, not some fraction of that amount.320
314. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (2008).
315. Id. § 2S1.3 cmt. (2008) (referring to various Title 31 offenses to the
guideline, including offenses under § 5324).
316. Id. § 1B1.1(b).
31.7. Id. § 2S1.3(a)(2); see also United States v. Pellegrini, Crim. Action No.
08-210 (GEB), 2008 WL 5061829, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008). Guideline
sentencing entails the computing of offense levels. Generally speaking, the
higher the offense level, the greater the sentence of imprisonment.
318. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.1 (2008) (discussing
the low base offense level in the editorial note at the end of the guideline).
319. Id. § 2S1.3 cmt. n.1.
320. See United States v. Abdi, 342 F.3d 313, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the sentence must be based on the entire amount structured, not just on
the fractional amount that went over $10,000 each day); United States v. Beras,
183 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1999); Pellegrini, 2008 WL 5061829, at *2; United
States v. Cooper, No. 06-CR-35-LRR, 2007 WL 2076042, at *3 (N.D. Iowa July
18, 2007); United States v. Builes, 837 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); cf.
United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 138 (2nd Cir. 2008) (affirming guideline
analysis that increased a defendant's base offense level for conspiring to violate
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Moreover, the definition does not turn on whether funds were
lawfully or unlawfully obtained.2 ' In a case involving a
defendant who structures a large amount of money, the base
offense level climbs dramatically above level six. For
example, an individual convicted of structuring in an amount
more than $400,000 begins with a base offense level of
twenty. 32
2
The base offense level for structuring offenses parallels
base offenses levels used in the theft and fraud guideline and
the money laundering section. 23 By referencing the value of
the funds involved in the transaction, section 2S1.3(a)(2)
allows the value of the funds involved in the structuring
transactions to drive the base offense level analysis into the
sentencing stratosphere.324  The approach represents a
significant departure from the approach taken in other
guideline provision addressing regulatory offenses, including
those involving recordkeeping requirements. 25  It also
represents a significant departure from the approach
formerly taken in section 2S1.3 . 26  As the guidelines stand,
§ 1960 by sixteen levels based on the total amount of funds transferred during
the course of the conspiracy).
321. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008);
Pellegrini, 2008 WL 5061829, at *2.
322. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3(a)(2).
323. The guideline applicable to structuring offenses specifies a base offense
level of six plus the number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (theft,
property destruction, and fraud) corresponding to the value of the funds. U.S.
Id Sections 2S1.1 (money laundering) and 2Bl.1 (fraud) refer to the same table
in computing the base offense level.
324. In Pellegrini, the defendant structured approximately $3 million. 2008
WL 5061829, at *1. His base offense level was twenty-four (six plus eighteen)
before any specific offense characteristics were applied. Id. at *2.
325. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.3 (1989)
(providing for a base offense level of six); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2N2.1(a) (2008) (discussing "Violations of Statutes and Regulations
Dealing With Any Food, Drug, Biological Product, Device, Cosmetic, or
Agricultural Product," which provide for a base offense level of six unless
certain aggravating factors are present); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2N3.1(a) (2001) (discussing "Odometer Laws and Regulations," which
provide for a base offense level of six unless offense involves more than one
vehicle).
326. Prior to November 1, 1993, the base offense level did not turn on the
value of the funds involved in the structuring activity. Instead, in structuring
cases, section 2S1.3(a) provided a base offense level of thirteen without regard
to the total dollar volume of structured funds. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 490 (1993). The Sentencing Commission
amended the guideline, effective November 1, 1993, to add the "value of the
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subsection 2S1.3(a)(2), when combined with others discussed
below, has the potential to produce unjust sentences in
certain structuring cases, particularly those involving "serial"
structuring.
B. Specific Offense Characteristics
Subsection 2S1.3(b) sets forth three specific offense
characteristics a court must examine after determining the
base offense level.
1. Dirty Source/Dirty Purpose Enhancement
Subsection 2S1.3(b)(1) provides: "If (A) the defendant
knew or believed that the funds were proceeds of unlawful
activity, or were intended to promote unlawful activity, or (B)
the offense involved bulk cash smuggling, increase by 2
levels."3 27  This subsection effectively amounts to a money
laundering enhancement. If a defendant structures funds
knowing them to be the proceeds of an unlawful activity, he
has engaged in activity comparable to a § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii)
money laundering violation. 28 Similarly, if he structures
funds with the intent to promote unlawful activity, the
defendant has engaged in activity that resembles "reverse
funds" component to the base offense level computation. Id. It did so
apparently to "assure greater consistency of punishment for similar offenses
and greater sensitivity to indicia of offense seriousness." Id.
327. Subsection (b)(1) originally provided for a five-level enhancement "if the
defendant knew or believed that the funds were criminally derived."
Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission reduced the enhancement to four
levels unless the resulting offense level was less than thirteen. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 379 (1993). Effective
November 1, 1993, the enhancement was modified again to reflect a two-level
enhancement. Id.
328. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (making it a money laundering
transaction to engage in a financial transaction involving the proceeds with the
intent to evade federal or state reporting requirements); see also United States
v. Hill, 171 Fed. App'x 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vasquez, 53
F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that the defendant's false explanations
for currency provided basis for the court to conclude funds were criminally
derived); United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing
cash received from drug dealer in real estate transaction); Pellegrini, 2008 WL
5061829, at *2 (discussing a situation where the defendant received a two level
enhancement under section 2S1.3(b)(1)(A) because the defendant knew the
structured funds were the proceeds of check kiting or bank fraud scheme);
United States v. Cooper, No. 06-CR-35-LRR, 2007 WL 2076042, at *5 (N.D.
Iowa July 18, 2007) (discussing cash received from drug dealer in real estate
transaction).
20101 REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECY ACT
money laundering," a form of which is also a crime under §
1956.329 The enhancement effects a rough parity between the
advisory guideline sentence the defendant would otherwise
have received if he or she had been convicted of a money
laundering offense based on the same offense conduct.
2. The Pattern of Unlawful Activity Enhancement
Second, subsection 2S1.3(b)(2) represents the Sentencing
Commission's attempt to incorporate the aggravated penalty
provision from § 5322(b) into the section 2S1.3 guideline. 3 1 It
provides: "If the defendant (A) was convicted of an offense
under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code [the BSA]; and (B) committed the offense as part of a
pattern of unlawful activity involving more than 100,000 in a
[twelve]-month period, increase by [two] levels."331  The
application note explaining this provision defines the term
"pattern of unlawful activity" to mean "at least two separate
occasions of unlawful activity involving a total amount of
more than $100,000 in a twelve-month period, without regard
to whether such an occasion occurred during the course of the
offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that
occurred on that occasion."332
Although not explicitly addressed in the guideline or its
application note, subsection 2S1.3(b)(2) applies to two
different kinds of unlawful activity. First, it applies in
circumstances where the unlawful activity is separate from
the structuring itself. Thus, for example, a defendant may
structure cash deposits to facilitate a separate crime, such as
a scheme to evade federal and state income taxes. Such
conduct, if it involves at least two separate occasions of tax
evasion activity involving more than $100,000 in a twelve-
329. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (2006).
330. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C amend. 637 (2002).
In amending section 2S1.3(b) to provide for a "pattern of unlawful activity
enhancement" the Sentencing Commission referenced its intent to incorporate
the aggravated penalty provision of section 5322(b), but omitted specific
reference to section 5324(d)(2). Id. ("The amendment also provides an
enhancement in section 2S1.3(b) to give effect to the enhanced penalty
provisions under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) for offenses under subchapter II of chapter
53 of title 31 . . . ."). Given that section 2S1.3 explicitly applies to § 5324
offenses, the failure to reference § 5324(d)(2) appears to be an oversight.
331. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1(b)(2) (2008).
332. Id. § 2S1.3 cmt. n.3.
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month period, triggers the subsection 2S1.3(b) enhancement.
Second, and less intuitively, the enhancement applies
when a defendant engages in what has been termed "serial"
structuring. Serial structuring refers to a pattern of
structuring activity involving more than $100,000 in any
twelve-month period. 333  The phrase "pattern of illegal
activity" appears not just in the sentencing guidelines, but
also in § 5322. 334 Courts construing the phrase as it appears
in § 5322 have consistently held that it encompasses serial
structuring conduct, even in the absence of other criminal
activity. 335 Because the Sentencing Commission adopted the
"pattern of unlawful activity" enhancement to give effect to
this penalty provision, it follows that the phrase "pattern of
unlawful activity," as used in subsection 2S1.3(b)(2), also
applies to serial structuring conduct. 336
Viewed in isolation, this enhancement also makes sense.
It gives effect to Congress's manifest intent that cases of
structuring involving certain aggravating factors, including
serial structuring, be prosecuted more severely than cases of
simple structuring. However, as discussed below, this
provision has the potential to work perverse results when
applied in conjunction with the safe harbor provision
discussed below.
333. See United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 586-88
(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 853 (1st
Cir. 1987) (stating that bank's repeated failure to file CTRs constituted a
pattern of unlawful activity); United States v. Valdes-Guerra, 758 F.2d 1411,
1413-14 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that the pattern of unlawful
activity must refer to illegal activity apart from the reporting violations); United
States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88, 91-93 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d
871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that Congress intended more severe
penalties in cases involving particularly serious violations, whether violations of
the BSA alone, or violations of the Act in conjunction with some other illegal
activity); Soliman v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 667, 678 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(stating that sentencing guideline providing for an increase in the base offense
level if the defendant engages in a pattern of unlawful activity involving more
than $100,000 in twelve months was not limited only to terrorist activity, but
applied to defendant's activity in structuring financial transactions).
334. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (2006).
335. See, e.g., Soliman, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
336. One possible way for a defendant to escape this enhancement is to refer
to the unit of prosecution. A defendant who possesses a cash hoard in excess of
$100,000 and then breaks it into sub-$10,000 deposits commits only one
structuring violation, not a series of violations.
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3. The "Safe Harbor" Provision
Section 2S1.3(b)(3) provides a safe harbor for the
potentially harsh advisory guideline sentences available in
structuring prosecutions.337 It provides:
If (A) subsection (a)(2) applies and subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(2) do not apply; (B) the defendant did not act with
reckless disregard of the source of the funds; (C) the funds
were the proceeds of lawful activity; and (D) the funds
were to be used for a lawful purpose, decrease the offense
level to level [six]. 33
The safe harbor provision has no application in cases
where the defendant receives either the (b)(1) or (b)(2)
enhancements. This means that if the government shows the
structured funds derived from a criminal source or were
intended for a criminal purpose, or that the structuring
conduct occurred as part of a "pattern of unlawful activity"
involving more than $100,000 in a twelve-month period, the
defendant cannot qualify for the safe harbor. 339  The safe
harbor operates to reduce the offense level. As a rule, the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
facts necessary to reduce the base offense level. 4 ° Consistent
with that rule, the Fourth Circuit has held that the defendant
who seeks a reduction in sentence based upon the safe harbor
provision bears the burden of showing that each of the
conditions has been met.34'
337. See United States v. Abdi, 342 F.3d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (referring to
subsection 2S1.3(b)(2), the predecessor to subsection 2S1.3(b)(3), as a "safe
harbor" provision). The version of the guidelines in effect when the defendants
were sentenced in Abdi placed the "safe harbor" provision in subsection
2S1.3(b)(2). Amendment 637 re-designated this provision as section 2S1.3(b)(3).
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. II, amend. 637 at 242
(Nov. 2003).
338. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3(b)(3) (2009).
339. Soliman, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (stating that a defendant who gets
enhancement for structuring more than $100,000 in a twelve-month period
cannot qualify for the safe harbor).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
the party seeking to alter the base offense level bears the burden of doing so);
see also United States v. Solomon, 274 F.3d 825, 828 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that "every circuit to consider [who bears the burden of proofl has assigned to
the defendant the burden of proving entitlement to a sentencing reduction").
341. Abdi, 342 F.3d at 317 ("The Government, of course, bears the burden of
demonstrating the requirements to increase the base offense level under section
2S1.3(b)(1). Because any reduction in a sentencing level under section
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For defendants who collect and structure funds as part of
an on-going business activity, subsection 2S1.3(b)(3) assigns
to defendants a burden that is almost impossible to overcome.
In United States v. Abdi, the defendants pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to structure approximately $4.2 million.342 In
connection with the defendants' operation of a money
transmitting business, the structured funds were wired
overseas into the A1-Barakat network, an international
money-transmitting exchange headquartered in the Middle
East. 4  During sentencing, "the defendants testified that
they knew many of their customers and kept records of the
transactions they made, but they did not know from where
the customers derived the money and they did not know for
what [purpose] the money was to be used once it was
transmitted overseas." 3"
The district court determined the defendants were not
eligible for the safe harbor and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the safe harbor provision
required them to affirmatively demonstrate that the
structured monies were the proceeds of "lawful activity and
were to be used for lawful purposes." 45 As the defendants'
conceded at sentencing, they could not make that showing.346
Judge Motz concurred in the judgment, but not with the
reasoning. She construed the safe harbor provisions to
require proof only that defendants' activities and purposes
were lawful, not that the activities and purposes of each of
their customers were lawful. 47
C. Booker Variances in Structuring Prosecutions
Section 2S1.3 has the potential to yield very high
advisory guideline sentences in cases involving serial
structuring. Courts have begun to balk at these high
2S1.3(b)[(3)] can be given only upon demonstration of conditions (A)-(D), it
follows that the defendant, not the government, has the burden of showing
entitlement to any reduction.").
342. Id. at 315.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 316.
345. Id. at 317.
346. Id.
347. United States v. Abdi, 342 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J.,
concurring) (citing United States v. Bove, 155 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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advisory guideline sentences.3 4  The recent decision in
United States v. Pellegrini is illustrative. There, the
defendant pleaded guilty on the eve of trial to a single count
of structuring and fifty-three counts of causing or attempting
to cause banks to fail to file a CTR.349 Calculating his
sentence, the district court began with a base offense level of
six and added the number of levels corresponding to the
amount of funds involved in the structuring conduct.350 The
value of the structured funds was $3,000,000, resulting in an
eighteen level increase to the base offense level. 35' The court
added an additional two levels pursuant to subsection
2S1.3(b)(1) because the defendant knew the structured funds
derived from a check-kiting scheme. 35 '2 The court added two
more levels under subsection 2S1.3(b)(2) because the
defendant committed the offenses as part of a pattern of
unlawful activity.5 3 Thus, the defendant had an offense level
of twenty-six (twenty-eight minus two for acceptance of
responsibility). Based on a Category I criminal history, the
guidelines advised a sentencing range of between sixty-three
to seventy-eight months.354
Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Booker, in which the Court held that sentencing
guidelines are advisory and that the court must consider
statutory sentencing factors, the district court then looked to
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 355 Based
on those factors the court imposed a sentence of five years
probation with a special condition of eight months home
confinement and a $15,000 fine. 356  The court justified this
radical variance from the advisory guideline by emphasizing
348. See, e.g., United States v. Feker, No. 09-CR-138, 2009 WL 3379177 (E.D.
Wis. Oct. 19, 2009) (imposing a one-day term of imprisonment based on tax and
structuring convictions while the guidelines called for an eight to fourteen
month term of imprisonment).
349. United States v. Pellegrini, Crim. Action No. 08-210 (GEB), 2008 WL
5061829, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008).
350. Id. at *2.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. United States v. Pellegrini, Crim. Action No. 08-210 (GEB), 2008 WL
5061829, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005).
356. Pellegrini, 2008 WL 5061829, at *6.
489
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
several considerations, including the defendant's personal
history and the fact that he had paid the bank its actual
damages prior to sentencing. The defendant's unlawful
conduct "was essentially a check kiting scheme" that
supported his gambling habit.5 7 Moreover, the defendant
obtained nowhere near three million dollars from the
scheme-the bank settled its losses with the defendant for
$56,000. 1 8 The Pellegrini Court did not directly criticize the
harshness of the advisory guideline sentence. Instead, it did
so indirectly by juxtaposing the sentence the defendant would
have received if convicted of the underlying check kiting
criminal activity:
Had the defendant pleaded guilty to the amount of actual
loss that the bank asserted it endured as the result of
these unlawful acts, specifically $45,000, and had the
defendant been sentenced accordingly, the Court would
have otherwise computed Defendant's offense level under
the Guidelines to be fourteen, which instructs that the
term of imprisonment under the Guidelines is fifteen to
twenty-one months. Although this difference is
substantial, the Court is not at liberty to reduce the
amount of the funds from the $3,000,000 figure.359
The drawing of this comparison hints at the court's
disapproval of the severity of the applicable guideline
sentence.
D. The Need for Guideline Reform
Cases such as Pellegrini illustrate how punitive Section
2S1.3 advisory guideline sentences can be, particularly in
cases involving massive amounts of structured funds. But
even when the dollar amount involved in the structuring is
much smaller, the guidelines are still too punitive for serial
structuring when compared to advisory guideline sentences
for more morally blameworthy conduct.
Take a defendant who swindles his or her victims out of
$125,000. If convicted of mail fraud in violation of § 1341, he
or she would be sentenced under § 2B1.1. Assuming no
adjustments other than for loss, the defendant would begin
with a base offense level of seven, plus ten levels
357. Id. at *4.
358. Id.
359. Id. at *2 n.3.
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corresponding to the value of the funds obtained through the
fraud, yielding an adjusted offense level of seventeen. 360 Now,
change the facts. Instead of fleecing fraud victims out of
$125,000, a defendant receives $125,000 in cash into his
business in five equal installments of $25,000 each. He
structures each installment into a bank account such that at
the end of a few weeks time he has deposited the entire
$125,000 in a series of structured transactions. The offense is
purely one involving structuring; there is no evidence the
funds derived from or were intended for anything other than
a lawful purpose. Nonetheless, under section 2S1.3, the
defendant would begin with a base offense level of sixteen,
only one level less than the fraudster. He would then receive
a two-level enhancement based on the serial structuring
activity, pursuant to § 2S1.3(b)(2). That enhancement would
preclude him from qualifying for the safe harbor provision
under section 2S1.3(b)(3). The net result would be an
adjusted offense level of eighteen, one level higher than the
adjusted offense level of the fraudster whose offense involved
a comparable sum of money. Under no rational sentencing
regime would a court punish a person who commits a purely
regulatory violation involving a particular sum of money
more severely than an offender who defrauds victims of the
exact same sum. 361 Yet the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines
do just that.
One solution to this problem is to eliminate the all-or-
nothing approach taken in the safe harbor provision. Under
existing law, a defendant either qualifies for the safe harbor,
in which case he parachutes down to an offense level six, or
he does not. Current law offers no middle ground-no
approach that recognizes that in the case of serial
structuring, the gravity of the structuring conduct is more
360. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2009).
361. In Pellegrini, the facts were even more startling. Pellegrini was a case
where the defendant engaged in a check kiting scheme, during the course of
which he structured approximately three million dollars. Pellegrini, 2008 WL
5061829, at *2. However, the actual loss to the bank was $56,000. Id. at *2 n.1.
The court observed that had the defendant been convicted of check kiting and
sentenced based on that offense, his adjusted offense level would have been
fourteen, resulting in a guideline sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one
months. Id. at *2 n.3. As it was, he was convicted of structuring the entire
three million dollars. Id. His adjusted offense level for that conduct was
twenty-six, or sixty-three months to seventy-eight months. Id. at *2.
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serious than for simple structuring, but not as serious as
crimes such as fraud or money laundering involving
comparable sums of money.
The better approach is one that offers a more calibrated
sentencing scheme tied to the rationale for the BSA and the
anti-structuring statute. When an individual structures
transactions, the harm to the government is that it has been
deprived of reports and records that Congress has found
highly useful to law enforcement and other agencies. This is
a harm, but not a serious one, especially if we concede the
government is far more interested in the SAR that will likely
be generated by a defendant's structuring behavior than it is
the CTR that would have been generated had the defendant
not structured (and in the case of imperfect structuring, was
most likely generated anyway).362 In the absence of evidence
of some other criminal activity, the § 2S1.3 guideline should
sentence serial structuring offenses more severely than
simple structuring offenses, or at least offer some middle
ground sentence.
Now evaluate the harm under the emerging rationale for
the BSA. The emerging rationale is that the BSA forces
money launderers to engage in high-risk behavior such as
structuring, so law enforcement can catch them. Under the
emerging rationale, a person who structures has not harmed
the government. Rather, the person has risen to take the bait
the government set for money launderers, tax evaders, and
others engaged in criminal activity. So understood, the
central issue in deciding the appropriate punishment should
be whether the defendant fits within the class of people the
government seeks to identify through the BSA's requirements
and its anti-structuring law.363  If, at sentencing, the
government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant is a money launderer, tax evader, or otherwise
engaged in criminal activity, then the structuring guidelines
362. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 (1998) ("Failure to
report his currency affected only one party, the Government, and in a relatively
minor way. There was no fraud on the United States, and the respondent
caused no loss to the public fisc. Had his crime gone undetected, the
Government would have been derived only of the information that $357,144 had
left the country.").
363. See id. at 338 ("Whatever his other vices, respondent does not fit into
the class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed: He is not a
money launderer, drug trafficker or a tax evader.").
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should refer the sentencing court to the guideline applicable
to the underlying criminal activity. If, for example, a
defendant structured funds to facilitate a tax evasion scheme,
then the guideline should refer the court to Chapter Two Part
T, which addresses offenses involving taxation. 36 The court
should then compute the sentence that the defendant would
have received had he or she been convicted of the underlying
tax crime, and add one or more levels to that adjusted offense
level to take into account the structuring conduct.
This approach is consistent with the approach the
Sentencing Commission has taken in the section 2S1.1. That
guideline applies to money laundering offenses under §§
1956, 1957, and 1960(b)(1)(c).365 Where a defendant who
commits the underlying offense from which the laundered
funds were derived, or would be accountable for them under
relevant conduct rules, section 2S1.1 directs the court to
determine the offense level for the underlying offense
conduct. 66 For most white collar offenses, section 2S1.1 then
directs the court to increase the offense level by one or two
levels depending on whether the defendant violated § 1956 or
1957.367 This approach ensures that the defendant's money
laundering sentence bears some proportionality to the moral
blameworthiness of his or her underlying conduct and yet
provides an appropriate enhancement to reflect that the
defendant committed additional crimes when he or she
laundered the money. The government may support reform
of section 2S1.3 to encourage more predictable and calibrated
sentencing. Currently, the government has little to offer a
defendant in plea negotiations in a structuring prosecution.
If the defendant pleads guilty to an offense such as the one in
Pellegrini, he or she faces an advisory guideline sentence so
high it defies common sense.
If the defendant takes the government to trial, the
defendant risks little more (in Pellegrini, the defendant's
guideline range would only have jumped from a level twenty-
364. In the case of structuring involving tax offenses, existing section
2S1.3(c) directs the court to apply the guideline applicable to the underlying tax
offense, but only if the resulting offense level is greater than determined under
section 2S1.3.
365. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 cmt. (2009).
366. Id. § 2S1.1(a)(1).
367. Id. § 2S1.1(b)(2).
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six to a level twenty-eight) and gains quite a bit. He or she
gains the opportunity to put the government to its burden, to
mount a defense, and if convicted, to argue for a Booker
variance from the advisory guidelines. Given these
incentives, it is difficult for the government to resolve
structuring prosecutions by plea agreement. Compounding
this difficulty is the problem of uniformity of sentences.
Pellegrini illustrates the problem of imposing uniform
sentences when advisory guidelines are too high. There the
court imposed a sentence of probation when the guidelines
called for as much as seventy-eight months imprisonment.
Had the guidelines themselves provided a middle approach
(somewhere between seventy-eight months and probation),
they would have allowed for a more uniform and finely-
calibrated sentence, both of which encourage plea bargaining
and the just disposition of criminal cases.368
VIII. OTHER SANCTIONS: ASSET FORFEITURE AND CIVIL
PENALTY ENFORCEMENT
A. Asset Forfeiture
Subsection 5317(c) authorizes civil and criminal
forfeiture for selected violations of the BSA, including
structuring offenses under § 5324.369 The criminal forfeiture
provision authorizes the court, in the event of structuring
conviction, to "order the defendant to forfeit all property, real
or personal, involved in the offense and any property
traceable thereto."370  The provision's language mirrors the
criminal forfeiture statute for money laundering
368. In the case of defendants who appear eligible to receive the benefit of
the safe harbor, e.g., an offense level six, the government may decide to forego
criminal prosecution altogether in favor of some other sanction such as civil
asset forfeiture or a civil enforcement penalty.
369. Legislative changes made in the USA PATRIOT Act consolidated the
forfeiture provisions for BSA violations into 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) and expanded
them slightly. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, §§ 372(a), (b), 115 Stat. 272,
338-39. Former law authorized forfeiture for structuring violations, but the
authority was found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), 982(a)(1). The operative
language of the former forfeiture law was similar to the language now found in
Section 5317(c).
370. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1) (2006).
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convictions.37' Similarly, the civil forfeiture provision
authorizes civil forfeiture of "[any property involved in a
violation of [§ 5324], or any conspiracy to commit any such
violation, and property traceable to any such violation or
conspiracy." 372  This mirrors the language in the civil
forfeiture statute that applies to money laundering
violations.373 The criminal forfeiture provision incorporates
Title 21 criminal forfeiture procedures, and the civil forfeiture
provision incorporates Title 18 civil forfeiture procedures. 74
It is beyond the reach of this article to engage in an
extended discussion of assets forfeiture procedure and
practice, as others have covered these topics exhaustively. 75
The purpose of this discussion is instead to highlight
forfeiture issues unique to structuring offenses.
1. The Meaning of the Phrase "Involved in"
Assume Congress enacted the civil and criminal
forfeiture provisions in § 5317 against the background of
existing law. If so, the scope of what is potentially forfeitable
in a structuring prosecution is broad indeed. In the money
laundering context, the phrase "involved in" has been
construed to refer to property intrinsic to the offense (e.g., the
laundered funds), and perhaps more controversially, certain
property extrinsic to the offense (e.g., property used to
facilitate the laundering offense).376
Under a broad construction of the phrase "involved in"
two different kinds of property are potentially subject to
371. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
372. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(2).
373. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (2006).
374. See 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(B) ("Forfeitures under this paragraph shall be
governed by the procedures established in section 413 of the Controlled
Substances Act [21 U.S.C. § 853]."); id. § 5317(c)(2) (stating that seizures and
forfeitures shall be effected "in accordance with the procedures governing civil
forfeitures in money laundering cases pursuant to section 981(a)(1)(A) of Title
18, United States Code").
375. There are several treatises available devoted exclusively to the subject
of U.S. asset forfeiture laws. See generally STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET
FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES (1987).
376. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1056-58 (8th Cir.
2005); United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1154 (11th Cir. 2003); United
States v. McGauley, 279 F.3d 62, 76 n.14 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bornfield, 145 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tencer, 107
F.3d 1120, 1134 (5th Cir. 1997).
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forfeiture because they are intrinsic to the structuring
offense. First, and most obviously, the unreported funds are
subject to forfeiture. 77 Second, in the case of nonreportable
funds (e.g., personal checks) deposited with reportable funds
(e.g., currency) in a transaction to evade a CTR, the
nonreportable funds are arguably subject to forfeiture
because they were in a literal sense "involved in" the
violation. 78
In the money laundering context, there is a second
category of extrinsic property: "facilitating property."
Facilitating property is property that is extrinsic to the
offense conduct. Extrinsic property includes property that is
not part of the financial transaction itself, but nonetheless
makes the offense easier to commit or harder to detect. 79
Facilitating property can, in limited circumstances, include
legitimate funds pooled in the same bank account as
illegitimate funds, and may even include a business used to
facilitate money laundering. 380
The extrinsic, or facilitating property theory, may not
work as readily in structuring cases as it does in money
377. See United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d
66, 88-89 (2nd Cir. 2002) (discussing structuring to evade $3000 recordkeeping
threshold for currency purchases of money orders); United States v. Ahmad, 213
F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing a situation in which parties stipulated
that property which "is directly traceable to deposits structured so as to avoid
reporting requirements" is subject to civil forfeiture); United States v. 874
Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing forfeiture of real
property purchased with cashier checks, which checks were acquired in
structured transactions); United States v. 1988 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme 2
Door, 983 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. $23,090.00 in U.S.
Currency, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229-30 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (following bench trial,
court orders civil forfeiture of funds structured among different travelers to
evade the CMIR requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(3)); United
States v. Funds in the Amount of $170,926.00, 985 F. Supp. 810, 815 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
378. See United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2008); 1988
Oldsmobile Supreme 2 Door, 983 F.2d at 675 (finding that vehicles purchased in
structured transactions to evade Form 8300 requirements are "involved in"
offense).
379. Huber, 404 F.3d at 1061 n.11; McGauley, 279 F.3d at 77.
380. United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding
the forfeiture of a motel where the owner received payment for motel rooms
with prostitution proceeds); United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 969-70 (7th
Cir. 2000) (upholding forfeiture of business premises because it was the location
from which money laundering scheme was directed); United States v. All Assets
of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 487 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discussing business used
to sell stolen auto parts and launder proceeds forfeited under § 981).
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laundering cases. In United States v. Hassan,381 the
government indicted several individuals for structuring
transactions to evade recordkeeping and reporting
requirements, and sought to seize, restrain, and forfeit
various assets it characterized as having been "involved in"
the structuring offenses. 82  In connection with pretrial
motions regarding the seizure and restraint of the assets, the
government submitted an affidavit showing defendants
purchased numerous official checks from various banks in
amounts just below $3000.33 The affidavit further described
how one defendant had a pattern of depositing cash in
amounts just below the $10,000 CTR threshold."384 These
cash transactions occurred in bank accounts controlled by
some of the defendants.
One of the assets the government sought to restrain and
forfeit as part of its structuring prosecution was a
convenience store operated by two of the defendants. The
government argued the convenience store was subject to
forfeiture because it facilitated the structuring offenses by
providing a source of cash revenue subsequently used by the
defendants to purchase cashier's checks in structured
amounts.8 5 The district court rejected the argument. Unlike
many cases upholding facilitating property forfeitures in the
money laundering context, the convenience store did not
generate criminal-derived property.386  Moreover, the
convenience store did not make the structuring offenses-
which occurred elsewhere-any easier to commit or harder to
detect.387
One recurring issue in cases involving structured cash
withdrawals from a bank account is whether the funds that
remain behind are subject to forfeiture. It is difficult to
characterize the funds that remain behind in the account as
intrinsically or even extrinsically "involved in" the structured
withdrawal. They are not intrinsically involved because they
are not themselves structured. Instead, they remain behind
381. United States v. Hassan, 439 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
382. Id. at 904.
383. Id. at 904-05.
384. Id. at 905.
385. Id. at 906-07.
386. Id. at 906-09.
387. United States v. Hassan, 439 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-09 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
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in the bank account. Also, they are not extrinsically involved
because they do not make the structured withdrawal any
easier to commit or harder to detect.388 Perhaps only in the
case of aggravated structuring conduct, in which the
government shows a broad pattern of structuring behavior
involving funds in the account, could the funds that remain
behind even arguably be considered "involved in" the
structuring offense.3 8 9
2. Tracing, the Fungible Asset Statute, and Substitute
Assets
In any civil forfeiture case, the government must
establish the requisite nexus between the property subject to
forfeiture and the offense giving rise to forfeiture.39 ° Without
such proof, the "guilty property" fiction upon which in rem
forfeiture rests cannot operate. 39' The forfeiture provision for
structuring violations authorizes the civil and criminal
forfeiture of property "involved in" the offense as well as
property traceable to such property. 92 This means that if
structured funds are exchanged for another form of property,
the property acquired with the structured funds becomes
subject to forfeiture. Relying on this principle, courts have
sustained the forfeiture of personal and real property
acquired with structured funds.393
388. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307 (RPP),
93 Civ. 0357 (RPP), 1993 WL 158542, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (finding
that untainted funds in an interbank account used to "clear" structured money
orders were not forfeitable under a facilitation theory).
389. Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 430 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D.N.J. 2006)
(upholding the forfeiture in an amount beyond the value of the funds involved in
the structuring offense of conviction because the government established a
pattern of structuring conduct involving more than $100,000 in funds in a
twelve-month period), vacated in part, 464 F. Supp. 2d 387 (D.N.J. 2006).
390. See, e.g., United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141,
158 (3d Cir. 2003). But see United States v. Mudd, No. 1:06-CR-00057-R, 2009
WL 197516, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2009) (finding that an indictment that
charges only $44,800 in illegally structured transactions cannot support the
government's requested forfeiture money judgment in the amount of
$203,510.10).
391. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 340 (1998).
392. See 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1), (2) (2006).
393. See United States v. 874 Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996)
(affirming a grant of summary judgment in a forfeiture action against real
property in which the government predicated forfeiture, in part, on the theory
that the property was purchased with ten cashier's checks acquired in a
structuring violation).
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The tracing requirement is most problematic for the
government in cases involving fungible property such as
funds maintained in a bank account. As forfeitable funds are
withdrawn, and clean funds deposited, the government's
ability to trace breaks down. Some courts allow the
government to use forensic accounting principles to overcome
these obstacles, particularly in cases involving commingled
funds. 94 However, accounting rules substitute for tracing
only to a limited extent. When the government relies on
accounting rules such as "last in, first out" or "first in, first
out" it must also satisfy the "lowest intermediate balance
rule."395 The lowest intermediate balance rule defeats tracing
in cases where a bank account is filled with crime proceeds,
emptied, then filled with legitimate funds, because the
government cannot trace the dirty money to the funds
remaining in the bank account even under these accounting
concepts. 396
Congress provided the government with a powerful
statute to address tracing problems involving bank accounts.
That statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 984, is tailor-made for
forfeiture cases premised on § 5324(a) violations. In general
terms, this section provides that where property that is
subject to forfeiture is placed in a bank account and
subsequently removed, the government can seize and forfeit
funds it finds in the bank account at the time of seizure, even
though the directly forfeitable funds were previously
withdrawn.
This statute, though powerful, has three significant
limitations. First, the amount of funds the government can
forfeit under § 984 can never exceed the total value of directly
forfeitable funds placed into the bank account. In other
words, if a person deposits $50,000 into a bank account in
394. See United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-62
(2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the government is entitled to use "first in, first out"
or "first in, last out" tracing rules to overcome tracing issues in cases involving
tainted funds moving through a volatile bank account).
395. "Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, it is assumed that traced
proceeds are the last funds withdrawn from a contested account. Once the
traced proceeds are withdrawn, however, they are treated as lost, even though
subsequent deposits are made into the account." Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v.
Union Planters Bank, 409 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
396. Id.
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structured transactions, the government cannot use § 984 to
seize $100,000. It must be satisfied with $50,000 or whatever
lesser amount remains in the account at the time of
seizure.39 v Second, this provision has its own unique statute
of limitations. To take advantage of the statute, the
government must commence a forfeiture action within one
year of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.398 Finally, § 984
cannot be used as a tracing statute. In other words, if funds
forfeitable under § 984, but not forfeitable under a tracing
rule, are removed from the account, the government cannot
forfeit the removed funds on the theory that they are
traceable to property that is forfeitable under § 984. Section
984 only allows the government to seize funds from the
account in which the forfeitable property was previously
deposited.99
There remains an unresolved issue concerning whether
the government may forfeit substitute assets involved in or
traceable to structuring violations. The criminal forfeiture
statute applicable to money laundering violations authorizes
forfeiture of "substitute assets" by incorporating the
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853, which include the substitute
asset provision used in narcotics-related cases under 21
U.S.C. § 853(p).4 °° Subsection 5317(c)(1) also incorporates §
853 using slightly different terms. Yet rather than
incorporate the provisions of § 853, it incorporates the
397. See generally United States v. U.S. Currency Deposited into Account,
176 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the government must establish
the amount of money laundered through the account in the prior year, and that
once it does so, that figure sets the cap on the total amount the government can
seize and forfeit under § 984).
398. See 18 U.S.C. § 984(b) (2006); see also United States v. $8,221,877.16 in
U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 157-61 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the forfeiture
complaint must be filed within one year; seizure within one year is not an
.action" and thus does not stop the running of the statute of limitations). But
see United States v. Funds Representing Proceeds of Drug Trafficking in
Amount of $75,868.62, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that it
is sufficient for purposes of § 984 that the government seize the property within
one year of the offensive conduct).
399. See 18 U.S.C. § 984(a)(1) ("In any forfeiture action in rem in which the
subject property is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited
in an account in a financial institution (as defined in section 20) or precious
metals-(A) it shall not be necessary for the government to identify the specific
property involved in the offense that is the basis for forfeiture. . .
400. See id. § 982(b)(1).
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procedures of that statute.401 Noting the semantic distinction
between the terms "provisions" and "procedures," a district
court in New Jersey concluded that substitute assets were not
forfeitable for structuring violations because the substitute
asset provision of § 853(p) is not a "procedure."4 °2 The court
subsequently withdrew and vacated this portion of its
decision, leaving the issue for another day.
40 3
3. Excessive Fines Clause
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that no excessive
fines shall be imposed.4 4 The Supreme Court has held that
certain kinds of civil and criminal forfeitures-generally, non-
instrumentality forfeitures-are a form of fine or penalty
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.4 5
The leading case to test the constitutionality of a
forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause was United
States v. Bajakajian.4 °6  In Bajakajian, a defendant
attempted to carry approximately $357,144 out of the United
States without filing a CMIR.4 °7 When advised of the CMIR
requirement, the defendant lied; he told the customs
inspector that he had $8000 and his wife had $7000, but that
they had no additional currency to declare. After a search of
the defendant's baggage uncovered the undeclared currency,
the defendant was taken into custody and the currency was
seized.
The defendant was subsequently indicted for failing to
file a CMIR report and for making a materially false
statement to the United States Customs Service. The
indictment also included an allegation seeking forfeiture of
408the $357,144 in currency. The defendant entered a guilty
plea to the CMIR violation and the court conducted a bench
trial on the forfeiture allegation. 40 9  The district court
401. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(B) (2006).
402. United States v. Rodriguez, 464 F. Supp. 2d 387, 388 (D.N.J. 2006).
403. Id.
404. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
405. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
406. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321.
407. Id. at 324-25.
408. Id. at 325.
409. Id.
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determined that the seized funds were "involved in" the
reporting offense and thus subject to forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. § 9 8 2 (a)(1), but reduced the forfeiture to $15,000 based
on its determination that the forfeiture of any amount greater
than that would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.41 ° On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Excessive Fines
Clause barred any forfeiture of unreported currency because
the currency was not an "instrumentality" of the reporting
offense.41'
The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture was punitive
as opposed to remedial, and therefore susceptible to challenge
under the Excessive Fines Clause.412 The Court further held
that the forfeiture of all currency involved in the CMIR
offense was constitutionally excessive because it was grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the offense.413 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied upon a number of
considerations. Most importantly, the defendant's conduct
was unrelated to other criminal activities, and fell outside the
class of activities the statute was designed to prevent.414 The
Court also emphasized that the guidelines imposed
comparatively modest punishment for the offense.41 Further,
the harm the defendant caused was minimal; he merely
deprived the government of information about currency
leaving the country.41
How Bajakajian bears upon the government's ability to
use asset forfeiture for structuring violations is an open issue.
In United States v. Ahmad, the Fourth Circuit held that
Bajakajian's gross disproportional analysis applies when
determining whether forfeiture premised on a structuring
violation is excessive."' Ahmad addressed a situation in
which the government sought to forfeit approximately
$186,587.42 in funds, of which around $85,000 was traceable
to violations of § 5324(a)(3), and the remainder traceable to
410. Id. at 325-26.
411. Id. at 326-27. Although the reasoning of the court of appeals meant
that no forfeiture was permitted, it let the $15,000 forfeiture stand because the
defendant had not cross-appealed. Id. at 327.
412. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
413. Id. at 337-40.
414. Id. at 338.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 339.
417. United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 815 (4th Cir. 2000).
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customs violations.1 After determining the $85,000 was in
fact subject to civil forfeiture, notwithstanding the reversal of
the structuring conviction in the parallel criminal case, the
court turned to whether the forfeiture violated the Excessive
Fines Clause in light of the Bajakajian decision.419
Examining the relevant factors identified in Bajakajian
regarding the gravity of the offense, the Ahmad court
distinguished the CMIR violation at issue in Bajakajian from
the structuring violations at issue in the instant case. The
court began by noting that Bajakajian's reporting offense was
a violation of a "lone reporting duty imposed on him as an
individual."420  By contrast, the defendant's structuring
violation in Ahmad caused a financial institution to fail to
comply with its reporting obligations on numerous occasions.
"The nature of Ahmad's structuring is thus readily
distinguishable from the 'single' reporting offense at issue in
Bajakajian in which the property owner, out of 'fear
stemming from 'cultural differences,' tried to take his own
money out of the country without reporting it." 421
The Ahmad court drew a second distinction. While the
underlying activities in both the Bajakajian and the Ahmad
cases involved lawful activities, "Ahmad's structuring
constituted part of a complicated larger scheme related to
customs fraud violations."422  The defendant in Ahmad
engaged in structuring deposits so that the account holder
"could pay Pakistani manufacturers inflated purchase prices
for imported surgical equipment."423 In assessing the harm
caused by the offense, the Ahmad court noted that in
Bajakajian, the offense resulted only in a loss of information
to the government. "In the present case, Ahmad's deposit
structuring activities not only caused the government to lose
information, but also implicated an intermediary actor . . .
and affected its legal duty to report certain transactions."424
418. Id. at 807-09.
419. Id. at 808-09.
420. Id. at 816.
421. Id.
422. Id.; see also United States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing Bajakajian: "Obviously, he was operating an unregistered
airplane on an ongoing basis, as opposed to the one time violation in
Bajakajian").
423. Ahmad, 213 F.3d at 817.
424. Id.
503
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In addition, the structuring behavior subjected to forfeiture
the funds of Ahmad's clients, whereas the defendant in
Bajakajian merely put at risk his own money.425
Some of the distinctions drawn in the Ahmad decision
between the violation at issue in Bajakajian and a
structuring violation in Ahmad are doubtful. First, the
Ahmad court repeatedly emphasized that the defendant's
conduct in that case caused a financial institution to fail to
comply with its reporting obligations. Strictly speaking, this
is not so. The defendant in Ahmad was convicted of a §
5324(a)(3) violation, as opposed to a § 5324(a)(1) violation.426
The essence of a § 5324(a)(3) offense-"perfect" structuring-
is that the defendant's conduct in fact never triggers any
bank's reporting obligation, if it had triggered such an
obligation, the offense should have been charged under §
5324(a)(1). Thus, it is inaccurate to characterize the
defendant's conduct as having caused a bank to fail to comply
with the CTR requirement because the essence of a §
5324(a)(3) violation is that conduct completely evaded the
reporting obligation.
Second, in distinguishing Bajakajian, the Ahmad court
emphasized that the conduct in Bajakajian was a single
reporting offense out of fear stemming from cultural
differences.427 In contrast, "Ahmad's conduct was not a
single, isolated untruth," but rather a series of sophisticated
commercial transactions.428 This line of reasoning misstates
the legal significance of the facts of both Bajakajian and
Ahmad. The Bajakajian majority explicitly rejected the
district court's finding that Bajakajian's "cultural differences"
mitigated the gravity of the offense.429 Moreover, while the
offense conduct in a structuring prosecution may indeed
involve a series of transactions, it does not necessarily follow
that the defendant in Ahmad committed multiple violations
of § 5324(a)(3). As discussed in Part V.B, a person who takes
a lump sum of currency and breaks it down into multiple
transactions only commits one structuring violation under §
5324(a)(3).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 808
427. Id. at 816.
428. Id.
429. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 n.12 (1998).
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More compelling was the fact that Ahmad's structuring
conduct related to a larger scheme involving the evasion of
custom tax duties. In Bajakajian, the defendant did not "fit
into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally
designed: He is not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a
tax evader."4 30  The funds were lawfully derived and the
defendant intended to use the money to repay a legitimate
debt.431  In contrast, Ahmad acknowledged that he
transferred some of the funds from his illegally structured
deposits into an account used to further a customs fraud
scheme.4 32 Congress enacted the CTR requirement precisely
out of concern that large unreported currency transactions
enabled tax evasion and similar crimes. This fact, more than
the other marshaled by the Ahmad court, distinguishes
Ahmad from Bajakajian. Indeed, the handful of post-
Bajakajian decisions involving forfeitures for reporting
violations can largely be synthesized on this ground. Courts
tend to uphold the forfeiture against excessive fines
challenges when the reporting violation relates to a central
purpose of the BSA and tend to mitigate it when it does
not.
433
Beyond those distinctions, there are other factors that
may distinguish a structuring offense from the CMIR
violation at issue in Bajakajian. First, a criminal conviction
for an ordinary CMIR violation requires proof the defendant
acted for the purpose of evading the CMIR, but it does not
require proof the defendant broke down or concealed the
monetary instruments subject to the CMIR requirement.4 34
In other words, the monetary instruments not reported in a
CMIR offense are not themselves the instrumentality of the
430. Id. at 338.
431. Id. at 326, 338.
432. Ahmad, 213 F.3d at 816-17.
433. Compare United States v. Six Negotiable Checks in Various
Denominations, 389 F. Supp. 2d 813, 823-24 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (stating that
forfeiture of $200,000 in negotiable instruments was not grossly disproportional
to CMIR offense where reporting violation related to tax-evasion activity), with
United States v. $120,856 in U.S. Currency More or Less, 394 F. Supp. 2d 687,
694 (D.V.I. 2005) (noting that in a situation where the claimant was bringing
$120,856 in legitimately savings into the United States to help his mother buy a
house, forfeiture of entire amount for CMIR violation would violate Excessive
Fines Clause).
434. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (2006).
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offense.435 On the other hand, a structuring offense, including
structuring to evade the CMIR, requires proof of structuring,
i.e., a breaking down of the funds to evade the reporting
requirement, not merely a failure to report those funds. This
added element of concealment or purposeful evasion means
that a structuring offense more closely parallels a bulk cash
smuggling offense than an ordinary CMIR offense.436
Congress enacted the bulk cash smuggling statute precisely
because it wanted to define an offense in which the currency
was itself the corpus delicti, or instrumentality, of the offense,
effectively legislating around Bajakajian.437 There are a
handful of cases applying the Excessive Fines Clause to a
bulk cash smuggling offense, but the law is still developing.4 38
Even the government's own mitigation guidelines for CMIR
offenses do not differentiate between a CMIR offense and a
bulk cash smuggling offense.4 39
There is a second unstated ground for distinguishing
Ahmad from Bajakajian. In Bajakajian, the government
sought the forfeiture of the entire amount of unreported
money. In the case of a CMIR violation, the government will
almost always seize the total amount of funds "involved in"
the violation because it will literally intercept the traveler on
the jetway before he or she has an opportunity to dissipate
435. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 n.9.
436. See 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (2006) (specifying that a bulk cash smuggling
offense includes an element of concealment); United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d
1174, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the difference between a CMIR
offense and bulk cash smuggling offense).
437. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 371(a)-(b), 115 Stat. 272, 336, 337.
438. See, e.g., United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 108-13 (1st Cir. 2007)
(upholding entire forfeiture under § 5332 and distinguishing Bajakajian);
United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that
Excessive Fines analysis for a bulk cash smuggling is different than for a CMIR
offense); United States v. $293,316 in U.S. Currency, 349 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643-
44, 650-51 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging that forfeiture should be greater for
a bulk cash smuggling offense than for a CMIR offense, but nonetheless
reducing forfeiture by one half). See generally Stefan D. Cassella, Bulk Cash
Smuggling and the Globalization of Crime: Overcoming Constitutional
Challenges to Forfeiture Under 31 U.S.C. § 5332, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 98
(2004).
439. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 6 (calling on
Customs and Boarder Patrol to promulgate forfeiture mitigation guidelines for
bulk cash smuggling offenses that are different than those it currently uses for
CMIR violations).
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the forfeitable property. However, in a structuring forfeiture,
the government more often than not will be able to seize only
a portion of the structured funds; the other funds may be
withdrawn or dissipated weeks and months before the
government can execute the seizure warrant against funds in
any particular bank account. Thus, we have begun to see
lower court decisions distinguishing Bajakajian on the
ground that the structuring conduct involved a far greater
sum of money than the government actually seized for
forfeiture.44 °
Finally, the punishment for most CMIR violations is
comparatively insignificant. The defendant in Bajakajian, for
example, faced an advisory maximum term of imprisonment
of six months and a maximum guideline fine of $5000.441 In
contrast, section 2S1.3 locks in harsh advisory guideline
sentences in cases involving serial structuring. By way of
comparison to Bajakajian, had the defendant in Bajakajian
structured $357,144 in currency, instead of failing to report it,
as part of a pattern of structuring conduct involving more
than $100,000 in a twelve-month period, he would have faced
an advisory guideline sentence of as much as thirty months
(even after acceptance of responsibility), and a guideline fine
as high as the statutory maximum fine of $500,000.442
4. Alternative Pretrial Restraint Theories in
Structuring Prosecutions
Both the civil and criminal forfeiture provisions of §
440. See United States v. Rodriguez, 430 F. Supp. 2d 388, 408-11 (D.N.J.
2006) (following Ahmad); United States v. Contents of Account Number
901121707, 36 F. Supp. 2d 614, 618 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dictum) (stating that a
situation where the claimant structured over twenty million dollars in funds,
forfeiture of $210,000-roughly one percent of the total currency-would not be
constitutionally excessive; by contrast, in Bajakajian government sought
forfeiture of all of the funds involved in the offense).
441. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1998).
442. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3(b)(2) (2003)
(applying a two-level enhancement for aggravated Title 31 violations); id. §
2S1.3(b)(3) (foreclosing resort to safe harbor in cases where section 2S1.3(b)(2)
applies); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d)(2) (2006) (authorizing a $500,000 fine in
the case of aggravated violations); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5E1.2(c)(4) (2008) (stating that a fine table does not limit the maximum if the
defendant is convicted under a statute authorizing a maximum fine greater
than $250,000); Rodriguez, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (explaining how guideline
punishment for serial structuring is more serious than for the CMIR violation at
issue in Bajakajian).
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5317(c) incorporate the asset restraint and seizure provisions
of their money laundering analogs."43  Thus, it is widely
understood that a civil seizure or restraint in a structuring
case is effected through 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), and a criminal
seizure or restraint is effected through 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) or
(f). With one exception, every circuit in the country has held
that the government may seize or restrain for civil or criminal
forfeiture only that property which is involved in or traceable
to the violation itself.1 " In the specific context of criminal
prosecutions, this means that the government may not
restrain or seize for forfeiture "substitute assets."
Even if the forfeiture statutes do not allow the
government to seize or restrain substitute assets before trial,
an underutilized statute-18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2)-provides
the equivalent authority. It provides in pertinent part:
If a person is alienating or disposing of property, or
intends to alienate or dispose of property, obtained as a
result of a banking law violation (as defined in section
3322(d) of this title)445 . . . or property which is traceable
to such violation, the Attorney General may commence a
civil action in any Federal court-
(A) to enjoin such alienation or disposition of
property; or
(B) for a restraining order to-
(i) prohibit any person from withdrawing,
transferring, removing, dissipating, or disposing
of any such property or property of equivalent
value; and
(ii) appoint a temporary receiver to administer
such restraining order.446
443. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1)(B) (2006) (discussing incorporated criminal
forfeiture procedures of 21 U.S.C. § 853); id. § 5317(c)(2) (discussing
incorporating civil forfeiture procedures governing forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(A)).
444. See, e.g., United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806-10 (E.D.
Va. 2005) (summarizing case law).
445. The term "banking law violation," as that term is used in, 18 U.S.C. §
3322 includes a "violation of, or a conspiracy to violate . . . any provision of
subchapter II of chapter 53 of Title 31, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. §
3322(d)(1) (2006). In other words, it includes the offense of structuring in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
446. 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2).
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What is extraordinary about this provision is the clause
that appears in § 1345(a)(2)(B): "or property of equivalent
value." That phrase authorizes the government to do what it
cannot do in the forfeiture context outside the Fourth
Circuit-restrain "equivalent value" assets (i.e., "substitute
assets").
Despite this extraordinarily broad grant of authority, the
government has seldom used § 1345(a)(2) outside the health
care fraud context. Outside the health care fraud cases, the
leading case under § 1345 involved an action under §
1345(a)(1) to restrain the proceeds of a consumer fraud
scheme. 447 That provision also authorizes injunctions against
banking law violations and may even authorize the pretrial
restraint of assets, but it does not include the all-powerful
"equivalent value" restraining authority.
B. Civil Penalty Enforcement
Subsection 5322(a)(4) authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to impose a civil money penalty on any person who
violates any provision of § 5324. Civil penalty referrals for
structuring violations are rare. The government usually
reaches for the civil forfeiture tool before it reaches for the
civil sanctions tool. One advantage of civil forfeiture is that
the government prosecutors can more freely share grand jury
information with civil forfeiture prosecutors than they can
with Treasury or Justice Department authorities pursuing
civil enforcement remedies.448 A second advantage is that the
government can seize and restrain property involved in a
structuring offense ex parte under civil forfeiture laws while
it must proceed to an early adversarial hearing under the
fraud injunction statute. 449 As of this writing, there is no
447. See United States v. Payment Processing Ctr., LLC, 435 F. Supp. 2d 462
(E.D. Pa. 2006).
448. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (2006) (authorizing a federal prosecutor to
share grand jury materials for use in civil forfeiture actions), with INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL § 9.5.5.3.5 (requiring civil penalty referrals to be "sanitized"
of grand jury information).
449. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) (2006) (authorizing civil seizures issued in
the same manner as search warrants under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41), with §
1345(a)(2) (authorizing FED. R. Civ. P. 65 injunctions if a person alienates or
disposes of property obtained as a result of a "banking law" violation), and
United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
term "restraining order" in § 1345(a)(2)(B) refers to any injunctive relief,
including preliminary injunction, and was not limited to temporary restraining
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reported judicial decision in which the government sought a
civil enforcement penalty under § 5322(a)(4).
IX. CONCLUSION
A central premise of the BSA is that law enforcement
agencies review documents such as CTRs to detect criminal
activity. That may have been true forty years ago when the
volume of CTR filings was comparatively low and large
currency transactions stood apart from other financial
transactions. Today, the volume of reports filed by financial
institutions, especially CTRs, is simply too great, and large
cash transactions too common, for this rationale alone to
support the entire artifice of the BSA. If the BSA is to remain
viable in the face of increasingly vocal criticism from the
banking community and others, Congress needs to embrace a
new rationale. The BSA acts as a barrier that criminals
seeking to move illegitimate funds must confront and avoid; it
forces criminals to act in ways that increase their risk of
detection.
Structuring is the principal method of evading the BSA.
The anti-structuring statute emerged in the mid-1980s to
plug a hole in the BSA's reporting and recordkeeping
requirements. Today, the structuring offenses exist as a sort
of trap set for money launderers, tax evaders, and others
engaged in criminal activity. Those bent on avoiding the
paper trail that the BSA's requirements create will be
tempted to resort to increasingly high-risk behavior such as
structuring and bulk cash smuggling. From a law
enforcement perspective, this is desirable; such high-risk
behavior makes it easier to separate out financial crime from
an otherwise large volume of ordinary financial transactions.
The government's renewed emphasis on crimes such as
structuring invites a reexamination of the structuring statute
and its criminal, civil forfeiture, and civil enforcement
mechanisms. This article has undertaken that examination
in terms that emphasize the current legal issues facing
prosecutors and defense lawyers. Structuring is a regulatory
crime. Like other regulatory crimes, structuring has the
potential to ensnare innocent or morally blameless conduct.
When Congress overruled Ratzlaf and relaxed the mens rea
order).
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elements of the structuring offense, it increased the danger
that the structuring statute could be misused. Moreover, the
existing sentencing law places the statute in some peril of
public and judicial disfavor because advisory guideline
sentences for many structuring cases are far too punitive.
Likewise, courts may have to mitigate certain forfeitures
premised on structuring violations under the Excessive Fines
Clause lest the government extract too much punishment.
Importantly, if the rationale for the BSA shifts from one
that places emphasis on detection to one that places emphasis
on deterrence, then the rationale for punishing crimes such as
structuring also shifts. Today, we punish crimes such as
structuring not so much because structuring deprives the
government of BSA reports and records, although that
remains a consideration, but rather because structuring is a
good indicator of other criminal behavior. Our experience is
that those who risk detection by engaging in crimes such as
structuring are also often engaged in hard-to-prove crimes
such as money laundering and tax evasion. In that case,
sentencing and asset forfeiture in structuring cases need to be
tied closely to whether the structurer had an underlying bad
purpose or motive for engaging in structuring behavior. The
government may not be able to prove the underlying criminal
activity beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, but it may be able
to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.
Thus, the issue of motive should be a key inquiry at
sentencing in structuring prosecutions.
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APPENDIX
31 U.S.C. § 5324. Structuring transactions to evade
reporting requirement prohibited.
(a) Domestic Coin and Currency Transactions
Involving Financial Institutions.-No person shall, for
the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section
5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such
section, the reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed
by any order issued under section 5326, or the recordkeeping
requirements imposed by any regulation prescribed under
section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 123
of Public Law 91-508-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial
institution to fail to file a report required under
section 5313 (a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed
under any such section, to file a report or to
maintain a record required by an order issued under
section 5326, or to maintain a record required
pursuant to any regulation prescribed under section
21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section
123 of Public Law 91-508;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial
institution to file a report required under section
5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under
any such section, to file a report or to maintain a
record required by any order issued under section
5326, or to maintain a record required pursuant to
any regulation prescribed under section 5326, or to
maintain a record required pursuant to any
regulation prescribed under section 21 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law
91-508, that contains a material omission or
misstatement of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction
with one or more domestic financial institutions.
(b) Domestic Coin and Currency Transactions
Involving Nonfinancial Trades or Businesses.-No
[Vol:50
2010] REDEFINING THE BANK SECRECYACT
person shall, for the purpose of evading the report
requirements of section 5331 or any regulation prescribed
under such section-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a nonfinancial trade or
business to fail to file a report required under section
5331 or any regulation prescribed under such
section;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a nonfinancial trade or
business to file a report required under section 5331
or any regulation prescribed under such section that
contains a material omission or misstatement of fact;
or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction
with 1 or more nonfinancial trades or businesses.
(c) International Monetary Instrument
Transactions.-No person shall, for the purpose of evading
the reporting requirements of section 5316-
(1) fail to file a report required by section 5316, or
cause or attempt to cause a person to fail to file such
a report;
(2) file or cause or attempt to cause a person to file a
report required under section 5316 that contains a
material omission or misstatement of fact; or (3)
structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any importation or
exportation of monetary instruments.
(d) Criminal Penalty.-
(1) In general.- Whoever violates this section shall
be fined in accordance with title 18, United States
Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
(2) Enhanced penalty for aggravated cases.-
Whoever violates this section while violating another
law of the United States or as part of a pattern of
any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in
a 12-month period shall be fined twice the amount
provided in subsection (b)(3) or (c)(3) (as the case
may be) of section 3571 of title 18, United States
Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or
both.
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